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Abstract 
This thesis uses critical discursive psychology to analyse anti-Semitic and Islamophobic 
discourse on the Facebook pages of two far-right organisations: Britain First and the 
English Defence League. Using the Charlie Hebdo attack as a time frame, I examine how 
the far-right manage their identity and maintain rationality online, as well as how users on 
Facebook respond to the far-right. This thesis demonstrates how Britain First and the 
English Defence League present themselves as ‘reasonable’ in their anti-Semitic and anti-
Islamic stance following the Charlie Hebdo shooting. Ultimately, I bring together the study 
of fascist discourse and political discourse on social media using critical discursive 
psychology, in a novel synthesis. 
The Charlie Hebdo shooting and the shooting at the kosher supermarket in Paris in January 
2015 (as well as other attacks by members of the Islamic State) have led to Muslims being 
seen as a threat to Britain, and thus Muslims have been exposed to Islamophobic attacks 
and racial abuse. The current climate is a challenging situation for the far-right, as they are 
presented with the dilemma of appearing as rational and even mainstream, whilst 
nevertheless adopting an anti-Islamic stance.  
The analysis focuses on how Britain First and the English Defence League used the 
shooting at the Kosher supermarket to align with Jews in order to construct them as under 
threat from Islam, and promote its anti-Islamic stance. I also analyse visual communication 
used by Britain First to provide ‘evidence’ that Britain First supported Jewish 
communities. Discourse from Facebook users transitioned from supportive towards Jews, 
to questioning the benefits that Jews brought to Britain, and expressing Holocaust denial. 
Furthermore, I discuss how other far-right politicians in Europe such as Geert Wilders 
from the Dutch Party for Freedom, portrayed himself as a reasonable politician in the anti-
Islamic stance he has taken in the wake of the Charlie Hebdo attack.  
Findings are discussed in light of how the far-right communicate about the Charlie Hebdo 
shooting whilst maintaining a reasonable stance when projecting anti-Semitic and 
Islamophobic ideology, and how such discourse can encompass hate speech. I demonstrate 
how critical discursive psychology can be used to show how various conflicting social 
identities are constructed and interact with each other online. This thesis shows how the 
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far-right use aligning with Jews as means to present Muslims as problematic, and how 
such alignment has resulted in the marginalisation of both Jews and Muslims. 
Keywords: Facebook, Far-right, Critical Discursive Psychology, anti-Semitism, 
Islamophobia 
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1. Introduction  
 
“If the future remains uncertain, we know the past history of nationalism. 
And that should be sufficient to encourage a habit of watchful suspicion.” 
― Michael Billig, Banal Nationalism, pp. 177 
 
This thesis examines how two far-right groups, Britain First and the English Defence 
League, communicate on the social networking website Facebook, how they construct 
their identities in an online environment, and manage accusations of racism and 
Islamophobia in the aftermath of the Charlie Hebdo attack. While increasing in popularity 
on social media, the far-right in the UK are nevertheless widely criticised for being racist 
and Islamophobic. Social networking websites have become a significant way for far-right 
parties to reach and communicate to a wider audience. Using the theoretical framework of 
critical discursive psychology, I investigate how Britain First and the English Defence 
League responded to the Charlie Hebdo attack. The purpose of this research is to critically 
analyse how the far-right portray anti-Semitic and Islamophobic ideologies on Facebook 
Pages, particularly how they manage opposition to Islam in the wake of a terrorist attack. 
While previous research has addressed how far-right parties use strategies to appear as 
reasonable and non-racist, this has not been examined during a crucial period, such as the 
aftermath of a terrorist attack.  
1.1 January 2015 Paris attacks: “Three Days of Terror” 
On 7th January 2015, two gunmen, brothers Saïd and Chérif Kouachi, shot ten people in the 
headquarters of the French satirical newspaper Charlie Hebdo in Paris. During their 
getaway, the gunmen shot a police officer, and shot another police officer the following 
day on the street. The attack was allegedly motivated by Charlie Hebdo’s controversial 
caricature drawings of Muhammed in 2011 and 2012, which appeared to be mocking Islam 
(Watt, 2015). The gunmen were identified as belonging to an Al-Qaeda branch; Al-Qaeda 
in the Arabian Peninsula. Two days after the attack, a Kosher supermarket in Paris was 
subjected to an attack by Amedy Coulibaly, a close friend of the Kouachi brothers and a 
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member of ISIS. Four people were killed in the siege, all of them Jewish (Saul, 2015). The 
motive behind the attack was to defend Muslims, particularly Palestinians, and to demand 
that the Kouachi brothers be freed (they were simultaneously being held hostage by police 
at a print house). In the aftermath of the “Three days of terror”1, millions of people 
expressed their solidarity with France over the attacks, and the slogan ‘Je Suis Charlie’ 
became an international symbol of solidarity and support (Mondon and Winter, 2017).  
Other incidents in the UK such as the July 2005 London bombings and the killing of the 
British soldier Lee Rigby in May 2013 (Wright, Morris and Legge, 2013), have facilitated 
the construction in the (mass and social) media of a global ‘war on terror’, in which Arabs 
and Muslims are positioned as being a threat to Britain (Foner and Alba 2008; Wood and 
Finlay 2008). More recent attacks by members of the self-styled Islamic State (IS), such as 
those in Paris in November 2015 and subsequent attacks elsewhere in Europe such as the 
IS attacks at an airport in Belgium2, continue to provide resources for the construction of 
Muslims as a (global) threat.   
These terrorist attacks have fuelled even greater support for the far-right and led to 
‘Islamophobia’ becoming a prominent issue in contemporary British society. There have 
been Islamophobic attacks in the United Kingdom, particularly on public transport and 
towards women who are more visible as Muslims, through wearing the hijab and the 
burqa, an example being the anti-Islamic verbal abuse towards a pregnant Muslim female 
that was caught on CCTV on a London bus (Troup Buchanan, 2015). The Charlie Hebdo 
attack and these subsequent terrorist attacks have encouraged far-right parties and 
organisations to focus on Muslims as a ‘problem’ in Britain, a problem described as the 
‘Islamification’ of Britain (Richardson, 2011; Richardson and Wodak 2009a). The 
challenge for far-right parties and organisations in the UK has been to promote their 
fiercely anti-Islamic stance whilst appealing to the mainstream in British politics. These 
types of dilemmas for the far-right are not new, as will be discussed in more detail in 
chapters two and three. 
                                                          
1 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-30708237 
2 http://www.latimes.com/world/europe/la-fg-brussels-airport-explosion-20160322-story.html 
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1.2 Structure of the thesis  
Chapter Two outlines the background to this thesis beginning with the history of the far-
right in Britain. I provide an overview of far-right parties in Britain, past and present: the 
British Union of Fascists, the National Front, the British National Party, the English 
Defence League, and Britain First. The far-right has had some political success, for 
example the British National Party’s success in local elections in 2004, but nonetheless 
remain marginalised in politics. The far-right historically have had to manage the dilemma 
of reaching out to the mainstream whilst maintaining their nativist values.  
In Chapter Three, I will provide an overview of discursive psychology including the 
origins of this approach and how this approach developed from a critique of commonly 
used approaches in social psychology such as surveys. This will lead me to introduce my 
chosen analytical approach, critical discursive psychology. This has distinctions from 
discursive psychology, such as a critique of relativism as it is understood in discursive 
psychology. Following on from this, I discuss discursive research on racism and prejudice, 
and how these approaches addressed the ‘weaknesses’ of previous social psychological 
research on racism and prejudice. For example, the consideration that racist discourse can 
be flexible and the same individual can produce conflicting accounts (e.g. Potter and 
Wetherell, 1987). Discursive methods can be used to analyse both subtle forms of 
‘modern’ racism, and more extreme language. In this chapter, I also cover the far-right’s 
link to anti-Semitism, including features of anti-Semitic discourse such as conspiracy 
theories and Holocaust denial. I discuss the strategies used by far-right parties in the UK to 
distance itself from the anti-Semitic label, whilst still implicitly projecting anti-Semitic 
ideologies. I also discuss Islamophobia and the comparison to anti-Semitism during the 1st 
and 2nd World War, and how Islamophobia is somewhat seen as ‘replacing’ anti-Semitism.  
In today’s socio-political climate, the significant issue related to prejudice is Islamophobia 
in many Western societies, particularly in the immediate aftermath of terrorist attacks 
mentioned earlier.  
Chapter Four discusses computer-mediated communication, how the study of computer 
discourse developed, and what research has been conducted on Facebook so far. I conclude 
the chapter with the rationale for the research and the research aims. My work aims to 
build upon the historical dilemma of the strategies used by the far-right to remain rational 
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in dispersing their extreme ideologies, but also to examine this dilemma in the aftermath of 
a terrorist attack.  
In Chapter Five, the method and data collection chapter covers the ontological positioning 
of my analytical framework. Critical discursive psychology is appropriate to studying 
political discourse due to the application of findings to wider social and historical contexts. 
I apply the principles of critical discursive psychology to the analysis of images and 
videos. I will consider other qualitative approaches such as Conversation Analysis and 
Critical Discourse Analysis, and outline why critical discursive psychology is better suited 
to my research aims of strategies used to maintain rationality whilst marginalising groups. 
I will discuss the possibility that people will be less ‘guarded’ or cautious with their talk 
online, with a particular interest in whether the far-right would remain guarded in the same 
way that they do offline. I cover the procedure I have used for data capture, including the 
software that was used to collect data from three Facebook pages of far-right 
organisations: the British National Party (which was not presented in analytical chapters 
due to a notable drop in Facebook activity), the English Defence League, and Britain First. 
I address issues such as the problematic nature of collecting data from Facebook, one 
principal problem being that pages are frequently being updated with material being added 
and removed, so that complete representation is difficult to portray. I will end with an 
overview of the ethical considerations of this research and the steps taken to anonymise 
participants. 
In this thesis, there are four analytical chapters that examine strategies used in the 
aftermath of the Charlie Hebdo attack to achieve anti-Islamic rhetoric. The first analytical 
chapter, Chapter Six, is an examination of Britain First’s ‘solidarity patrol’. Britain First 
patrolled on 31st January 2015, in Golders Green, an area of North London with a high 
Jewish population, to show support for the Jewish community following the ISIS attack at 
a Kosher supermarket in Paris. The analysis will focus on how Britain First projected a 
supportive message towards Jews, whilst the underlying message displays anti-Islamic 
rhetoric; my analysis draws upon the notion of ‘exoteric’ and ‘esoteric’ messages (Billig, 
1982; see also ‘surface’ and ‘depth’ ideology, Billig, 1978). The chapter will encompass 
how political correctness was drawn upon as explanations for why authorities are not 
taking action against Islamic extremists. I will conclude the chapter with an analysis of the 
visual images used by Britain First in the video clip of the solidarity patrol, to both provide 
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‘evidence’ that they support Jewish communities and send coded messages to their 
supporters.  
Chapter Seven is the second analytical chapter, where I examine the Facebook comments 
in response to Britain First’s solidarity patrol. I found that initial comments were showing 
support for and gratitude towards Britain First. There was also support from individuals 
who self-identified as being Jewish. However, comments progressively became anti-
Semitic (e.g. by posing, rhetorically, the question, of what benefits Jews have brought to 
Britain). Individuals on Facebook used similar strategies used by Britain First, in terms of 
separating being Jewish and being British, and supporting Jews as means to display anti-
Islamic discourse. Results are discussed in terms of how Britain First has managed to 
achieve anti-Islamic rhetoric whilst maintaining support from Facebook users. 
Next, in Chapter Eight, I discuss a video posted by Britain First, of the Dutch politician 
and leader of the Party for Freedom, Geert Wilders, being interviewed by Jon Snow on 
Channel 4 news. Wilders was interviewed following a blog that he posted claiming that the 
Charlie Hebdo attackers were inspired by Islam. In this interview, Snow attempted to 
undermine Wilders’ position by claiming that his arguments are bringing about “a civil 
war”, as well as having parallels with the Nazi party. Wilders rejected Snow’s claims and 
maintained that he wants peace, but in order to achieve this there must be no Islamic 
presence in the Netherlands. Wilders maintained that his opposition is to Islam, and that he 
is not opposed to Muslims. The distinction of Islam as an extremist ideology and a Muslim 
as a person not necessarily affiliated with its extremist aspect is an important strategy used 
by politicians such as Wilders to enable them to disguise their anti-Islamic ideology to be 
able to appear as rational (Verkuyten, 2013). This enables Wilders to portray being in 
opposition to a belief system and not to a group of people. 
My final analytical chapter, Chapter Nine, analyses a Facebook discussion in response to 
an English Defence League post that was posted the day after Holocaust Memorial Day 
(20 days after the Charlie Hebdo shooting). The English Defence League promoted a video 
of Auschwitz, saying that we “should never forget”. The discussion by Facebook users was 
related to the idea of ‘reopening’ concentration camps, in which to incarcerate Muslims. 
This chapter will show that the idea of “never forget” has been perverted by Facebook 
users into an extreme notion, yet has been constructed with the orientation to notions of 
logic and reasonability. Within this discussion instances of Holocaust Denial were 
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identified, which contain strategies such as devictimizing Jews in order to undermine Jews 
and downgrade the effects of the Holocaust. 
In the final chapter, Chapter Ten, I will discuss the findings in relation to the research aims 
and the existing literature on far-right discourse. I summarise how Britain First and the 
English Defence League have used strategies such as aligning with Jews, and 
distinguishing between opposing Islam generally as a religion, and Muslims as individuals 
in order to present themselves as acceptable, legitimate organisations and thereby 
mainstream despite their anti-Islamic stance. This reflects former parties such as the 
National Front who managed a similar dilemma regarding the partial concealment of their 
anti-Semitic ideologies. However, one novel aspect of this thesis is that it will examine this 
dilemma not only on social media, but also in the immediate aftermath of a terrorist attack, 
when Islamophobia is more prominent in society. I will discuss the contribution that the 
thesis has made in terms of the application of CDP to the construction and interaction of 
various conflicting social identities on social media. I also address the strengths and 
limitations of using such a dynamic platform for data collection, and possibilities for future 
research that this thesis has opened. Ultimately, this research has generated further 
questions. For example, when such discourse crosses the boundary at being illegal hate 
speech and the potential implications of this, and the function of extreme discourse in 
today’s rising use of social media.   
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2. Literature Review 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter begins with an introduction to the far-right parties in the UK, starting with the 
early far-right parties the British Union of Fascists and the National Front. I will discuss 
the dilemma that they had of appealing to the mainstream whilst keeping their underlying 
anti-Semitic ideologies. This will lead on to discuss the British National Party, how they 
formed and how its communication to audiences has progressed onto social media and the 
use of websites. The British National Party has a similar dilemma to the National Front 
that it needs to manage accusations of racism due to its anti-immigration stance. Finally, I 
will discuss two far-right organisations that are at the centre of this thesis, the English 
Defence League, and Britain First. These parties have the similar dilemma of maintaining 
their anti-Islamic values whilst appealing to the mainstream in this current climate.  
2.2: The Far-Right in the UK  
2. 2. 1 History of the far-right  
Researchers have defined far-right parties as parties that distinguish themselves from 
mainstream political parties, have nativist values and are opposed to immigration 
(Hainsworth, 2000). Researchers such as Harris (1990: 73) argued that opposition to 
immigration progressed from anti-Semitism with immigrants replacing Jews as scapegoats 
for the perceived grievances and injustices of the ‘native’ populations: “The immigrant is a 
more visible, convenient, and effective target, and the immigration issue produces a more 
substantial opportunity for mobilisation”.   
Ignazi (1997: 301) suggested that some of the principles of far-right parties are similar to 
mainstream right-wing parties, for example concerning issues related to immigration, but it 
is how the issues are dealt with by parties where they differ. The far-right promote more 
extreme immigration policies when it comes to proposing rights and entitlements for 
immigrants that appear as ‘racist’ in comparison to a right-wing party’s ‘tough’ stance on 
immigration i.e. mainstream parties would propose tougher immigration control, whilst 
far-right parties would aim to send immigrants back to countries of origin. Mudde (2010) 
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describes three features of populist radical right parties; 1) authoritarianism, the belief in a 
strict society, whereby violations are severely punished; 2) populism, the notion that 
society is separated into two groups: homogenous, ‘pure’ people, and the antagonistic, 
corrupt people; 3) nativism, the idea that places should only be inhabited by members of 
an indigenous group.   
During the 1930’s, the far-right in the UK were largely unsuccessful. The British Union of 
Fascists had little influence in local elections and no impact upon the 1935 general 
election, eventually being banned from government in 1940 (Eatwell, 2000). The National 
Front was formed in 1967 as a result of the union of several fascist organisations such as 
the British National Party and the Greater Britain Movement. The National Front gained 
more following in local elections rather than in general elections (Billig 1978; Eatwell, 
2000). Their main policy was to return all immigrants who were not white to their home 
countries (Särlvik and Crewe, 1983). The far-right’s lack of success continued during the 
leadership of Margaret Thatcher (1979-1990). Researchers suggested that this was due to 
Thatcher’s harsh policies on immigration, which took some support away from the far-
right (Taylor, 1993). Far-right parties generally portray immigrants and ethnic minorities 
to be of a threat (Richardson and Columbo, 2014). Researchers as well as political parties 
such as the Labour Party have argued that the increase in popularity for far-right parties 
has been due to perceived concern over issues such as asylum seeking and immigration, in 
the sense that asylum seekers and immigrants are blamed for economic difficulties (Bull 
and Simon-Vandenbergen, 2014; Schuster and Solomos, 2004). 
The white-nationalist party, the British National Party (BNP), emerged from the National 
Front, which gained popularity in the 1970’s through its anti-Asian immigration policies 
(Särlvick and Crewe, 1983). The BNP formed in 1982 as a merge between the British 
Movement and the New National Front, (following from John Tyndall’s departure as 
leader of the National Front in 1980, Engström, 2014). When the BNP first formed, the 
party was renowned for being an extremist political party promoting racial violence and 
Nazi ideology, until the leadership of Nick Griffin began in 1999 (Atton, 2006; Wood and 
Finlay, 2008). Tyndall’s former position as an overt Nazi provided a possible explanation 
for his removal as leader of the BNP, as nationalists felt that the party were unable to 
appeal to mainstream voters (Eatwell, 2000). Tyndall had openly been a Nazi, a common 
explanation for why opponents subsequently labelled the BNP as a Nazi party. The BNP 
refute any continuity with the fascist policies of their former incarnation the National 
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Front, a strategy (i.e. refuting links with its past identity and policies) used by other far-
right parties in Europe such as the French National Front (Wodak and Richardson, 2013).   
Support for far-right parties in the UK increased in the early 2000s, as did their electoral 
success, particularly the British National Party (BNP). The BNP achieved electoral success 
in local areas of the UK (Rhodes, 2009) and thereby generated wider UK recognition and 
attention (Bull and Simon-Vandenbergen, 2014). In the June 2004 elections (local 
councils, the London mayor and the London Assembly, and members of the European 
parliament), the BNP failed to win any seats in European Parliament, but had success in 
local elections, where it gained a further four seats in addition to the thirteen that the party 
gained in 2003 (Renton, 2005). Renton provided three explanations for the BNP’s lack of 
success in EU parliamentary elections: the increase in Conservative voters, more publicity 
being given to the UK Independence Party, and the intervention of anti-fascism 
organisations. However, the BNP gained some respectability through its success in local 
areas such as Dagenham and Stoke-on-Trent, and becoming involved in local communities 
by electing local citizens as candidates (Rhodes, 2009). The BNP gained success in the 
European Parliament in 2008 but lost their seats in 2014 (Bull and Simon-Vandenbergen, 
2014). In the 2012 and 2013 local elections, the BNP won no seats and again failed to win 
any seats in the 2010 General Election, though it was successful locally in Burnley Council 
(Eatwell, 2003).  
Despite its increase in popularity since the 2004 local elections, the BNP have been a 
marginalised party in politics, viewed negatively by the electorate and criticized for their 
anti-immigration and anti-Islamic ideologies. For example, the 2004 BBC documentary 
‘Secret Agent’ showed hidden camera footage of Nick Griffin and several other BNP 
candidates condemning Islam and advocating violence towards Muslims (Rhodes, 2009). 
Griffin has also been prosecuted for incitement to racial hatred, when he expressed 
Holocaust denial (Richardson, 2011).  
The far-right movement the English Defence league (EDL) are a street protest movement 
formed by Stephen Yaxley-Lennon (aka Tommy Robinson) in 2009. The EDL originated 
from “United People of Luton”, an organisation set up in response to a demonstration by a 
local radical Islamist movement opposing the British army returning from Afghanistan and 
Iraq (Bartlett and Littler, 2013; Goodwin, Cutts and Jantin-Lapinski, 2014). Robinson left 
the EDL in October 2013, attributing his departure to the EDL being dominated by far-
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right extremism. The EDL is linked to organised football hooligan groups with some 
members from football groups supporting the EDL (Brindle, 2016). Poll research from 
Bartlett and Littler (2013) found that 28% of EDL supporters are over the age of 30, and 
30% were educated to college or university level, which contrasts with the stereotype that 
far-right supporters are young and uneducated. Goodwin et al. (2014) found similar 
results, concluding that far-right supporters tended to be more concerned about the 
economy than Islam, despite the EDL protesting primarily against Islamic extremism.  
The EDL claims to differ from political parties such as the BNP insofar as it is multi-
ethnic, and has 134 divisions consisting of both local and diverse groups. Local divisions 
are for areas across the UK, while diverse groups include a Sikh division, a Jewish 
division, and a Lesbian Gay Bisexual Transgender division (Allen, 2011; Oaten, 2014; 
Treadwell and Garland, 2011). As of 2016, the EDL has a Traveller division3. The EDL is 
supportive towards Jews, in contrast to the BNP, which has proposed that there is a Jewish 
conspiracy (see Chapter 3.6 for further discussion on conspiracy theories, see also Copsey 
2008; Richardson, 2013a). As there is no formal membership structure or ‘joining’ process 
for the EDL, it is difficult to establish exactly how many ‘members’ or supporters there are 
(Kassimeris and Jackson, 2015). However, based on survey research, Bartlett and Littler 
(2013) established an approximate membership figure of around 25,000-35,000 members.  
Britain First is the newest far-right political party founded in 2011, it is committed to 
maintaining Christianity in UK society and openly opposing Islam (as well as other 
political doctrines such as Marxism, Fascism and ‘political correctness’). Britain First 
describes itself on its Facebook Page as: “a patriotic political party. Here you can join 
forces with patriots like you!”4 Britain First has had several controversies in the media, and 
has been restrained legally through such measures as an attempted injunction to ban 
members of the party from entering Luton in February 20165. Another controversy that 
Britain First is renowned for is ‘Christian Patrols’, during which members break into 
mosques, cause vandalism, and entered restaurants that sell Halal food to harass the 
owners for doing so (Withnall, 2015). Britain First gained further negative press in May 
2016 when Paul Golding turned his back on Sadiq Kahn when he was elected London’s 
                                                          
3 http://www.englishdefenceleague.org.uk/join-us/ 
4 https://www.facebook.com/britainfirstgb?fref=ts 
5 https://www.britainfirst.org/off-to-the-high-court-again-a-message-from-britain-first-leader-paul-golding/ 
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first Muslim mayor6. Golding ran for London mayor alongside Kahn in the same election, 
coming in eighth place with 1.21% of the vote.7 Being of rather recent origin, there is 
currently little research into Britain First’s methods and policies. 
Far right extremism elsewhere in Europe has increased, judged by voting patterns 
(Richardson and Columbo, 2014). In the 2004 European parliamentary elections, the 
French National Front gained 10 percent of the vote, as well as an increase in votes in local 
elections during the same year (Atton, 2006). The French National Front have distanced 
themselves from the extreme far-right xenophobic image, with Marine Le Penn suspending 
her father Jean-Marie Le Penn from the party after his conduct seemed to overstep 
boundaries such as his belittling the Holocaust (BBC News, 2015). The popularity of the 
French National Front has increased steadily since Marine Le Penn became leader. The 
Dutch Party for Freedom was successful in the 2010 national elections, becoming the third 
largest party. Despite achieving less electoral successes, coming fourth in the 2014 
European elections in the Netherlands, the party remains prominent in Dutch politics 
(Korteweg, 2013; Waterfield, 2014). 
2. 2. 2 Far-right Communication 
Historically, the dilemma of the far-right has been to uphold nativist nationalist values 
whilst simultaneously reaching out to the mass electorate in order to gain mainstream 
support. Billig (1978) argued that the far-right resolves this dilemma by partially 
concealing their ideologies to reach a mass audience, and phrasing propaganda for mass 
audiences differently in comparison to a party that would wish to have narrow support. 
Billig proposed that far-right parties such as the National Front which historically had 
underlying anti-Semitic ideologies, disguised their extremist views and rejected the fascist 
label, for example when talking about the party’s origins, in an attempt to avoid drawing 
attention to any fascist or Nazi connections. The National Front adopted an “anti-Zionist 
stance” (Billig 1978:166) rather than an ‘anti-Jewish’ stance, which allowed it to maintain 
opposition to Jews without coming under attack for being anti-Semitic. This is similar to 
                                                          
6 http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/may/07/the-politics-of-fear-and-division-isnt-dead-quite-yet-in-
sadiq-khans-london 
7 http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/05/06/london-mayoral-election-results-what-time-will-the-votes-be-
coun/ 
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how far-right parties today maintain opposition to Islamic extremists only, and not 
Muslims (discussed in more detail in the following chapter, section 3.6).  
Research using parliamentary data has shown how the BNP used strategies to mask their 
underlying racist ideologies and portray themselves as a respectable political party (Atton, 
2006); these strategies included contrasting its own principles with more extremist 
organizations such as the Ku Klux Klan, in order to appear to be more moderate and 
rational and thereby appealing to mainstream audiences (Goodman and Johnson, 2013). 
When Nick Griffin became leader of the BNP, the language used by the BNP became 
more moderate and legitimate in comparison to when John Tyndall was leader, despite the 
party still having underlying prejudicial policies when it came to immigration and asylum 
seekers (Copsey, 2004; Rhodes, 2009). This is in keeping with Billig’s (1982:218) idea 
that political moderates attempt to present themselves as neutral in order to be able to take 
up more extreme positions and frame them as non-extreme: 
” …this is that the image of fairness can be maintained by invoking the frightening image of 
extremism… The moderate then, as the situation demands, can assert the principle to be broken 
and can claim by the assertion a distinctive fairness from those extremes which do not uphold the 
principle at all”. 
The BNP has developed a media network that includes a website, blogs, and DVDs 
(Richardson, 2011). The BNP incorporated the Union Jack flag into their logo, and flags 
are frequently used in its images (Engström, 2014). The BNP’s present logo is a heart with 
the Union Jack Flag, symbolising that ‘Britishness’ is at the heart of its ideology. This 
patriotic logo in turn excludes ‘others’ who are not British (McGlashan, 2013). The BNP 
uses its website frequently to communicate to members (Engström, 2014). Nick Griffin 
states on the official BNP website, (also on the BNP’s official Facebook Page) that: 
“Native British are now treated like second-class citizens in our own country, whilst asylum-
seekers and immigrants are pushed to the front of the queue for housing, jobs and benefits” 
“Towns and cities all over our beautiful country now resemble parts of Africa or Asia. British 
people have become a minority in many areas already, and within a few decades, we will become a 
minority across the country as a whole8”.  
                                                          
8  http://www.bnp.org.uk/introduction. 
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The EDL are another far-right movement which attracts attention and causes controversy 
by virtue of its demonstrations across cities in the UK, including London, Leeds, 
Birmingham and Bradford (Baker, Gabrielatos and McEnery, 2013). These demonstrations 
draw in large numbers and while the demonstrations are organised with permissions from 
local authorities etc. (Busher, 2013), they are nonetheless renowned for being aggressive 
and violent in nature (Oaten, 2014). Demonstrations often result in counter-demonstrations 
and arrests, particularly due to many of the areas in which demonstrations are held having 
high numbers of Muslims (which researchers argued is a strategy to bait a violent 
retaliation from Muslims, Copsey, 2010), and assaults towards local Asian businesses and 
properties (Kassermeris and Jackson, 2015). Despite the EDL arguing that the purpose of 
demonstrations is to campaign against issues such as Islamic extremism and not oppose all 
Muslims (Treadwell, 2012; Treadwell and Garland, 2011), this distinction can become 
blurred in cases where anti-Islamic chants take place (Garland and Treadwell 2010). 
Events such as the murder of the soldier Lee Rigby and terrorist attacks discussed earlier in 
the first chapter, have fuelled the EDL demonstrations even further and increased the 
numbers of attendees up to thousands (Quinn and Urquhart, 2013). Within 24 hours of 
Rigby’s murder, the number of supporters of the EDL’s official Facebook page had more 
than tripled (Goodwin, 2013). On the EDL’s official website they state that they are “not 
racist, not violent, just no longer silent”. The EDL mission statement (stated on both their 
official website and Facebook page) outlines9: 
1) The English Defence League has risen from the English working class to act, lead and 
inspire in the struggle against global Islamification 
2) The English Defence League stands for human rights 
3)  The English Defence League stands for democracy and the rule of law (including 
opposing sharia law) 
4)  The English Defence League educates the British public about Islam 
5) The English Defence League respects English tradition 
6) The English Defence League is international in outlook (working in solidarity with others 
around the world) 
                                                          
9 http://www.englishdefenceleague.org/mission-statement/.   
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The discussion in this chapter demonstrates that political communication today contains a 
variety of media including newspapers, TV, blogs, and social media, showing that political 
communication is shaped by the media (Krotz, 2014). Researchers in social psychology 
such as Tileagă (2013) have argued that there is a lack of focus of detailed analysis of the 
form and function of political discourse, i.e. how politicians use language to achieve 
strategies, and analysing the form of political communication. Discursive research 
methods are particularly appropriate to the study of politics because language is at the 
centre of politics, as Chilton and Schäffner (1997:206) conclude: 
“Politics cannot be conducted without language, and is it probably the case that the use of language 
in the constitution of social groups leads to what we call “politics” in a broad sense”.  
2.3 Summary 
This chapter has considered the far-right, with a focus on the three current far-right parties 
that will be analysed in this thesis: 1) the British National Party; 2) the English Defence 
League; 3) Britain First. I have discussed how the parties became established in the UK 
and policies that have caused controversy, for example the English Defence League ‘anti-
Islamic’ demonstrations, and Britain First ‘Christian patrols’. Despite controversies 
associated with their reputations for being Islamophobic, far-right parties and groups have 
increased in popularity both in the UK and elsewhere in Europe, projecting far-right 
communication and discourse into the spotlight and making it a vital research issue. 
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3. Discursive Psychology and the far-
right 
3.1 Introduction 
Chapter three will cover the theoretical framework of Discursive Psychology, and how this 
method of analysis has been applied to far-right discourse. I begin with the work that 
influenced this approach; critiques of Chomskian linguistics and Wittgenstein’s work on 
emotion in language. This chapter discusses how discursive psychology developed as an 
alternative approach to the study of ‘attitudes’ as something fixed and internal, and instead 
aims to examine racism and prejudice as something that is attended to in talk. This will 
lead onto critical discursive psychology specifically. Next, I will outline how a discursive 
approach can be applied to the study of prejudice discourse. This section will begin with 
the earlier more traditional approaches to studying prejudice as a cognitive phenomenon, 
which discursive approaches reject. Discursive psychologists regard prejudice as 
something that is attended to in discourse rather than being cognitive, and argue that 
prejudice can manifest in subtle and flexible ways, namely ‘modern’ racism. Discursive 
research can also examine more extreme, hostile forms of discourse. I will then discuss 
these issues specifically applied to the far-right, and how the far-right deal with the key 
issues of this thesis, anti-Semitism and Islamophobia. This includes research that has 
considered parallels between Islamophobia and anti-Semitism.  
3.2 Origins of Discursive Psychology 
Discursive Psychology (henceforth DP) examines how psychological discourse is utilised 
and oriented to by people in conversations, and how people talk about and socially 
construct emotions and reality (Shotter, 1993). Cognition and psychological phenomena 
are resources that are utilised in interaction, rather than being an internal state or an 
indication into peoples’ minds. Therefore, in order to understand how individuals construct 
and orient to psychological attributes such as identity, we should look at how this is 
attended to in talk rather than the experimental study of cognitive processes (Edwards and 
Potter, 1992; Tileagă and Stokoe, 2016). DP focuses on what speakers accomplish in 
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interactions, rather than the cognitive states of individuals. While traditionally Psychology 
took language to be an indication of what is happening in peoples’ minds, DP places 
language at the centre of the focus, thus challenging and unpacking the topics and 
investigative methods used in Psychology (Edwards and Potter, 2001). DP examines how 
people construct psychological phenomena, and how talk or text is socially positioned. As 
Potter and Hepburn (2007:161) argued, the aim is not to read peoples’ minds, but to 
“look(s) for psychology in a completely different place”. Using the example of attitudes 
(discussed in more detail below), rather than being viewed as cognitive, DP is concerned 
with how attitudes are constructed, and what such constructions are being used to do.  
There are three approaches that influenced the development of DP: 1) Chomsky’s work on 
linguistics; 2) Wittgenstein’s theory of emotions; 3) Austin’s speech act theory. One of the 
origins of DP is its critique of the work of Chomsky (1966), who investigated the 
grammatical features of language, and how language is a formal system used to represent 
the world. Language can be understood outside of the context within which it is used; 
indeed, Chomsky was not at all interested in the study of the use of language (which he 
regarded as mere ‘language performance’) and held that only decontextualized and fully 
grammatical sentences (such as “The cat sat on the mat”) were worthy of linguistic 
investigation since such sentences were generated by the grammatical rules that underlay 
linguistic competence. Chomsky postulated that linguistic analysis could be based on 
intuitions, about well-formed sentences, as people know what is grammatically correct and 
what is not. DP on the other hand, argues that everyday interaction is regularly 
ungrammatical, and the focus on the underlying rules of grammar (those generative rules 
that account for well-formedness) alone ignores the significance of  the details of language 
use in larger texts (Edwards, 2005), and of language use in interaction; for example there 
can be no account in Chomsky for the practices or rhetorical devices that speakers use, nor 
of the orderliness – often associated with the orientation to normative forms of language 
use – of the apparent mess of self-repair in talk  (Drew, Walker and Ogden, 2012).  
Another source of the theoretical framework of DP is Wittgenstein’s (1953) analysis of 
emotions, that emotions are not private phenomena that occur in the minds of people, and 
uses the proof that we use words to describe emotions. How people use words is rooted in 
social activities, for example we learn how to use phrases such as “I am happy” by 
observing how others use the term, and learning the conventional relevant behaviours, 
such as smiling or laughing. Wittgenstein argued that language is not private, but a social, 
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public activity, and that meanings of words have public consensus. If people use language 
meaningfully, then there must be public ‘norms’ for how language is used. Thus, language 
cannot be about internal processes alone and must reflect the external environment. In 
order to understand how language is used, analysts should examine what people are doing 
with language when speaking, rather than looking for cognitive structures. DP is also 
grounded in Austin’s (1962) Speech Act Theory, which argued that language is not 
descriptive but performative. People use language to achieve social actions, such as blame, 
justify, and persuade and these ‘speech acts’ could not take place without language. To say 
something is to perform an action. For example, to say the phrase ‘I promise’ constitutes 
an action in that an agreement is being made, or to sentence someone to imprisonment is 
performing an action through saying the sentence itself. 
DP examines how individuals construct their own representation of realities using speech 
(Taylor, 2001), and observes that truth is something that people try to accomplish, rather 
than an objective reality. This is a premise also emphasised by Ethnomethodology and 
Conversation Analysis (Edwards and Potter, 1992).  The focus is on how individuals make 
sense of and organise their experiences, which is why ‘natural’ interaction is favoured as a 
data source (see chapter five, section 5.3 for further discussion). Rather than actions being 
a consequence of cognition, DP analyses the role that actions perform through talk and 
text. DP argues that when people are expressing attitudes, they are positioning themselves 
against an opposing attitude in a particular point of controversy. Therefore, an expression 
can be understood in terms of the view that is being opposed, as Billig (1996: 121) argued: 
“The meaning of discourse used in an argumentative context must be examined in terms of 
the contest between criticism and justification”. 
Traditionally, social psychologists argued that attitudes were behavioural postures rooted 
in childhood, that someone’s attitudes were consistent with one another, and that they were 
resistant to change (Allport, 1935). By contrast, some social cognitive researchers have 
suggested that attitudes vary according to context, mood and beliefs (Wilson and Hodges, 
1992), and that attitudes are assessed based on the time that they are judged and what 
information is accessible at the time (Schwarz and Strack, 1991). Likewise, self-
categorization theory argued that identities are dependent on context (Oakes, Haslam, and 
Turner, 1994).  
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DP criticised the traditional method of measuring prejudicial attitudes using scales, 
because attitudes are not stable and can be affected by the context and environment. DP 
proposed that traditional approaches to the study of attitudes overlook social context 
(Potter and Wetherell, 1988; 1987).  Contrary to traditional social psychological 
approaches, DP does not treat attitudes as stable entities, but variable expressions used 
interactionally and strategically by speakers. Attitudes are dependent on context, and are 
created and re-negotiated during discourse (Billig, 1991; Sherrard, 1997). However, there 
are cognitive researchers such as Wilson and Hodges (1992:37) who argued that attitudes 
can be context dependent: 
“We have been struck by how easy it has been to get people to change their attitudes, in marked 
contrast to how unyielding people are in other kinds of social psychological studies. Our findings 
seem inconsistent with the vast literature on attitude change”. 
Another critique from DP is the traditional definitions of prejudice, such as Allport’s 
(1954:9) definition: “an antipathy based upon a faulty and inflexible generalization”. 
Allport’s definition emphasises the role of cognition in prejudice, according to which 
prejudicial treatment is justified on the grounds of belief.  While traditional social 
psychological approaches such as Tajfel’s (1969) argued that prejudice consists of 
cognitive processes, discursive researchers argue that such approaches are too artificial to 
study humans as social beings (Sherrard, 1997). However, while Allport emphasised 
prejudice to be “a problem of the individual” (Tileagă, 2015:3), Allport did acknowledge 
that society and culture can influence our judgement, and that despite residing in cognition, 
prejudice does have a historical context. 
Research has examined how Social Identity and Self-categorisation theory adds to our 
understanding of political behaviour, such as the qualities that encompass strong 
leadership (Haslam, Reicher and Platow, 2010). Social Identity theory has been adapted by 
Reicher (1982) to account for crowd behaviour, and how a crowd is a social group with a 
perceived sense of common membership categories and group membership in order to 
achieve social power. Self-categorisation theory focuses on the processes through which 
people categorise themselves, with social identities, as group members, as well as 
psychological processes involved in categorisation (Sindic and Condor, 2014). Self-
categorisation theory argues that categorisation is a fluid process, and context dependent in 
a similar argument to DP, but nonetheless internal rather than situated in discourse (Oakes 
and Haslam, 2001). Self-categorisation can be used to provide a foundation for political 
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action, so politicians construct social relations based on collective self-categories (Reicher 
and Hopkins, 2001). Social representations theory argues that categorisations are dynamic 
and constructed according to context, so that a strength of this theory is its exploration of 
the content of representations and cultures (Augoustinos, 2001). However, social 
representations theory has been criticised for failing to examine closely the process of how 
categorisations are constructed (Potter, 1996a).  
Social cognitive researchers have argued that processes such as categorisation are stable 
and internal (Macrae and Bodenhausen, 2000). Discursive psychologists argued the 
contrary, on the grounds that categorization is a social accomplishment rather than a result 
of cognition, and that social cognitive approaches (e.g. Tajfel, 1981) simplified the 
purpose and function of categorization to reduce complexity. Social cognitive approaches 
overlook the content of prejudice discourse, and how that content reflects wider social 
contexts (Augoustinos and Reynolds, 2001). Rhetorical researchers such as Billig (2001) 
argued that in language about race, it is beneficial to analyse the categories that people use 
to depict ethnic groups, and to analyse particularly how categories and breaking taboos 
(the boundaries of conduct associated with categories) can be used for enjoyment between 
people. The focus is on what categories are used for, and studying the practises in which 
they are used. In this research, I will be taking the same stance as discursive psychologists, 
with the aim not to investigate whether someone is ‘really prejudice’, but to analyse 
prejudice in terms of how it is attended to in talk (Speer and Potter, 2000; Tileagă, 2005; 
2015). 
DP argues that language itself should be studied both in use and as part of interaction, 
focusing particularly on the use of language to empower and justify actions (Augoustinos 
and Every, 2007). This is termed the “action orientation” of talk by Edwards and Potter 
(1992:2). This involves looking at what is achieved through talk rather than what this tells 
us about individuals’ attitudes or psychological phenomena. As Edwards and Potter (1992: 
28) stated: 
” …In saying and writing things, people perform social actions. The specific features of these 
actions are a product of constructing talk and text out of a range of styles, linguistic resources and 
rhetorical devices. Part of the interest of analysis is in this constructive process. Since talk and text 
are action orientated, versions are likely to show variability according to the different interactional 
contexts they are constructed to serve”.  
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Potter and Wetherell (1987) used Marsh’s (1976) study that used attitude scales to 
highlight the problematic nature of scales. Marsh used an attitude scale to measure 
attitudes towards ‘coloured immigrants’. The options of responses ran from ‘completely 
sympathetic’, to ‘completely unsympathetic’. Marsh then split the responses into a scale 
containing categories such as ‘very hostile’, ‘neutral’, etc. Firstly, Potter and Wetherell 
highlighted the problematic nature of the term ‘coloured immigrants’, as there was no 
objective definition of this term, and the term could cover two separate groups of people. 
Secondly, there was no coherence between the move from ‘completely sympathetic’, to 
‘very hostile’. Finally, Potter and Wetherell concluded that the attitudes displayed by 
participants at a given moment in time may not be the same attitudes expressed at another 
point in time. Researchers argued that scales do not explain in depth why people hold 
particular attitudes (if they do), and fail to account for the variation that takes place in talk 
about race and prejudice (e.g. Lewis, 2005). Another criticism of surveys is that they are 
more of a self-reported measure rather than something that researchers can observe, 
particularly when it comes to research on prejudice and discrimination (Talakser, Fiske, 
and Chaiken, 2008). Surveys are not measures of ‘actual’ behaviour, as participants are 
merely ticking boxes of hypothetical responses; this is merely reading a report of 
someone’s behaviour rather than observing their behaviour (Baumeister, Vohs and Funder, 
2007). 
Survey research on far-right supporters enable cross-cultural comparisons to be made 
between the attitudes of far-right supporters in different countries, (e.g. Mierina and 
Koroleva, 2015). Surveys can explore the causality of such far-right attitudes, evident for 
example in the links between economic hardship and attitudes towards immigrants (O’ 
Connell, 2005). However, what is missing in this type of research is examining how 
supporters account for and justify their extreme views, and how identities and categories 
are constructed and re-constructed through discourse.  
3.3 Critical Discursive Psychology 
Discursive approaches are commonly deployed by critical psychologists (Gough, 
McFadden and McDonald 2013). As DP has become a well-established approach within 
social psychology (Edwards, 2012), it has led to the development of “sub-species” 
approaches (Billig, 2012: 414). The perspective that is most relevant to this research is 
critical discursive psychology, henceforth CDP (discussed in more detail in the fifth 
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chapter on method), which is an approach to analysis that builds upon the principles of DP, 
but with the addition of principles from Foucauldian discourse analysis, social 
constructionism, and critical realism (Potter, Edwards and Ashmore, 2002). 
CDP researchers have developed a more distinct and complex position in critical 
psychology (e.g. Parker, 2002, see also Wetherell and Edley, 1999), which is critical of 
relativism. Relativism usually encompasses a social constructionist and discursive 
approach to breaking down texts and analysing them as stories about psychological 
phenomena, and critical psychologists ask why psychologists must separate moral and 
political judgments when we tell stories. Critical realism in contrast, links our moral and 
political judgments to our knowledge. Therefore, CDP uses critical realism to address how 
psychological facts are socially constructed in the present-day society, as well as 
considering the historical context behind psychology (Harré, 1983; Parker, 2002). 
CDP has developed a post-structuralist approach, combining close analysis of attention to 
detail in discourse, with culture specific contexts and macro structures (Wetherell, 1998), 
as well as enquiry into the nature of discourse and how it functions in social practices, and 
the contradictory meanings it can produce (Potter and Wetherell, 1987). CDP is influenced 
by Wittgenstein’s argument about the cultural specificity of psychological phenomena. 
However, Parker (2002) argues that Wittgenstein’s argument lacks the concept of power, 
and we need to draw upon historical structures of power to complete Wittgenstein’s 
argument.   
CDP, in contrast to more traditional experimental approaches in psychology, draws upon 
theoretical frameworks outside of Psychology to contextualise discourse (Parker, 2002). 
The aim is to work with other disciplines in addition to social psychology, such as history 
(Wetherell, 2011). This would be an advantage, because, as Condor (1997: 140) argued, 
other disciplines turn to the expertise of psychologists to solve problems that are taking 
place within their own field: 
“…to the extent that historians, social anthropologists, feminists, linguistics or social theorists want 
‘us’ as collaborators, they want ‘us’ as psychologists. For they also look beyond the bounds of their 
disciplines for the solution to their own theoretical stalemates and disciplinary crises of authority”. 
What makes CDP a ‘critical’ approach is the aim to reveal the role of discursive resources 
in the creation of ideology that shapes social and cultural relations (Tileagă 2007). In 
critical discourse studies, “critical” is defined as “making explicit the implicit relationship 
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between discourse, power and ideology, challenging surface meanings, and not taking 
anything for granted” (Unger, Wodak, and KhosraviNik 2016:3). 
3.4 Discursive Research on Prejudice and Racism  
Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswick, Levinson, and Sanford’s (1950) theory of the authoritarian 
personality developed the idea that prejudice was due to certain personality traits such as 
antidemocratic views, which Adorno argued was the result of a harsh upbringing. The 
focus was on the association of prejudice and tolerance with the cognition of the 
individual, rather than the content of fascist ideology (Augoustinos and Tileagă, 2012). 
Adorno’s approach rested on the assumption that anti-Semitism lay in the minds of 
individuals with bigoted views. One of the ways in which this was measured, was through 
the Fascism scale. Criticisms of such approaches are that they oversimplify- and the 
authoritarian personality in particular- overlook the ambiguous strategies used by far-right 
parties to conceal their extreme ideologies (Billig, 1978). Tajfel’s (1981) theory on 
categorization set out to address the theory that prejudice can be a part of the process of 
‘ordinary thinking’, and not just reside in specific, more extreme personality types. Tajfel 
proposed that prejudice can also be a part of inter-group relations, and manifest according 
to which group we do or not ‘belong’ to. The process of favouring one’s own in-group and 
negatively judging out-groups, is another part of the ‘ordinary’ process of stereotyping 
(Billig, 2002).  
Traditionally, cognitive approaches in social psychology defined prejudice as a result of 
cognitive processes such as categorising and stereotyping (Ashmore and DelBoca, 1981). 
Prejudice has emotional determinants, with emotional prejudice more likely to result in 
discrimination than stereotyping (Talasker, Fiske, and Chaiken, 2008). Traditional social 
cognitive approaches such as Fiske and Taylor’s (1991) did not account for the subtle and 
complex nature of phenomena such as racism, and argued that for stereotyping and 
categorisations which are complex phenomena, traditional approaches relied on cognitive 
concepts to oversimplify these ideas (see O’Doherty and Lecouter, 2007 for further 
critique).  Allport (1954) similarly discussed that the function of categorisation was to 
simplify complex cognitive processes due to people having limited abilities of processing 
information, this applies to ethnic categorization (i.e. stereotyping) as well as other types 
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of information processing such as categorising objects. Prejudice is a natural outcome of 
categorical processing. 
Researchers argue that cognitive approaches lack explanation of how prejudicial attitudes 
can vary so quickly according to cultural change (Rapley, 2001). Rather than trying to 
construct definitions of race and prejudice, discursive research focuses on how speakers 
from majority groups use linguistic resources to make sense of such issues and construct 
ideas through interaction. Discursive research methods explore how individuals construct 
talk about controversial issues such as migration, asylum seekers and race, including how 
speakers account for and justify their support for harsh treatment towards minority groups 
(Augoustinos and Every, 2007; Figgou and Condor, 2006). 
DP views racism as a form of interactive communication and a social practice in everyday 
society, situated in language and discourse rather than in the minds of individuals. In social 
psychological literature, there has been a tendency to blur the terms ‘prejudice’ and 
‘racism’. One distinction is that while prejudice is an individual process, racism conveys 
societal norms (Augoustinos and Reynolds, 2001). Rather than creating concrete 
definitions of terms, discursive research investigates how racist views and discriminatory 
actions are produced by speakers and legitimised through discourse (Reisigl and Wodak, 
2001). Discursive psychologists defined features of prejudiced discourse as: “Discourse 
that denies, rationalizes and excuses the dehumanization and marginalization of, and 
discrimination against, minority out-groups” (Every and Augoustinos, 2007:412). Rather 
than being an internal state, prejudice is something that is attended to and constructed 
through discourse (Edwards, 2003).  
One of the early discursive studies on prejudice was conducted by Wetherell and Potter 
(1992), who found variation in accounts of Pākehā (white) peoples’ talk in discussions 
about indigenous Māori and Polynesian populations in New Zealand. Wetherell and Potter 
identified competing and overlapping discourses about culture. Culture was described as a 
‘heritage’, positioning Māori as a protected people, but the notion of Māori people 
behaving badly due to being marginalised from their cultural group was also expressed by 
the same individuals. This study created opportunities to research attitudes as flexible and 
evaluative (Tileagă, 2013), and argued that racism should not be analysed in terms of how 
factual its claims are. However, researchers such as Billig (1995; 1996) argued that 
individuals can be consistent when it comes to the display of political views, because they 
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are seen as advocates of that particular view to the public. Particularly when taking a 
stance on an issue of controversy, speakers feel the need to maintain a consistent stance 
(Condor, Tileagă and Billig, 2013). Another early study on prejudice discourse was 
conducted by van Dijk (1984), who examined discourse from interviews with white Dutch 
majority group members; the topic of minorities living in the Netherlands emerged in the 
interview. van Dijk demonstrated that majority group members work strategically to 
achieve positive self-presentation when talking about minority group members, for 
example, interviewees presenting themselves as rational citizens.  
Discursive research has shown that racist discourse is ambiguous, as well as flexible and 
changeable (Augoustinos and Every, 2007; Wetherell and Potter, 1992). Racism is not 
static, and the same individual can display varying opinions in the same discursive account 
(Reisigl and Wodak, 2001). Talk surrounding race occurs spontaneously in everyday 
discourse, and is related to the specific context in which the talk occurs (Condor, 2006).  
Recent discursive research examined how the terms ‘racism’ and ‘prejudice’ can be used 
interchangeably in discourse, particularly in discourses of denial (Augoustinos and Every, 
2007, see below for further discussion). Goodman and Rowe (2014) identified the use of a 
hierarchy, where racism was the most extreme form of opposition to an out-group, and 
prejudice less severe than racism, and therefore more acceptable. Goodman and Rowe 
showed how in online discussions about gypsies, prejudice was placed into a hierarchy: 
prejudice based on hearsay was unacceptable, but prejudice based on personal experiences 
was acceptable. Therefore, Goodman and Rowe suggested that there is a taboo against 
racism towards Gypsies, but not a taboo against prejudice. 
Discursive psychological approaches focus on the variation that takes place in talk about 
race and prejudice, for example the notion that people attempt to deny that they are 
prejudiced whilst making statements that could be considered prejudicial. This has been 
termed ‘the norm against prejudice’ by Billig (1988:95). Research has shown that the 
reason for this is that openly prejudicial expressions have become taboo, and prejudice is 
associated with irrationality. This is oriented to in several ways in everyday discourse, but 
a prominent strategy is use of disclaimers e.g. “I’m not prejudiced, but…” (Billig, et al. 
1988: 112) see also, “I’m not racist, but…” (van Dijk, 1992; Hewitt and Stokes, 1975).  
Disclaimers are the means by which speakers orient to their understanding that what they 
are about to express could be problematic, and usually signal the expression of racist views 
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(van Dijk, 2000). This norm has been found to be a generalizable discursive strategy in the 
context of asylum and race research (Goodman, 2008a).  
 Research suggests that the norm against prejudice is criticised and constructed as 
problematic by those accused of racism, as Goodman (2010) has shown in asylum debates, 
that making accusations of racism to opponents of asylum has become taboo.  This is 
because researchers now argue that accusations of racism have negative connotations and 
are a form of censorship. Therefore, people manage their position by avoiding making 
accusations of racism so as not to be seen as stifling free speech. Accusations of racism are 
seen as more problematic by recipients of accusations than racism itself, as the person 
making accusations is seen as being racist and intolerant towards majority groups (van 
Dijk, 1992). Therefore, people who make accusations of racism are open to being 
criticised for being unfair. This is due to accusations being too extreme for what van Dijk 
(1992:88) termed “modern” racism. Similar findings have emerged from asylum research, 
with speakers in support of asylum seeking rhetorically distancing themselves from the 
position of someone who makes accusations of racism, as people who accused opponents 
of being racist were open to accusations of “playing the race card”, and suppressing debate 
(Lewis 2005:40).  
Goodman and Burke (2010; 2011) found evidence in focus group discussions supporting 
the norm against prejudice about asylum seekers, as participants argued in a cautious 
manner that opposition to asylum was racist. However, other participants constructed 
accusations of racism towards opponents of asylum as an unreasonable act, and instead 
justified peoples’ opposition to asylum on three non-racist grounds: 1) economic factors; 
2) religious grounds and the association of asylum seekers with terrorism; 3) asylum 
seekers’ lack of integration into British society. Goodman and Burke found the same 
speakers presenting the notion that it is more difficult for people who are white to oppose 
asylum without being accused of being racist, and that it is easier for people from ethnic 
minorities to oppose asylum seekers. This orients to the idea that the norm against 
prejudice victimises people from majority groups (van Dijk, 1992). Similarly, Burke and 
Goodman (2012) identified opponents of immigration on Facebook discussions linking the 
taboo against prejudice with censorship, by arguing that they were being victimized and 
branded as racist and as Nazis for their opposition to immigration.  
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Every and Augoustinos (2007) outlined four strategies used by politicians in the common 
asylum debate about whether opposition to asylum is racist. These strategies were used to 
argue both that opposition to asylum is racist, and to disclaim that opposition to asylum is 
not racist. These strategies were: 1) the use of categorical generalisations; 2) comparing 
differential treatment of asylum seekers to ‘illegal’ immigrants 3); talk surrounding 
national sovereignty; 4) talk about cultural differences. The avoidance of race talk when 
discussing potentially race related issues, is termed discursive deracialisation. This is 
defined by Goodman and Burke (2011: 112) as: “where speakers try to ensure that their 
opposition to out-groups is attributed to reasons other than race”.  
3.4.1. Modern Racism  
van Dijk (1992) has distinguished between ‘old’ racism, and ‘modern’ racism’. Old racism 
is explicit racism by people who are white directed towards people who are not white, 
based on a belief that white people are superior due to biological factors, examples being 
apartheid in South Africa and during slavery. The purpose of old racism is to distinguish 
between different groups in order to show that there is a racial hierarchy (Neocleous, 
1997).  By contrast, modern racism is subtler and deemed more ‘socially acceptable’: 
 
“…The more 'modern', subtle and indirect forms of ethnic or racial inequality, and especially the 
'racism', or rather 'ethnicism' based on constructions of cultural difference and incompatibility, is 
seldom characterized as 'racism', but at most as xenophobia, and more often than not, as legitimate 
cultural self-defence” (van Dijk,1992:93).  
 
van Dijk (2000) argued, however, that modern racism is just as marginalising towards 
minority groups as that of old racism, because group members use rhetorical devices to 
legitimise harsh treatment of and exclusion towards minority members. Discursive 
researchers conclude that the ambiguous and subtle nature of racism means that it has 
become far more difficult to define the term ‘racism’ (Every and Augoustinos, 2007). This 
is shown in experimental social psychology as there are various constructs such as ‘subtle 
prejudice’ (Pettigrew and Meertens, 1995), a more indirect form of prejudice in contrast to 
‘blatant prejudice’, and ‘aversive racism’ (Dovidio and Gaertner, 2000), the notion that 
people regard themselves as not racist but still display discrimination in subtle forms, for 
example in employment decisions (Pearson, Dovidio and Gaertner, 2009).  
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A dominant feature of van Dijk’s notion of modern racism is the denial of racism by 
majority group members, so hostility towards minority groups is attributed to reasons other 
than racism. Modern racism rejects the segregationist principles of traditional racism 
(Augoustinos and Every, 2010; Augoustinos, Tuffin and Rapley, 1999; Walker, 2001), so 
speakers strategically work to deny racism when discussing racial issues, as prejudice is 
viewed as being irrational (Edwards, 2003). van Dijk (1992:88) indicated that the purpose 
of the denial of racism is to maintain “positive self-presentation”, and showed how modern 
racist discourse has features such as denials and disclaimers. This suggests that speakers 
are aware that negative talk about minority groups could be breaking social norms, and so 
promote racism without appearing to have racist tendencies. However, recent research has 
shown how accusations of racism were also managed cautiously or delicately by minority 
group members such as asylum seekers, suggesting the emergence of a new denial strategy 
in racist discourse (Kirkwood, 2012; Kirkwood, McKinlay and McVittie, 2013; see also 
Goodman, Burke, Liebling and Zadasa, 2014).  
The distinction between old and modern racism has been criticized for being too 
simplistic, and for ignoring the idea that racism can have multiple forms (Walker, 2001). 
Augoustinos and Every (2007; see also Rapley, 2001) highlighted that increasing social 
taboos against openly expressing racism has led to the development of discursive strategies 
to present potentially prejudicial arguments as reasonable and not prejudice. These 
strategies included mitigation (i.e. toning down or lessening), justifying harsh treatment, 
and victim blaming (van Dijk, 1992). Such strategies have been found to downplay racist 
treatment, in part through speakers representing themselves as reasonable (Augoustinos, et 
al., 1999).  
Augoustinos and Every (2007) identified five strategies in discourse to deny prejudice:  
1) Outright denial, for example the use of disclaimers (see as discussed above, pp. 
33).  
2) Grounding views as reflecting the external world. This is when arguments are 
based on rationality, and can be used alongside disclaimers. Capdevila and 
Callaghan (2008) demonstrated how the UK conservative party argued that their 
anti-immigration policies were “not racist, but common sense”. 
3) Positive self-presentation and negative other presentation, where speakers present 
themselves as being fair, and ‘the other’ as being unfair.  
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4) Discursive deracialisation, as discussed earlier (pp. 35). 
5) Liberal arguments for illiberal ends. This is when the circular argument is used that 
opposition to groups such as immigrants are to prevent extremists and the far-right 
from gaining control (see Goodman, 2008b). 
Verkuyten (2005) conducted research in the Netherlands, showing how participants made 
the argument that ethnic minorities were too sensitive to racism, a strategy used to 
downplay the seriousness of racism. Participants instead constructed racism as based on 
the perception of and by ethnic minorities rather than Dutch people being racist. Another 
strategy used in race talk is to draw upon historical narratives in such a way to rationalise 
opposition to ethnic minorities (Augoustinos et al., 1999), but it has been argued that 
drawing upon historical accounts is not constructive when discussing race, for example, 
Augoustinos, Hastie and Wright (2011) argued that apologising for past injustices is a 
discursive practise, which is complex and managed delicately in an attempt to avoid 
controversy. Condor (2006b) detailed how prejudiced discourse can be achieved as a 
collaborative accomplishment, so that potentially prejudicial statements are defended not 
only by the speaker but also by other individuals in the conversation. 
While those traditional methods in social psychology that have been outlined here are 
effective ways to apply understanding of prejudice to everyday behaviour, they do not 
address, to any significant extent, more extreme types of prejudice, and other aspects of 
prejudice that should be considered, such as ideological and motivational factors (Billig, 
2002). This is of interest to this research because prior research has shown aggressive and 
hostile language to be used on Facebook (Burke and Goodman, 2012). However, as has 
been discussed, political parties have more scope to be seen communicating in what might 
be considered to be a politer manner in order to appeal more broadly to potential 
supporters. 
Researchers such as Guerin (2003) argued that the function of racist language is to 
maintain group cohesion and social relationships, rather than to promote racism. This is 
one factor to explain the difficulty of combating racist talk, as it would affect group 
cohesion. Researchers have highlighted how accusations of racism tend to close debate and 
set up resistance on both sides (Every and Augoustinos 2007). For example, Guerin 
proposed that people should find ways of engaging in debate about the issues of asylum 
seeking without ending discussions.  
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Research from Perez (2013) challenged the notion that explicit racist talk in public is 
declining, and found that stand-up comedy students used rhetorical strategies to present 
racial stereotypes as humorous rather than offensive. However, the students who were 
white learnt to avoid in engaging in overt jokes about race, as well as denial strategies in 
order to be able to engage in racial commentary. Students from ethnic minorities on the 
other hand, engaged in racial stereotyping in an unguarded manner, a form of negative 
self-presentation. These findings are similar to that of Goodman and Burke, who showed 
that people argued that it was easier for people from ethnic minorities to oppose asylum 
seekers. Billig’s (2001) analysis of racist websites in support of the KKK demonstrated 
that the strategic use of humour and the disclaimer of ‘just being a joke’ allows the 
boundaries surrounding racist discourse to be broken, and protects speakers from being 
challenged when racist discourse is rooted in humour.  Extreme racist language was 
portrayed as being for the intention of enjoyment or to entertain, rather than reflecting 
hatred for a particular group.  
3.5 Far-right Rhetoric 
For politicians in particular, it is damaging to be viewed as being racist (Bull and Simon-
Vandenbergen, 2014). As discussed earlier, the National Front disguised their extremist 
views and underlying anti-Semitic ideologies (Billig, 1978; Eatwell, 2000), arguing that 
they were not anti-Semitic as their approach was not based on emotional factors; they 
defined anti-Semitism as extreme behaviour and insults, and publicly condemned acts of 
violence towards Jews therefore managed their position as not being outright anti-Semitic. 
Nazi leaders also denied accusations of racism and disguised their anti-Semitic messages 
using parasite metaphors (Musolff, 2013).   
Far-right politicians frequently attempt to present themselves as reasonable, prone to false 
accusations of racism, supporting Billig’s (1988) notion of the taboo on prejudice. Billig 
(2001) argued that extreme right-wing groups sought legitimacy by openly claiming to 
have democratic values, but privately distributing a more extreme message to supporters. 
McGlashan (2013) found that European far-right parties legitimise racist policies through 
focusing on the cultural and economic impact of racism. Research has also identified how 
the BNP used various strategies to mask its underlying fascist ideologies, such as using 
moderate language (Carter, 2005; Copsey, 2004).  
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Much of the early research on far-right parties used methods such as content analysis of 
the speeches and writings e of dictators such as Hitler (Eckhardt 1965) and Mussolini 
(Eckhardt, 1968). However, content analysis of far-right discourse failed to offer a detailed 
exploration of the reasoning and ideologies of the far-right (Billig, 1978). A discursive 
analysis of the BNP manifestos revealed that the party used language referring to ‘in-
group’ categories to describe British people, such as “indigenous people” (Edwards, 2012; 
Goodman and Johnson, 2013). This term evoked imagery of white British people, although 
Nick Griffin denied that this is what he meant when he used this term and constructed a 
parallel with indigenous populations in New Zealand and North America. As (Bull and 
Simon-Vandenbergen (2014) showed, Griffin has associated the term ‘indigenous’ with 
threatened cultures, and thus this parallel is a strategy by Griffin to draw upon the 
victimisation of white people. The accusation that the ‘indigenous’ majority of Britain are 
victims of anti-white racism orients to the norm against prejudice, as Griffin avoids being 
seen as directly persecuting ethnic minorities (Wood and Finlay, 2008). Research has 
showed that as a concept, ‘indigenous’ is used to legitimise racist policies (Williams and 
Law, 2012).  
Copsey (2007:61; see also 2004) termed ‘Fascism Recalibration’ to describe how the BNP 
attempted to reject the fascist label and promote more contemporary ideologies, by shifting 
the focus from concerns about race to more localised concerns for British citizens, 
including issues such as resources and local issues in communities. This has shown to have 
been effective in providing the BNP with a sense of respectability, as Rhodes (2009) found 
that BNP voters were mostly influenced by the BNP’s focus on local issues. Billig (1978) 
similarly showed that in the far-right magazine, ‘Spearhead’, anti-Semitic ideology was 
expressed as being rooted in economic factors.  
Another strategy used by the BNP to justify opposition to minority groups such as 
Muslims is to base opposition on the groups’ own prejudices, such as opposing Islam 
based on its apparent intolerances, a strategy also used by Dutch politician Geert Wilders 
(Verkuyten, 2013). Atton (2006) analysed the BNP’s official website, and identified how 
‘white racism’ was structured by the BNP as a common practice by ethnic minorities, 
using examples such as vandalism and assault committed by ethnic minorities to support 
this idea. White people were constructed as a repressed ‘other’, under threat from ethnic 
minorities. In this way, racism towards ethnic minorities was constructed as a reasonable 
reaction to a perceived racist treatment, indeed victimization, by the ‘other’. This 
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paralleled earlier work by Billig (1995) who argued how early far-right parties claimed 
that they were acting out of defence and not attacking particular groups of people. Atton 
(2006) also showed how the BNP website drew upon the idea that the members of the 
BNP were ordinary everyday people, who did not express racist views. Research carried 
out in the Netherlands (Rooyackers and Verkuyten, 2012) similarly found that Geert 
Wilders constructed himself as being a politician who was realistic and responsible, as 
well as group oriented.  
3.6 Anti-Semitism 
Historians such as Holmes (1979) define anti-Semitism as an intrinsic, irrational hostility 
towards Jews, characterised by perceptions of economic competition and cultural 
differences (Tilles, 2015). For some researchers, ‘anti-Semitism’ is a term that is used in a 
broad sense, to describe negative reactions either felt or expressed towards Jews (Cesarani, 
1994). 
Melley (2000) defines conspiracy theory as an intense fear of an external force that 
controls individuals. Nefes (2014) proposed that conspiracy theories are usually explained 
as power relations manipulated by a certain individual. Conspiracy theories are regarded as 
the most common form of anti-Semitism (Cohn, 1967) with ideas such as Jews plotting to 
dominate the world (Cohn, 1957; Byford and Billig, 2001). The characteristics of 
conspiracy theories include there being a secret Jewish government, and Jews have secret 
domination over international banking (Cohn, 1967; Richardson, 2013b).  
Conspiracy theories are a notion largely not accepted within mainstream Western politics 
today, but have historically been intrinsic to the far-right in the UK, going back to the early 
parties such as the British Union of Fascists, in disseminating their ideologies of a 
conspiracy theory that Jews has political and financial power over Britain (Stocker, 2015). 
One of its members AK Chesterton, advocated there being a Jewish conspiracy (Copsey, 
2008). Conspiracy theories were also emerging by far-right parties such as the BNP to 
encourage hostility towards Muslims (Wood and Finlay, 2008). Events such as shootings 
can lead to the prevalence of conspiracy theories, as uncertainty and fear is heightened 
(Eyerman, 2011). 
An extreme form of anti-Semitism is Holocaust denial, the theory that the historical 
account of the Holocaust is either exaggerated or incorrect, for example denial of the 
41 
 
extent of the mass murders (Griffin, 2015).  Holocaust denial is considered a manifestation 
of hate speech as it targets a specific ethnic and religious group (Wodak, 2015b). 
Characteristics of Holocaust denial include the denial of gas chambers being used. 
Holocaust denial is a criminal offence in some countries in Europe such as Austria, 
Germany and Poland. Thus, as Wodak (ibid) has highlighted, speakers commonly imply 
Holocaust denial rather than outright deny it, in order to avoid persecution. As will be 
discussed further in chapters seven and nine, anti-Semitism and Holocaust denial still 
occur, in this case on social media, and sometimes concurrently with Islamophobia.  
Far-right parties such as the BNP distances itself from the fascist label, and takes on a 
more ‘neo-fascist’ position that orients to contemporary issues, a process that Copsey 
(2008:82) termed “fascism re-calibrated (see section 3.5)”. Researchers argue that 
contemporary anti-Semitism today includes hostility towards Zionism (Klug, 2013). 
3.7 Islamophobia 
Researchers argue that the rise in Islamophobia mirrors anti-Semitism in Britain during the 
1st and 2nd World Wars (Klug, 2014; Linehan, 2012), and that the treatment of Muslims by 
far-right parties is similar to how Nazi parties treated Jews. For example, during the 2nd 
World War, the Jewish method of slaughtering animals, Schechita, was criticised for being 
cruel, much in the same way that Halal is commonly criticised today. Sajid (2005:31) has 
termed this parallel as “a new word for an old fear”. Such comparisons have led to the 
perception that Islamophobia has somewhat ‘replaced’ anti-Semitism, and that anti-
Semitism is no longer a prominent issue in contemporary political discourse (Wodak, 
2015a).  
The focus of this thesis is the current dilemma the far-right face, posed by being accused of 
being Islamophobic whilst still trying to attract supporters. However, Islamophobia is 
increasing in Britain, and leads to more support for far-right political parties. Bleich 
(2011:1581) defines Islamophobia as “indiscriminate negative attitudes or emotions 
directed at Islam or Muslims”. Researchers have pointed out that this definition does not 
make a distinction between opposing the religion and opposing individuals, and that a 
definition that addresses hate and/or racism would be more accurate (Halliday, 1999). 
Muslims are perceived as a threat to Britain (Foner and Alba, 2008), particularly after the 
July 2005 London bombings (Richardson, 2011; Wood and Finlay, 2008), and more recent 
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terrorist attacks elsewhere in Europe, as covered in the first chapter. Muslims have been 
exposed to attacks and “street racism” in Britain (Richardson, 2004:23).  
There is debate over whether Muslims can integrate into British society and researchers 
such as Amiraux (2016) argued that the visible ‘otherness’ of Muslims has driven public 
concern.  As issue that is particularly contentious in the British press (and indeed in 
France) is female Muslims wearing the hijab and burqa (Baker, Gabrielatos and McEnery, 
2013), with regards to whether this is worn as choice or forced upon women. This is likely 
to be because women are more ‘visible’ as Muslims (Deaux and Greenwood, 2013). 
Elsewhere in Europe, Geert Wilders has treated the hijab as a symbol of ‘Islamic threat’ 
(Korteweg, 2013; see also Ekman, 2015). The construction of female Muslims as under 
threat due to gender inequality is one of the strategies used to argue against allowing Islam 
a ‘space’ and physical presence in society (Törnberg and Törnberg, 2016).  
In newspapers Muslims are portrayed negatively, for example Richardson (2004) 
discussed four common themes argued in newspapers regarding Muslims: 1) Muslims as a 
military threat, 2) the association of Islam with terrorism, 3), Muslims as a threat to 
democracy, and 4), Muslims as a threat to society and sexism. Richardson has shown that 
newspapers engage in three processes to construct Muslims negatively: 1), separation, 2) 
differentiation, and 3) cultural deviance. Muslims are frequently portrayed in the British 
press as coming to Britain to claim benefits (Baker et al., 2013).  Most research on 
Islamophobia focuses largely on how Muslims are represented in the press media, rather 
than other types of media such as social networking websites, although research is 
emerging on how Muslims are the target of hatred on Internet blogs (Törnberg and 
Törnberg, 2016).  
While the far-right parties have in the past focused on proposing harsh immigration 
policies (Goodman and Speer, 2007), more recently, their focus has been on what the BNP 
termed the ‘Islamification’ of Britain (Richardson and Wodak, 2009a), which the BNP 
claimed is a result of an increase in immigration in Britain (Kassimeris and Jackson, 
2015).  This is arguably to shift the focus of far-right parties from being historically anti-
Semitic (Hafez, 2014), as well as making it easier for modern far-right politicians to 
distance themselves from historical anti-Semitic positions. One strategy is to draw 
parallels between Islam and the Nazis (Hafez, 2014). Surveys show that British peoples’ 
attitudes towards Muslims in general have been negative (Baker et al., 2013), regarding 
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Islam as a threat to Europe and resulting in measures to curb multi-culturalism such as the 
banning of the hijab in France (Fekete, 2004; Zúquete, 2008). 
Richardson and Columbo (2014) explored how female Muslims are used in anti-
immigration arguments by far-right parties, in particular the BNP which argued that British 
women need to be ‘defended’ against becoming Muslim. The BNP constructed Muslims as 
‘anti-white racists’, and used the Qur’an as evidence for the notion that Muslims want to 
take over Britain. Following the July 2005 London bombings, the BNP used this event to 
claim that all members of the Islamic faith (and not just extremists) are terrorists, and 
therefore a threat to Britain and undeserving of British citizenship (Wood and Finlay, 
2008). In addition to Muslims, the BNP constructed those individuals who believe in a 
multicultural Britain as being a threat to Britain (ibid, 2008). 
The EDL projected warnings of ‘Islamization’, constructing Muslims as a threat to British 
identity and security. The EDL claims that rather than being racist, Islamophobia is a 
rational reaction to Islamic extremism in the UK (Kassimeris and Jackson, 2015). Far-right 
organisations such as the EDL argue that they aim to campaign against Islamic extremism 
only, rather than all Muslims (Treadwell 2012, Treadwell and Garland 2011). The 
distinction between opposing Islam as a religion and not opposing Muslims as people is 
also utilised by Geert Wilders (Verkuyten, 2013). Such discourse has led to some 
researchers arguing that there needs to be a distinction between Islamophobia and 
‘Muslimophobia’ (Cheng, 2015), and that the concept of Islamophobia (such as the 
definition outlined at the start of section 3.6) conflates all Muslims as members of one 
nation of Islam rather than recognising that Muslims can belong to various divisions 
(Afshar, 2012).  
Researchers such as Jones (2011) argued that Islamophobia has worsened (i.e. increased) 
since the September 11th attack on the Twin Towers of the World Trade Centre in New 
York, as well as attacks against Muslims living in Britain (although other religious groups 
such as Sikhs have also been targeted, see Richardson, 2004). For example, Richardson 
(2008) outlined how the BNP leaflets were visually organised to construct Muslims as 
violent and problematic, with ‘problems’ on one side, and their proposed solutions on the 
other side. The function of Islamophobic images can be to elicit stereotypes when 
protesting issues such as building new mosques.  
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3.8 Summary 
In this chapter, I have set the scene for the use of my chosen analytical approach, critical 
discursive psychology. This included the origins of discursive psychology. I have 
considered the traditional approaches in social psychology, and how these are less 
beneficial for the consideration of variable discourse. I have covered discursive research 
on the topics of prejudice and racism, and highlighted that racism is a complex issue to 
research, as there are various definitions of racism, from subtle forms of racism, to more 
extreme, hostile discourse. Finally, I discussed the far-right’s historical fascist stance, and 
how far-right parties avoid being labelled as anti-Semitic today. The chapter concluded by 
showing how critical discursive research has been used to uncover the far-right’s common 
dilemma of attempting to look reasonable and non-racist despite their underlying extreme 
ideologies. In today’s current climate, this can be seen starkly in the case of Islamophobia.  
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4: Computer-Mediated Communication 
and rationale for research 
4.1 Introduction 
Computer mediated communication refers to how people communicate via digital 
communication and networking, most commonly computers and more recently 
smartphones (Herring and Androutsopolous, 2015). In this chapter I will outline how the 
study of computer discourse developed from two models: the social presence model, and 
the reduced social cues model. I will examine prior research on Facebook, which mostly 
encompasses research on the personality traits of Facebook users, and will lead onto 
research that addressed how far-right organisations and supporters use Facebook. I will 
discuss extremist discourse, as computer-mediated communication has played a role in the 
dissemination of extremist discourse and hate speech, for example the likelihood of 
anonymity. Finally, I will conclude by introducing the rationale for conducting my 
research and my research aims.   
4.2 Origins of Computer-Mediated Communication 
Research on Computer-mediated communication (henceforth CMC) has generally 
investigated how people interact with each other and patterns in how people talk to each 
other online, including paralinguistic features, such as emoticons of smiley faces etc. 
(Garcia and Jacobs, 1999). CMC refers to text communication through computers, such as 
email, instant messaging and blogs (Hollingshead, 2001). CMC provides a rich, unlimited 
platform in which to observe interaction. As highlighted by Ardévol and Gómez-Cruz 
(2014:504):  
“The Internet is an open, flexible and everyday more wide-spread technology, changing with its 
design, uses and appropriations. It is a global communication system along with different digital 
technologies that crosses transnational practices but whose meanings are locally negotiated by 
every cultural agent”.  
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Approaches to CMC arose from two models: the social presence theory, and the reduced 
social cues approach. The social presence theory is based on the early work of Short, 
Williams and Christie (1976) who researched face-to-face interaction and 
telecommunication. This theory proposed that effective communication was dependent on 
the level of social presence, i.e. how aware one is that there are other people present during 
communication. Research using CMC considers social presence in terms of how people 
choose to represent themselves online and how they relate to other individuals online. 
However, the Reduced Social Cues approach (Kiesler, Siegel, and McGuire, 1984; 
McGuire, Kiesler, and Siegel, 1987), argued that a lack of non-verbal cues in online 
communication can lead to more uninhibited communication. Subsequent research 
suggested that para-linguistic features such as ‘emoticons’ are emerging in CMC, which 
can overcome such behaviour and give indications of non-verbal communication that are 
important indicators during face-to-face conversation (Giles, Stommel, Paulus, Lester, and 
Reed, 2015; Krohn, 2004).  
The model of CMC (Kiesler, 1986; Kiesler et al. 1984) proposed that due to the lack of 
face-to-face cues present in CMC, this is more likely to lead to group polarisation, and 
‘flaming’, which refers to aggressive and hostile forms of communication (Bomberger, 
2004). Language is likely to be less inhibited because users are less identifiable (Postmes, 
Spears and Lea, 1998). This concept can also be applicable to politicians, who are 
scrutinised when they appear on other media such as television, as they are not only heard, 
but are seen too (Bull, 2012). Online newspapers such as The New York Times can have 
strict moderation policies such as registering and verifying identity before being allowed to 
leave posts, and offensive comments can be removed (Hughey and Daniels, 2013). Despite 
this, Goodman (2007) examined discussions on UK local news forums about asylum 
seekers, and showed that supporters of asylum seeking used terms such as ‘loving family’ 
which normalised asylum seekers, whilst opponents of asylum seekers used animalistic 
and dehumanising terms to describe asylum seekers, such as ‘breeding family’.   
One of the benefits of studying CMC is demonstrated by applying Billig (1991)’s 
argument that an individual supporting a particular position is also arguing against the 
counter position. This is based on the premise from DP that expressing views involves 
criticising and justifying, so when a person makes a claim about their view, they are taking 
a stance and undermining potential counter arguments at the same time (see also Billig, 
1996). When people are arguing their viewpoint, they are not only justifying their own 
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view, but anticipating and rebutting opposing arguments. Less attention has been given to 
political discourse in CMC and how this may be shaped by online environments, though 
recently there has been an increase in the publication of research using critical and 
discourse analytic methods exploring online interaction (e.g. Burke and Goodman, 2012; 
Goodman and Rowe, 2014; Sneijder and te Molder 2004).  
4.3 Facebook   
Social networking websites such as Facebook have become an important platform for 
people to present themselves (Anderson, Fagan, Woodnutt, and Chamorro-Prezmuzic, 
2012). On social networking websites, people share content and information in a virtual 
community or network. The use of social media has increased and influenced how people 
communicate with family and friends. Additionally, as will be discussed in the following 
chapter, Facebook is a multi-modal platform with a variety of forms of communication 
that can be researched, such as images, slogans, and emoticons. Communication on social 
media can lead to forms of unacceptable social practises such as hate speech. Researchers 
such as Albert and Salam (2013) suggested that social media is a discursive system that 
reflects social practises such as Cyberbullying. Smith and Brecher (2010) argue that social 
media provides the communication networks necessary for effective social action. There is 
a need for novel approaches to investigate the phenomena of social media due to its multi-
modality. These social acts such as online hate speech and cyber bullying can have effects 
such as coercion and victimization.  
 Facebook is not an anonymous environment because users are required to give their real 
and full name to sign up (Facebook, 2013a), although the likelihood that there are false 
Facebook profiles being created to impersonate other users cannot be overlooked 
(Krombholz, Merkl and Weippl, 2012). This means that users are held more accountable 
for their actions, and therefore are more likely to adhere to social norms (Zhao, Grasmark 
and Martin, 2008). However, Burke and Goodman (2012) demonstrated that people can 
nevertheless engage more easily in racist interactions, and that online there is both a lack 
of orientation towards the norm against prejudice as well as a lack of the taboo against 
making accusations of racism. Facebook is a significant medium for analysis because it is 
an international brand with users from across the globe. The implication of Facebook 
being international is that values and forms of discourse that are acceptable in one society 
or culture can be ‘exported’ into a different setting and be viewed by another culture where 
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the values are not acceptable. An example of this can be seen in political discourse offline, 
when BBC political editor Laura Kuenssberg questioned Donald Trump at the joint press 
conference with British Prime Minister Theresa May. Kuenssberg raised the issue of 
Trump’s belief over what is acceptable in the US, may not be considered as acceptable in 
the UK10. Additionally, networks and communications on Facebook are current and 
beneficial to social science research regarding political debates.  
Most of the rather limited qualitative research addressing discussions on Facebook has 
measured individual behaviours and personality traits of Facebook users, rather than 
examining closely users’ discourse and reasoning. Research has frequently used 
quantitative methods, for example, Carpenter (2012) used surveys to measure levels of 
narcissism in Facebook users (see also Nadkarni and Hofman, 2012), and Gerstenfeld, 
Grant and Chaing (2003), used content analysis on extremist websites. Researchers such as 
Schafer (2002) pointed out the problematic nature of content analysis, due to the inability 
to determine the size of the population using the internet. Another limitation is that most 
research conducted on Facebook focused on university students as a sample population 
(Ellison, Steinfield and Lampe, 2007), although this is perhaps not surprising as Facebook 
was begun as a social networking website exclusively for university students (see 
methodology chapter five for further discussion). 
4.4 Far-right discourse on CMC  
Political parties in general have started to use the internet as a forum to communicate their 
messages, for example by circulating advertisement posters (Burgess, 2011). The internet 
was particularly influential among people under the age of 35 for gaining information 
about the 2010 General Election (Mortimore, Cleary and Mludzinski, 2011), and generally 
has opened more ways for political parties and activists to disseminate content, and 
provide a wider platform to influence peoples’ views about political issues (Tileagă 2013). 
The internet allowed for political campaigns to grow at all levels through official 
webpages, and social media such as Facebook and Twitter, to reach audiences who may 
not necessarily watch political TV programmes or read newspapers- whilst an added 
advantage is that it is a cheap form of communicating (Trent and Friedenberg, 2007). For 
                                                          
10 http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/01/27/laura-kuenssbergs-stern-questioning-donald-trump-
angers-presidents/ 
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all these reasons the internet has enabled newer and less popular political parties or 
political groupings to advertise and compete with more established parties (Chadwick, 
2006).  
Before the internet, resources used by far-right parties to disseminate their messages to 
audiences was limited, although the BNP campaigned heavily through ‘traditional’ media 
such as the distribution of leaflets and canvassing throughout local areas (Rhodes, 2009; 
Richardson, 2008). The internet has become a significant medium of communication for 
far-right parties to be able to set up websites and communicate to a wider audience and 
gain more supporters (Atton, 2006; Fekete, 2012; Gerstensfeld et al.,2003), particularly 
among extremist groups, due to its advantage of being easier to avoid regulation and law 
enforcements (Tateo, 2005).  
Far-right parties such as the BNP have recently recognised the advantage of using the 
internet to gain further support, illustrated for instance by the BNP’s official website which 
contains links to its Facebook Page, Twitter account and BNPTV channel (Copsey, 2007). 
The BNPTV channel is also accessible on YouTube. 11 Additionally, the BNP has an 
online shop, with videos taken from (offline) broadcast media available to download, and a 
mailing list for people to sign up to (Atton, 2006).  There is a lack of analytical research on 
right-wing internet media, with the exception of Atton (2006), who analysed the BNP’s 
official website, noting that it did not provide opportunities for discussion and sharing of 
ideas between individuals. Despite prior research investigating how far-right parties 
challenge accusations of racism, this research has been parliamentary or media data (e.g. 
Goodman and Johnson, 2013; Rhodes, 2009).   
4.5 CMC and Extremist Discourse 
Extremist organisations are defined as those that reject multiculturalism and position 
ethnic minorities as inferior to white superiority, indeed supremacy (Roderick, 2016), 
advocating extreme actions, such as the extermination of groups of people (Finlay, 2007). 
CMC is an appealing medium for communication for extremist organisations, due to the 
less regulated nature of the internet (Gerstenfeld et al., 2003), although on websites such as 
                                                          
11 https://www.youtube.com/user/bnptv 
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Facebook, organisations are required to adhere to certain terms and conditions (Ben-David 
and Matamoros Fernández, 2016).  
Members of extremist groups can offer each other social support (Kaplan and Weinberg, 
1998) and share information in a way that is unregulated by the government and rules that 
apply to more conventional news media (Dobratz and Shanks Meile, 1997).  Researchers 
such as Gerstenfeld et al. (2003) and Schafer (2002) argued that for extremist 
organisations, the internet is an easier (e.g. more accessible) way to debate and disseminate 
to audiences and recruit new supporters, due to peoples’ anonymity not being 
compromised. Prior to the introduction of CMC and social media, extremist organisations 
had limited resources to disseminate their messages. De Koster and Houtman (2008) 
interviewed members from the extreme right-wing website Stormfront12, and found that 
individuals who were stigmatized offline for being right-wing found the website to be a 
source of support, and expressed the website as more of a community in comparison to 
those who did not experience stigmatisation.   
Gerstenfeld et al. (2003) identified that extremist websites can contain several multimedia 
elements, and the internet can be used to reach and influence widespread. This supports 
early work by McDonald (1999) who found that white supremacist websites used 
techniques of foot-in-the-door persuasion (e.g. disclaimers, outlining of objectives) to 
recruit new supporters. Kaplan and Weinberg (1998) claimed that groups can use the 
internet to make themselves appear more socially and politically acceptable. Gerstenfeld et 
al. (2003) also found several extremist websites that contained claims not to be racist or 
hate groups, in keeping with research conducted on offline media identifying how the BNP 
used strategies to claim not to be a racist party (Goodman and Johnson, 2013). Gerstenfeld 
et al. also found that some extremist groups proclaimed the Freedom of Expression law in 
support of their right to say whatever they wanted. Wetherell and Potter (1992) similarly 
found that individual rights and equality arguments are strategies not only used in anti-
racist discourse, but also in racist discourse itself.   
                                                          
12 http://www.stormfront.org/forum/f22/ 
51 
 
4.6. Rational and Research Aims 
An area of research that has received little attention is how the far-right use social media as 
a multi-media platform to communicate. This research aims to address far-right discourse 
on the multiple forms of communication available on Facebook, and how these features 
contribute to portraying anti-Islamic rhetoric. This includes text, images, videos, and other 
Facebook features such as emoticons. Specifically, there is a lack of research addressing 
visual communication of the far-right, with much of the research focusing on the BNP only 
(Engström, 2014; Richardson, 2011; Richardson and Wodak, 2009a; 2009b), and on 
printed materials rather than online.  
What this research also analyses that the prior research did not address, is how the far-right 
communicate following a specific terrorist attack. In the wake of a terrorist attack, the 
dilemma that the far-right have is even more crucial - there is the opportunity to attract 
more supporters (e.g. people who are seeking reassurance after a terrorist attack), yet there 
is still the need to maintain rationality. I am also interested in how individuals respond to 
the far-right and whether they manage the same dilemma of appearing rational in anti-
Islamic rhetoric. Thus, this thesis will make an original contribution by using critical 
discursive psychology to analyse fascist discourse on social media in the aftermath of a 
terrorist attack. 
The aims of the current research are to use critical discursive psychology to analyse (with 
the analytical chapters that each aim addresses in brackets): 
1) The discursive devices used by the far-right to represent their views on Facebook about 
Islam in an attempt to broaden appeal and support, and compete with mainstream parties 
(chapters six, eight and nine).  
2) The discursive devices used by the far-right to portray the condemnation of Islam as 
‘reasonable’ and rational on Facebook during the aftermath of the Charlie Hebdo attack 
(chapters six and eight).  
3) The response by Facebook users to far-right Facebook posts, and the discursive 
strategies used by Facebook users when both rebutting and supporting the far-right 
(chapters seven and nine).  
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In this chapter I have covered computer-mediated communication, and showed that much 
of research on Facebook has been quantitative and addressed personality characteristics of 
those who espouse far-right views and opinions, rather than the discourse and reasoning 
through which they express those views. I have discussed research that has examined far-
right and extremist discourse on CMC, particularly on social media. Finally, I have 
outlined the aims of my research, the particular research questions around which my 
research has focused.   
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5. Methodology and Data Collection 
5.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapter, I described the aims of my research, which was to critically 
analyse the discourse of far-right and far-right supporters on Facebook pages, with a focus 
on how the far-right maintain rationality in anti-Islamic rhetoric. To do this, I used the 
theoretical framework of critical discursive psychology (Wetherell and Edley, 1999) to 
analyse Facebook posts by far-right groups, and discussions by Facebook users in response 
to far-right posts. This chapter will describe my methods for data collection and my 
methodological framework, as well as explaining how my research came to focus 
specifically on the event of the Charlie Hebdo attack.  
I start by outlining the epistemological position of my analytical approach, critical 
discursive psychology (henceforth CDP). I then explain how this approach can be applied 
to a multi-modal setting such as Facebook (focusing specifically on visual 
communication), and the benefits the approach has for my research specifically which 
includes considering how findings reflect wider historical and social patterns. There are 
three strategies at the centre of CDP that I will outline; 1) Subject positions; 2) Ideological 
dilemmas; 3) Interpretative repertoires. Section 5.2 explains the nature of computer-
mediated communication and the advantages of using a naturalistic platform for data 
collection. Section 5.2.1 provides background information about the social networking 
website Facebook, and specifically Facebook pages. In section 5.3, I describe the process 
of data collection from the Facebook pages of three far-right groups; 1) the English 
defence league, 2) the British national party, and 3) Britain First. I include a summary of 
the Facebook pages from which data were collected, information about when the pages 
were started on Facebook, and how many ‘likes’ each page has. I will then outline the 
extracts that were chosen for final analysis. Finally, in section 5.4, I discuss the ethical 
considerations and issues that arose during data collection.  
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5.2 Analytical Approach 
5.2.1 Ontological Position of Critical Discursive Psychology  
Researchers from a critical discursive psychological perspective (e.g. Parker, 2002) argued 
that approaches such as Foucauldian discourse analysis that attempted to engage with 
issues of power and political discourse, overlooked how individuals actively construct 
their own identities. Critical discursive psychology is an approach that suits my research 
aims because analysis identities is an aspect that I am interested in, for example how 
people construct their own identities in order to marginalise and ‘other’ groups. CDP uses 
the same social constructionist ontological position that discursive psychology (DP) holds, 
i.e. that we socially construct our own realities. However, DP in contrast to CDP, adopts a 
relativist stance in that the notion of facts are treated as culture specific categories used 
within a social setting and do not say anything about psychological reality (Edwards, 
1997). As discussed in more depth later in this chapter, CDP aims to understand and 
analyse discursive practises, and apply them to wider social and cultural contexts.  
5. 2.2 Critical Discursive Psychology 
Similarly to DP, CDP has the premise that internal states are situated in social activity, so 
it is beneficial to study discourse in practise. The focus is on the “action orientation” of 
talk or text (Edwards and Potter, 1992:2), meaning that analysts focus on what actions 
people are achieving through talk, e.g. making or defending accusations, rather than 
looking at what this tells us about what people think. This focus on action makes CDP a 
suitable method for analysing talk surrounding controversial issues, as the focus can be on 
how individuals justify the harsh treatment of minority groups by placing blame, or 
constructing opposition to minority groups as a rational action (Augoustinos and Every, 
2007). 
Other qualitative methods in Psychology such as phenomenological approaches attempt to 
predict consistent interpretation and meaning in participants’ accounts. CDP in contrast, 
embraces the inconsistency and variation that takes place in discourse to examine the 
different fragments of meanings in an account. This is useful for accounting for the 
subtlety that takes place in contemporary race discourse. The variation that takes place in 
discourse is what Billig et al. (1988) refer to as the ‘dilemmatic’ nature of talk.  
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CDP differs from DP, as it argues that discourse reflects not only the context, but broader 
patterns of collective understanding (i.e. the possibility that findings can reflect global 
contexts), for example, local expressions of racist discourse may reflect broader patterns of 
racism in society, in that participants and speakers may draw upon terms that have history 
behind those terms (Wetherell, 2003). This is what Wetherell (1998:405) referred to as 
“the social and political consequences of discursive patterning”. CDP embraces contexts 
where identities and positions are carried forward from other conversations, meaning that 
analysts considering the detail of the discourse without overlooking the broad context 
(Wetherell and Edley, 1999, see also KhosravaNik, forthcoming). Considering the 
historical and wider context is useful not only for research on the far-right generally, but 
particularly in this research the key is to examine how the far-right manage their identity 
and position at a controversial time such as the Charlie Hebdo attack. Historically, far-right 
parties such as the National Front simultaneously promoted anti-Semitic ideologies. What 
will be shown in the analytical chapters is a far-right party aligning with the same 
community that historically the far-right opposed. Therefore, this places the findings of my 
research in a novel context.  It allows me to show new ways that identities are formed, and 
how aligning with Jews allows the far-right to oppose the lesser ‘other’ of Islam.  
In CDP, the critical element of the approach means that we can also analyse discourse in 
wider contexts such as historical or political, and consider how history and culture affects 
discourse as well as the practical implications of the research findings (see Unger, Wodak 
and KhosraviNik, 2016). CDP focuses on the formation of identities and interaction, and 
the interactional work that is performed through discursive accounts (Wetherell, 1998). 
CDP argues that individuals are active in constructing their own identities against larger 
social contexts. However, there can be tensions between the construction of identities, and 
identities being challenged by others if they are seen as negative (Taylor 2005; 2006).  
Unlike more conversational approaches to DP, where the focus is on more institutional 
everyday settings such as police interviews (e.g. Stokoe and Edwards, 2007) and 
interaction in healthcare settings (e.g. Antaki, 2013), CDP focuses on how discourse takes 
place within wider social and political settings (e.g. Tileagă, 2011). While Conversation 
Analysis focuses on the immediate interactional features and linguistic strategies such as 
gaining applause from audience (Atkinson, 1984), CDP adopts the Foucauldian outlook of 
considering the wider context of discourse, and the form of argumentation (Billig, 1991). 
Scholars such as Schegloff (1997: 183) argued that close examination of language results 
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in more complex understandings, while attempting to globalise findings and arguments 
ignores the details of a single episode and rejects ‘binding’ more closely to the data itself. 
In response to this, Billig (1999) criticised the common practise in Conversation Analysis 
of naming and identifying participants, yet not including the consideration of any other 
background or context. Considering this, I aim to anonymise participants and focus on how 
participants construct themselves and their own context, rather than concentrate on 
whether it is their ‘real’ identity.  
CDP fulfils my aim of examining how the far-right justified and constructed opposition to 
Muslims in the wake of the Charlie Hebdo attack. CDP attempts to capture the paradoxical 
relationship between discourse and the individual (Edley, 2001). Applications of CDP 
extend to not just speech and writing, but non-verbal communication and images (Parker, 
2002), which is why this approach is beneficial for a multi-modal setting such as Facebook 
pages that contains visual communication such as images and videos. Whilst previous 
research has addressed how the English Defence League use Facebook (Allen, 2011), this 
has been quantitative in nature, e.g. using surveys (Bartlett and Littler, 2013); there is a 
lack of research addressing how other far-right parties use Facebook to disseminate their 
ideologies to a wider audience. It is important to address this, as far-right parties are using 
social networking more to communicate ideologies, and share other aspects of media such 
as images and videos. 
Other approaches such as Critical Discourse Analysis (e.g. van Dijk, 1992; 1993a), argue 
that discourse has underlying cognitions in terms of mental representations of knowledge, 
as opposed to CDP which focuses on cultural representations. Another focus of Critical 
Discourse Analysis (CDA) is the construction of power and inequalities in discourse 
(Fairclough, 2010; van Dijk, 2001), while the aim of this research is to focus on how 
inequalities are justified rather than created. Another aspect of CDA is that the starting 
point is the moral stance of the researcher (i.e. ‘the problem’), rather than letting problems 
arise out of the data. While my research addresses a ‘problem’ in the form of how groups 
are marginalised in the aftermath of the Charlie Hebdo attack, it was the turn in events 
during data collection that led the analytical direction of research, i.e. my approach is ‘data 
driven’. Additionally, critiques of CDA such as Finlayson (2004) noted that in CDA there 
is a lack of context when analysing arguments, which as I have highlighted, is significant 
for my research. 
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Some researchers argue that rather than being a method as such, DP forms what Tileagă 
(2013: 136) described as an “epistemological turn”, where the focus is on treating 
language as a social practise, rather than having a presumption about what discourse 
‘really means’. Billig (1998: 43) also argued that discursive analysis “is more than 
following procedures for collecting and categorising discursive data; it involves a 
theoretical way of understanding the nature of discourse and the nature of psychological 
phenomena”.  This means that in order to conduct research, the analyst must not have 
presumptions about underlying attitudes behind discourse, but instead adopt the theoretical 
assumptions of their analytical approach and work with those assumptions.  Wetherell and 
Edley (1999:337) provided a framework of questions of which they asked of their data, 
when they used CDP to analyse masculinity: 
“How are the norms [of hegemonic masculinity] conveyed, through what routes, and in what ways 
are they enacted by men in their daily lives? What are the norms? Are they the same in every social 
situation? ... How is hegemony conveyed interactionally and practically in mundane life? How do 
men conform to an ideal and turn themselves into complicit or resistant types, without anyone ever 
managing to exactly embody that ideal?” 
CDP focuses on “the highly occasioned and situated nature of subject positions and the 
importance of accountability rather than "discourse" per se in fuelling the take up of 
positions in talk” (Wetherell, 1998:394). This involves how identities are formed in 
interaction and accomplished by speakers. Additionally, the process of analysing discourse 
in contexts other than the context being examined (as discussed above), considering 
identities and positions that may have been carried over from other conversations 
(Wetherell and Edley, 1998).  
Analysis involved reading data repeatedly in order to gain a sense of familiarity about the 
overall content. Billig (1998: 47) described “intuitive hunches” as the first stage of 
analysis, which Billig argued arises out of theoretical understanding of the premises of the 
approach. I then organised these “intuitive hunches” around potential themes and 
instances. I indexed material in terms of topics, and focused on how similar topics were 
discussed and posted by different pages. The discourse surrounding the Charlie Hebdo 
shooting and how the far-right communicated about this event was a prominent topic, so I 
focused on data that occurred around the time of the events surrounding the Charlie Hebdo 
attack. This material and potential extracts were indexed in terms of actions (e.g. aligning 
with the Jewish community, distinguishing between opposing Islam as an ideology and 
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Muslims as people); this is what Potter and Wetherell (1987: 168) termed “organizational 
features”. Features and patterns of interest were then noted, and narratives were 
constructed surrounding these interesting features and chosen extracts. This stage of 
writing more refined existences of discourse involved revisiting the data, and examining 
more closely the similarities and contradictions across the data corpus.   
Three elements that are at the centre of analysis in CDP and were the ‘analytic tools’ for 
this research are; 1) Subject Positions; 2) Ideological Dilemmas; 3) Interpretative 
Repertoires (additional strategies will be discussed in individual analytical chapters). 
Subject Positions refer to how people are drawn into identities, and categories that are 
made salient (Edley, 2001). In CDP, this relates back to the importance of the relationship 
between the discourse and the individual (Wetherell, 1998). CDP can be used to examine 
how identity is mobilized through discourse (Antaki, Condor and Levine 1996), and the 
discursive resources used to construct and negotiate multiple identities (Potter, 2012).  
Subject positions are especially key for my research as construction of identities and 
categories is a key strategy in ‘othering’ groups.  
Ideological Dilemmas explain how contradicting ideas are managed within the same 
account (Billig et al., 1988). Not only are Ideological Dilemmas studied in terms of how 
they are used rhetorically for a particular purpose, but in terms of their wider cultural 
implications (Edley, 2001). These dilemmas are particularly significant in contentious 
discourse such as political discourse, where people may be working to manage their own 
position. Ideological Dilemmas are key to my analysis for examining how the far-right 
manage appearing reasonable whilst maintaining the portrayal of their Islamophobic 
views.  
Interpretative Repertoires are an index of ideas or terms used to construct concepts 
(Edwards and Potter, 1992). Interpretative Repertoires are defined as “a lexicon or register 
of terms and metaphors drawn upon to characterize and evaluate action and events” (Potter 
and Wetherell, 1987:138) and “the building blocks of conversation” (Edley, 2001: 198), 
because they provide coherent ways of talking, and a base for shared cultural 
understanding in a community. Interpretative repertoires can be shared amongst 
individuals in groups in order to achieve social actions (Goodman, 2008b), and emphasise 
the role of humans in the development of language. As well as how Interpretative 
Repertoires are deployed locally, in CDP the focus is on wider social implications of 
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Interpretative Repertoires and the functions they serve in constructing identities (Edley, 
2001). Thus, I examined how the same interpretative repertoires were drawn upon by both 
far-right groups and Facebook users, and whether similar devices were utilised by former 
far-right parties in the UK.  
5. 2. 3 Visual Communication 
In addition to text and spoken discourse, this research also encompassed analysing visual 
communication i.e. images and videos. There are additional visual communicative forms 
relevant to Facebook that cannot be overlooked: tagging’ someone in a post or comment 
which means that users are notified if their name has been ‘tagged’ in a photo or post; a tag 
means that the photo or post will feature on their profile (explained in more detail in 
chapter seven), ‘liking’ a post, and the use of emoticons. Arguments against investigating 
visual media include the ambiguous nature of images and that they can have multiple 
meanings, so interpretation will not be stable or related to any spoken accounts (Reavey 
and Johnson, 2008). However, the use of images and analysing visual rhetoric has 
increased in social sciences (Reavey, 2011; Richardson and Columbo, 2014), and 
researchers recognise that language is not an isolated phenomenon (Kress and Van 
Leeuwen, 2001).  Goffman’s (1979a) early work on gender advertisements discussed the 
various functions that images can carry, from providing information for medical books, to 
complementing a human-interest story. Goffman explored how men and women were 
displayed in advertisements, for example through where they were positioned, and aspects 
such as elevation to symbolise status.  
Language should be considered within the context of which it is embedded, with other 
resources such as images (O’ Halloran, 2004). Much of the criticism of visual analysis is 
directed towards participants generating and interpreting their own images, rather than 
images that are pre-existing to research for other purposes, for example political discourse 
(Buckingham, 2009). Images are important for identities and representing how we 
construct ourselves and others (Blair, 2004; Richardson and Wodak, 2009a). Examining 
visuals in political discourse is of importance, as political campaigns rarely contain text 
alone (McGlashan, 2013). Researchers such as Richardson and Wodak (2009a) argued that 
images can argue and defend standpoints, and when linguistic content is analysed in 
combination with images, visual standpoints can be appreciated. 
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As well as examining the function of language and images as separate elements, 
researchers argue for the function and meaning of both textual and pictorial representations 
as semiotic resources to provide an integrated approach to analysis (O’ Halloran, 2004). 
Researchers argued that there is scope for visual analysis in research on identity 
construction and their representation to critically examine identities (Howarth, 2011). As 
Goodwin (2000: 158) argued: 
“it quickly becomes apparent that visual phenomena can only be investigated by taking into 
account a diverse set of semiotic resources and meaning-making practices that participants deploy 
to build the social worlds that they inhabit and constitute through ongoing processes of action”. 
While approaches such as Conversation Analysis consider visual semiotics such as gaze, 
hand gestures and their contribution to the sequence of talk in interaction, as well as the 
visual interaction between actors (e.g. Goodwin 1995; Mondada, 2014), this is more 
appropriate for analysing the visual aspects of social actions such as requesting. I am 
interested in how the visuals are chosen and portrayed by the far-right and users on 
Facebook, and what purpose they serve, rather than visual semiotics as such. Discursive 
analysis of images focuses on how images produce social practises e.g. an ‘us and them’ 
binary construction, and how images can construct accounts of the social world (Rose, 
2012). For example, how Britain First chose to film individuals that are recognisable as 
belonging to the Hasidic Jewish sect based on their religious clothing, in order to provide 
evidence that they support Jewish communities. 
To date, the application of CDP specifically to visual discourse is lacking. I apply the 
principles of CDP to visual discourse, which involves considering whether a stereotype or 
prejudice is disseminated. Discursive features such as subject positions can be examined, 
for example who is in the image (if a person is portrayed), where they are positioned in the 
image, and what actions they are performing. Analysis can also focus on whether 
individuals in images are constructed into identities and whether this in turn draws the 
audience into a subject position i.e. can the audience relate to what is happening in the 
image, or whether the image addresses the audience in a particular manner. The aim is to 
focus on processes and communicative strategies, and what is accomplished using 
different components of images and the messages in the images. As well as examining 
language and images separately, I focus on how both language and images work together 
as semiotic resources, in order to provide an integrated analysis (see O’ Halloran, 2004), 
for example how spoken discourse and visuals jointly create meaning.  
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5.3 Data Collection 
The internet is a key source of data collection for discursive methods, due to the extent to 
which social issues are articulated online (Mautner, 2005). The internet means that the far-
right’s means of effectively communicating has extended, and media such as political 
debates and other forms of communication can easily be retrieved on the internet by 
members of the public (Condor, Tileagă, And Billig, 2013). The internet is cheap and 
easily accessible, and can reach international audiences (Ferber, 1998). Traditionally, DP 
has argued that talk-in-interaction is the default mode of communication (Edwards and 
Potter, 2005), because during conversation people build meaning together in sequences of 
naturally occurring talk. However, approaches such as Herring’s (2007) computer-
mediated discourse analysis have applied the principles of DP to examine the interaction in 
emails and internet posts, and as such it can be argued that DP can be used to analyse the 
interactions that take place on social networking websites.  
This project employed a naturalistic data collection method, in so far as the data existed 
prior to research and is therefore not “researcher provoked” (Augoustinos, Tuffin, and 
Every, 2005:321; see also Potter, 1997). This is of importance to my research, as I am 
interested in how the far-right communicate in a less contrived environment, as well as 
how users on Facebook respond to less contrived far-right discourse. The other benefits of 
using naturalistic data are that it avoids the researcher’s influence, and captures interaction 
as it happens, which allows for the analysis of the complexity of naturalistic situations 
(Wiggins and Potter, 2008). The internet can provide a source of naturally occurring data 
on a large scale (Lamerichs and te Molder, 2003). Online discussions are also beneficial to 
gain access to everyday conversations that are easier to obtain than for example, telephone 
conversations (Potter, 2012), as there is access to the social settings such as forums already 
set up to discuss political issues, rather than setting up more contrived situations for people 
to talk about these issues verbally (e.g. face-to-face, focus groups).  
Social networking websites allow multiple modes of communication such as verbal and 
visual to be synthesised. Websites such as Facebook have a wide scope for people to 
communicate visually, as there is the opportunity to post images and videos both to 
profiles and community pages (Reavey, 2011). More recently, social media has been a 
platform for people to access news and institutional communication instantly and provide 
commentary (KhosraviNik, forthcoming). This gives my research the additional benefit of 
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considering not only the content of the visual communication itself, but how that is being 
responded to by other users on Facebook. As stated by Seargeant and Tagg (2013: 4): 
“Participation and interaction, with the result that the content of what is developed and shared on 
the internet is as much a product of participation as it is of traditional creative and publishing/ 
broadcasting processes”. 
The benefits of using CMC for data collection are firstly, that CMC evens out status 
differences that can occur in face-to-face interaction (Postmes, et al., 1998). Secondly, part 
of the data consists of discourse from “ordinary, everyday” people (Lynn and Lea 
2003:429) who write comments in response to posts, in addition to the posts left by the 
administrators of the official Facebook pages. “Ordinary people” in this instance means 
people who are not politicians and do not have any social or political power. This is of 
significance for my research, as part of the objective is to explore the responses to far-right 
discourse, for example how people on Facebook construct or defend accusations that far-
right organisations are racist or Islamophobic. Users online are less likely to be guarded of 
accusations of racism or Islamophobia as they are under less public scrutiny and do not 
have to manage their position the same way a public figure or politician needs to (Edwards 
and Potter, 1992; Goodman, 2007). Traditionally, critical social psychological research 
focusing on discourse about controversial topics examined parliamentary or television 
debates (e.g. Augoustinos and Every, 2007), where public and political figures were more 
likely to be guarded with their language. It was anticipated that the posts left by the far-
right would be more cautious as they have to manage their position more carefully, so 
studying both politicians’ and members of the public’s discourse means that there is the 
added benefit of a mixture of both guarded and extreme discourse. 
Coffey (2004) suggested that anonymity affects level and tone of discourse when sensitive 
issues are being discussed online, as anonymity can promote deeper conversation and 
could lead to people making harsher criticisms. Researchers argued that CMC can lead to 
more extreme language in comparison to face-to-face settings, leading to the phenomenon 
of ‘flaming’ (e.g. Bomberger, 2004) where people exchange arguments and insults. 
Despite this, Postmes et al. (1998) argued that the lack of visual cues in an online 
environment leads to a greater social awareness, and researchers such as Kushin and 
Kitchener (2009) have found that people can engage in polite discussions about issues such 
as politics in CMC. Kushin and Kitchener suggest that this may be because social 
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networking sites such as Facebook reduce anonymity as names and photographs are 
shown.  
Burke and Goodman (2012) found extreme race talk related to Nazis being used in 
Facebook discussions by supporters of asylum to challenge opposition as racist, and 
opponents expressed support for Hitler in their opposition to asylum. However, Burke and 
Goodman also found speakers orienting to the norm against prejudice by presenting the 
notion of being discriminated against and labelled a Nazi for opposing asylum seekers. 
This suggests that more extreme use of language takes place when asylum is debated 
online, and opposing asylum appears to be less problematic online. This implies that the 
internet helps to facilitate taboos on explicit language. The internet has allowed extreme 
language such as Holocaust denial to take place (Webb, 2015), which will be examined 
further in chapter nine, section 9.6. In contrast with the norm against prejudice, Miller 
(1993) suggested that people whose views are in the majority are more likely to be 
forthright in expressing their views. However, Fozdar and Pederson (2013) challenged this 
notion, and found online blogs about asylum that contained racist views being directly and 
openly challenged by supporters of asylum. Specifically, for critical research, internet 
discourse allows for the examination of how meanings and social phenomena are 
constructed in a virtual space, along with how discourses are produced, reproduced, and 
defended (Stainton-Rogers, 2009).  
Facebook was founded in 2004 by Mark Zuckerberg, and was initially a social networking 
website exclusively for students from Harvard University. Eventually, Facebook became 
available for anyone who attended a university to join (Facebook, 2013a). In 2006, 
Facebook became accessible to anyone over the age of 13 who had an email address, to 
sign up for free (Facebook, 2013b). As of June 2015, Facebook has 1.49 billion monthly 
active users, and 968 million users who log in daily (Facebook, 2015a). I chose to collect 
data from Facebook as this has become a significant platform to discuss political issues in 
a social media setting, and provides a large enough corpus of data for the research. 
Facebook was used prominently in the 2010 general election for providing links to the 
political parties, and a link to the official website that enabled people to register to vote 
(Charles, 2014; Watson, 2011). 
Facebook users can create their own profile, with a profile photo (this is a passport size 
photo which appears in the top left corner of their individual profile), and a cover photo (a 
64 
 
banner type photo along the top of their profile. Users can share photos, his or her personal 
details and interests, and write statuses. A status is written in a box at the top of a user’s 
homepage that says, ‘what’s on your mind?’ Upon writing in the box, this text disappears 
to enable a user to share their ‘status update’. Users are also able to link to other users’ 
profiles by creating a network of ‘friends’, and can communicate to their ‘friends’ through 
comments, private messages, and pressing the ‘like’ button; a ‘like’ button is a way of 
expressing interest or support, similar to saying “yeah” or nodding in agreement to a 
statement. (Zhao, Grasmuck, and Martin, 2008).  Another feature on Facebook is the 
option to ‘share’ posts, which mean reposting a post onto one’s own timeline, or someone 
else’s.  
5. 3. 1 Facebook Pages  
As well as individual profiles, it is now possible for organisations to set up a page on 
Facebook in order to communicate with and answer queries from customers or service 
users, and Facebook users can show their support for the organisation by ‘liking’ the page 
(Anderson, et al., 2012). Facebook pages can also be used by professionals and 
organizations to advertise and share information to members (Christiane Meier, 2014). 
Facebook pages are a significant and advantageous form of communication for far-right 
parties and movements as it is free both to set up and use. Recently the far-right have 
started to use digital and social media (Engström, 2014). The EDL has a prominence on 
Facebook (Garland and Treadwell, 2010), as they use it as a platform to promote their 
demonstrations, with various links to local division Facebook pages (see chapter two for 
more information about EDL demonstrations). There are various EDL Facebook support 
pages for local areas, meaning that showing support for the EDL is easy and accessible 
(Allen, 2011). I chose to collect data from the main EDL Facebook page, as this is the 
Facebook page that is advertised on the EDL’s website with a link provided.  
On pages, users can share updates, stories, links to other websites, and images (Facebook, 
2013c). Users who are interested in the content or wish to show appreciation for the page 
can choose to press the ‘like’ button, and the ‘like’ will feature on their personal Facebook 
profile. They will then receive updates from the page on their Facebook homepage 
newsfeed. As Facebook pages are public, anyone with a Facebook account can comment, 
like or share any of the content without pressing ‘like’, thus, choosing to ‘like’ a page is 
making a statement about affiliating to that particular organisation.   
65 
 
The layout of a Facebook page (see Figure 1.) is similar to a Facebook profile; the cover 
photo is at the top and the profile photo in to the bottom left of the cover photo, both of 
which can be clicked on to be viewed in full size. When opening Facebook pages, the 
Timeline is visible, which displays the posts in descending chronological order. If an 
organisation has chosen to ‘pin’ a post, this post will permanently be at the top of the 
timeline. There is an ‘about’ Section, containing information such as when the page was 
set up, a short biography of the organisation, contact details, and links to other websites 
(often the organisation’s official website). There is a tab to access photos, as well as other 
features such as future events taking place (this is on a drop-down menu that can be seen 
upon pressing ‘More’).   
 
 
Figure 1-Britain First's Facebook Page  
Posted on Britain First’s official Facebook Page at https://www.facebook.com/OfficialBritainFirst/ 
on 7th September 2015 
Communication on Facebook pages is asynchronous, which means that users do not need 
to be online at the same time in order to communicate, and therefore there can be a delay 
in responses to previous messages (Burke and Goodman, 2012; Chadwick, 2006). 
Facebook users can also press the ‘like’ button to other users’ comments, and the author of 
the comment will be notified if the ‘like’ button has been pressed in response to one of 
their comments. Facebook pages also contain images that have been added by individuals, 
as well as by the administrators of that page. 
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When users leave posts or photos on Facebook pages, the post shows the profile photo and 
name of the individual who has written the post. Both the photo and name carry a 
hyperlink to the individual’s profile page, so that other Facebook users can access the 
public information on their profile page from comments they have left, and therefore users 
can be more accountable for their comments depending on the privacy settings of their 
own Facebook profile. While most websites such as news websites have the option to 
remove offensive comments, e.g. comments of a racist nature (Hughey and Daniels, 2013), 
Facebook comments and offensive materials are removed if they are reported by Facebook 
users through the report button, (a report button is on all Facebook posts, photos and 
videos), or deleted by the page administrators. This means that the level of the 
acceptability of posts is determined by individual users on Facebook (Ben-David and 
Matamoros Fernández, 2016), and content can be reported with minimal investment of 
time or effort (Oboler, 2013). Users can be banned from pages by Facebook 
administrators, which means they can no longer access or communicate on the page, which 
is the same as to ‘block’ someone (Facebook, 2015b). A recent report by Oboler (2013) 
showed that much of the content reported to Facebook, including posts containing anti-
Semitic material, was not deemed to be a violation of Facebook’s terms and policies 
regarding hate speech and therefore not removed from Facebook. 
5. 4 Procedure for data collection  
5.4.1 Far-right Pages  
Data was collected from three official far-right Facebook pages; the far-right movement 
English Defence League13 (EDL), and the far-right political parties the British National 
Party14 (BNP), Britain First15 (See chapter two for an overview of each organisation).  The 
pages were selected on the basis that they were the official Facebook pages of the three 
most prominent far-right organisations in the UK at the time of data collection. The pages 
were sourced from the link provided on each organisation’s official website in order to 
ensure that I was sourcing from the official Facebook page. If one was to type the 
organisation into the Facebook search engine, more than one page would appear, some of 
                                                          
13 https://www.facebook.com/pages/EDL-English-Defence-League/238696516197018 
14 https://www.facebook.com/OfficialBritishNationalParty 
15 https://www.facebook.com/britainfirstgb?fref=ts 
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which would be ‘unofficial’ and not created by or linked to the official organisation. The 
EDL in particular has various Facebook pages for each of its local divisions, but has one 
main Facebook Page.   
The pages contained regular updates commenting on what was happening in the news and 
significant events, for example the child sexual exploitation scandal in Rotherham reported 
in August 201416, and the Charlie Hebdo attack in Paris in January 2015. The EDL use 
their Facebook page frequently to promote upcoming demonstrations, and often change 
their cover photo to advertise the upcoming demonstration. While Facebook has been 
described as “semi-public” (KhosravaNik, forthcoming; Sveningsson Elm, 2009) in the 
sense that membership is required to sign up, however, content can be public or private 
according to individual privacy settings. It was decided to access content that was public 
only. As the three official pages can be accessed from the parties’ official websites, this 
means that their Facebook page contents are visible to an internet user who does not have a 
Facebook account.  Below is information about how long each Page has been on 
Facebook, how many posts, images and videos were collected from each page, and how 
many ‘likes’ each Page had by the time data collection had ceased, to give a sense of how 
popular and how much activity each page has:  
Name of page Year the 
page joined 
Facebook 
Number of 
likes 
Number of 
Posts  
Number of 
images  
Number 
of videos  
English 
Defence 
League 
2011 183, 091 143 127 5 
British 
National Party 
2009 188, 752 18 86 2 
Britain First 2013 673, 974 12 96 3 
 
Table 1-Date and no of 'likes' as of March 2015 
 
                                                          
16 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-south-yorkshire-28934963 
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5.4.2 Capturing Data 
For the purpose of data collection, a Facebook profile was created to search for and collect 
from far-right pages. The profile contained an anonymised name, and had no personal 
information about myself or pictures. Pages were liked and covertly observed, I did not 
engage in any participation or discussion with any other Facebook members (see Ethical 
Considerations in section 5.5). Covert observation is beneficial as researchers such as 
Bartlett and Littler (2013:3) argue that: 
“only through the lens of activism can academics and policymakers arrive at a more concrete 
understanding of far right movements such as the EDL, which have formerly been described as 
both ‘complex’ and ‘amorphous’”.  
Firstly, the Facebook posts and images were captured using the computer software 
Awesome Screenshot™, which was downloaded from Google Chrome. This software 
allowed me to capture Facebook screenshots as they appeared on the page, save them as 
PDF files, label them, and annotate them to assist with analysis. Aspects of the page can 
also be covered up, for example names and photos in order to make authors anonymous. 
Videos were recorded using ‘liteCam’™, a similar screen capture programme that captures 
and records videos online. Lyrics and speech in videos were transcribed verbatim, and then 
in more detail using Jeffersonian transcription conventions (2004; see appendix B for a list 
of transcription symbols used). Data were collected between March 2014 and February 
2015. Data were captured daily as frequently as possible throughout the day. Data were 
stored electronically on a password protected computer, and printed copies were stored in 
locked files in an office at Loughborough University. As the project focuses on how the 
far-right responded to the events surrounding the Charlie Hebdo attack, these posts are 
from January-February 2015 (note that the British National party had a notable reduction 
in posts following Griffin’s bankruptcy and subsequent departure in July 2014, and thus, 
are not included in the final analysis). 
One of the challenges of using Facebook for data collection is that texts on Facebook 
pages were frequently disappearing as a result of either being deleted, or members 
deactivating their Facebook account. It became apparent during data collection that some 
comments had already been deleted before I could capture them. This was evident from 
two ways: the administrators of the page leaving posts announcing that a post of a fascist 
69 
 
nature had been deleted or that a user had been removed from the page, or users directly 
replying to other users who did not appear to be present in the discussion.  
5.4.3 Selection of Extracts 
The selection of extracts presented has been purposefully selective in order to represent the 
issues that I am focusing on i.e., the aftermath of the Charlie Hebdo attack (see appendix A 
for an outline of the full data corpus). The extracts encompass a combination of video 
footage, Facebook discussions, and Facebook posts. This includes the following, in 
chronological order: 
1. A post by the English Defence League from 16th January titled ‘Islamists are just 
21st century fascists’, with an image of Osama bin Laden beside an image of Adolf 
Hitler. 
2. A video posted by Britain First on 17th January 2015, of an interview on Channel 4 
news with the Dutch far-right politician Geert Wilders. The video is 3:45 minutes 
long.  
3. Comments to the Britain First video of the Geert Wilders interview, 384 comments 
in total. 
4. A post by the English Defence League from 28th January titled ‘70 years After Its 
liberation, A Drone Captures the Auschwitz we Should Never Forget’. The post 
contained a link to a video of a drone capturing the concentration camp.  
5. Facebook comments left in response to the Auschwitz post, 59 comments in total. 
6. A video posted by Britain First on 31st January 2015, of Britain First on a 
‘solidarity patrol’ in Golders Green, London to show support for the Jewish 
community following the Charlie Hebdo attack. The video is 6:03 minutes long.  
7. Facebook comments that were left in response to the solidarity patrol, 436 
comments in total. 
The aim is not to provide a representative sample of far-right responses to terrorist attacks, 
but to draw upon a selection that represent the key strategies used by Britain First and the 
English Defence League. Thus, the order of analytical chapters is not chronological by 
post, but is organised to give a reflection of each of the key strategies: 
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1) Ideology and concealment in the Britain First solidarity patrol. 
2) Examining the transition from supportive comments towards Jews to anti-Semitic 
discourse in Facebook comments to the solidarity patrol. 
3) Anti-Islamic rhetoric in the interview with Geert Wilders. 
4) Interaction and conflict in discussions surrounding the idea of ‘reopening’ 
concentration camps. 
Secondly, the aim is to examine how the far-right responded to and maintained opposition 
to Islam during the events surrounding the Charlie Hebdo attack, rather than to provide an 
overview of far-right discourse in general. All posts in the analysis are presented as they 
appeared on Facebook, so spelling and grammatical errors remain. Another reason to 
present posts uncensored is so that the discourse is conveyed as extreme as it appeared on 
Facebook. To censor offensive terms would be as Billig (2001:12) described: “modifying 
this hatefulness”.  
5. 5 Ethical Considerations  
The research was conducted in coherence with Loughborough University’s Ethical 
Guidelines and the British Psychological Society’s Ethical Principles for conducting 
Research with Human Participants (2009) and the Ethics Guidelines for Internet-mediated 
Research (2013). Ethical approval was granted from Loughborough University’s Ethics 
Committee after completion of an Ethical Clearance Checklist. The purpose of this 
checklist is to ensure that research involving human participants complies with the Ethics 
Committee’s guidelines. After completion of the checklist, the Ethics Committee requested 
that I confirmed with the IT services of Loughborough University that the research 
complied with the University’s IT regulations. Following from this, the IT services 
confirmed that the research complied with all regulations. The Ethics Committee advised 
to use a fully anonymised email address and Facebook account, which I confirmed that I 
had done with the Ethics Committee by sending screenshots of my Facebook profile, 
which was found to be satisfactory. Profile pictures of participants have been anonymised 
unless the picture is an avatar. Names have been omitted with the pseudonym P 
(‘participant’) followed by a number, to assist with analysis (e.g. P1).   
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5.6 Summary  
In this chapter, I have described my method and procedure of collecting data from 
Facebook. I have outlined my analytical approach of critical discursive psychology, and 
discussed the benefits of why this approach is suitable to analyse both textual and visual 
data, such as the application of findings to reflect wider social and historical contexts. I 
have discussed why Facebook is valuable as a naturalistic and rich source of data. I 
outlined how the data were collected from far-right pages and the challenges that I faced 
with the ‘open-ended’ nature of Facebook. This led onto the selection of extracts chosen 
for the analysis that reflected the current climate of the Charlie Hebdo attack. Finally, I 
addressed the ethical implications of my research and how I adhered to ethical principles. 
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6. Ideology and Concealment in the 
Britain First Solidarity Patrol 
6.1 Introduction 
The solidarity patrol video was posted on Britain First’s Facebook Page on 31st January 
2015, 22 days after the ISIS shooting in the Kosher supermarket in Paris, and after media 
reports of anti-Semitic attacks in the UK. The video was also posted on Britain First’s 
website. Britain First was patrolling in Golders Green, North London, the purpose of 
which was, ostensibly, to offer support to Jewish communities after the shooting in the 
Kosher supermarket in Paris. The caption to the video reads: “These patrols are in response 
to a steep rise in Islamic hostility and attacks directed at the Jewish community in 
Britain”17. Britain First are thereby implying that Muslims are responsible for the anti-
Semitic attacks that followed the Charlie Hebdo shooting. 
In this chapter, I focus on how Britain First on the surface show support for the Jewish 
community in order to appear as reasonable. Towards the end of the video, it emerges that 
the solidarity patrol is less about supporting Jews, and more about opposing Islam. This is 
shown through discourse about political correctness. I also analyse how Britain First 
visually communicate in the video that they are supporting the Jewish community. Results 
are discussed in light of how Britain First achieves anti-Islamic rhetoric whilst maintaining 
support from the mainstream.  
In the solidarity patrol, Britain First aims to show that it is supporting British Jews (who 
Golding and Fransen refer to in the video as “the Jewish community”) who are presented 
as being under threat from Islam (this strategy of presenting Jews as under threat was seen 
on several far-right posts in addition to the solidarity patrol). Britain First is managing the 
tension and ideological dilemma (Billig et al., 1988) of showing support for the Jewish 
community whilst maintaining its far-right position. This was the first patrol of its kind 
executed by Britain First, prior to this Britain First had been on ‘Christian patrols’, where 
they broke into mosques or harassed Muslims in factories and restaurants to protest against 
                                                          
17 https://www.britainfirst.org/solidarity-patrol/). 
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issues such as selling Halal food (see chapter two, 2.2). This anti-Islamic patrol is being 
disguised by Britain First as a patrol to show solidarity to the Jewish community and leave 
the audience to make the link between anti-Semitic attacks and opposing Islam. Britain 
First is targeting Islam, but only indirectly, in contrast to other far-right movements such 
as the English Defence League, which holds violent and aggressive anti-Islamic 
demonstrations (Garland and Treadwell, 2010). 
Solidarity is defined by Rorty (1989) as the reference to a ‘we’ type community in order to 
protect others. This is in keeping with Billig’s (1982: 229-230, see also Richardson, 2011) 
discussion of ‘esoteric’ and ‘exoteric’ messages (also referred to as ‘surface’ and ‘depth’ 
ideology, Billig, 1978). Exoteric messages are those articulated to appeal to the mass 
audience (i.e. non-supporters), using non-specialist language and often expressing failures 
of ‘the system’. Here this is the more outward messages from Britain First of solidarity 
towards the Jewish community. Esoteric messages are the underlying ideologies of groups, 
and thus, new members only are initially exposed to exoteric messages. The same concept 
was utilised by the Nazi party using euphemisms and metaphors in the discourse that they 
circulated to the public (Griffin, 2015). 
6. 2 The Solidarity Patrol 
The solidarity patrol took place in Golders Green, an area in North London with a large 
Jewish population. Britain First filmed its members handing out leaflets, occasionally to 
people who appear to belong to the Hasidic Jewish community in Golders Green (see 
figure 4 in this chapter). Jayda Fransen (Britain First’s deputy leader), standing in front of 
the camera, began by expressing “heartbreak” over Jews fleeing from Britain because of 
an increase in anti-Semitic attacks in Britain (which Fransen linked to the Charlie Hebdo 
attack). Throughout Fransen’s account there were shots of newspaper clippings such as the 
Daily Mail outlining anti-Semitic attacks committed by Muslims. Paul Golding (the leader 
of Britain First) then talked about protecting the Jewish community, and claimed that 
nothing is being done to protect Jews from Islamic extremism due to “political 
correctness”. Again, there are screenshots of news headlines, for example an article from 
the BBC news with the heading “Jewish fears for safety in wake of Paris attacks”.  
The opening of the video was set out like a generic, third party news report on a busy 
street, in order to appear natural and unscripted. Paul Golding began behind the camera 
filming Fransen, possibly to break the stereotype of Britain First being typical far-right 
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members; at this point he was acting like an unrelated media member. Jayda Fransen was 
in front of the camera (and in contrast to Golding, was not made salient as a member by 
wearing Britain First merchandise). The video is a contrived performance of acting 
reasonable. Each time there was a two-part construction of telling the audience where they 
were, and why they were there. Both Fransen and Golding started their accounts by saying 
“we are here in Golders Green” (lines 5, 38). This is to emphasise the length of time that 
Britain First spent patrolling in Golders Green, and the sky gets progressively darker as the 
video goes on. Both Golding and Fransen gave separate accounts from each other, with no 
reference back to each other’s accounts.  
The location as Golders Green is recognisable, as the war memorial is visible behind 
Fransen and Golding whenever they speak to the camera. Britain First did not explicitly 
explain the link between Golders Green and the Jewish community, but Britain First need 
to justify why, as a far-right party, they were in an area with a high Jewish population. 
Britain First made it salient that they are protecting the Jewish community in Golders 
Green. This is a strategy of linking places to a religion, using Golders Green as a resource 
to identify Jewish communities. There was no explicit mention of the ISIS attack on the 
Kosher supermarket in Paris, with the focus being on protecting the Jewish community 
after a series of reports of anti-Semitic attacks in the UK.  
6. 3 Analytical Strategies 
In this chapter I focus on three strategies: 1) Identity construction; 2) Us and them; and 3) 
Footing. Firstly, I examine the identity work surrounding Britain First supporters helping 
people like ‘us’, and how identities such as ‘us’ and ‘them’ are constructed in this context. 
This is in line with previous research examining the construction of asylum seekers as ‘just 
like us’ (Masocha, 2015), which in turns challenges the counter-position that asylum 
seekers are different to ‘us’ and therefore a threat (Capdevila and Callaghan, 2008). 
Another analytical focus is the formation of the ‘us and them’ interpretative repertoire 
(Lynn and Lea 2003: 437), in which a binary opposition is created of a group being 
different to ‘us’, usually on cultural grounds and an out-group is constructed as the ‘other’ 
(Masocha, 2015).  This is in line with van Dijk’s (1995) notion of ‘us versus them’, in 
which ‘they’ are associated with negative attributes and threatening the identity and values 
of ‘us’. Construction of ‘the other’ can be related to structures of power and reinforce 
inequality between groups (Dyers and Wankah, 2012). The separation of ‘us and them’ 
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allows the speaker to shift agency and responsibility; for example, the problem of 
integration in a community can either be attributed to those inside or outside of a 
community. (Kirkwood, McKinlay and McVittie, 2014).  
Finally, I will show how Britain First use ‘footing’ to speak on behalf of Jews. Footing is 
defined as "the alignment we take up to ourselves and the others present as expressed in 
the way we manage the production or reception of an utterance" (Goffman, 1979b; 
1981:128). This means that in the suitable context, speakers can shift their alignment to 
speak on behalf of other people.   
To start with, Fransen introduces the leaflets and the purpose of the Solidarity patrol: 
Extract One, Jayda Fransen 
1. we’re out on a Britain First SolidARITY patrol (.) now this is in response to 
2. what many of you will have seen has been covered by: a lot of the media recently  
3. (.) um and they’re reporting that there is a err significant ri:se in anti-Semitism in  
4. the UK which is actually causing the Jewish community to feel that they have to  
5. flee Britain (.) ah and ((places hand on chest)) this is absolutely heart-breaking  
6. >y know< we don’t want a peaceful community to be run out of of Britain 
 
Fransen begins by constructing an appeal to common knowledge (2) about the shooting at 
the kosher supermarket, something that people “will have seen”, without explicitly 
referring to the attack.  Fransen refers to “many of you”, suggesting that Britain First has a 
high number of supporters and people who will be viewing the video. This also excludes 
Muslims and Jews as audience members, and implies that the video is not intended to be 
viewed by Muslims or Jews. Fransen attributes the negative report as coming from the 
media, implying that Fransen has not heard personally about any anti-Semitic attacks, the 
negative news is not coming from Fransen directly (Drew, 2006). Muslims are constructed 
as causing a problem: Jews wanting to flee Britain. The seriousness of this matter is 
emphasised through Fransen’s use of the word “actually” (4). The use of the extreme case 
formulations (Pomerantz, 1986) “significant rise” and “flee” (3, 5) indicates the magnitude 
of the problem, that Jews are fearful and being forced out of Britain. This type of imagery 
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invokes an asylum seeker type identity and constructs Jews as a vulnerable group, fearful 
of facing persecution from Islamic extremists.  
Fransen is footing on behalf of Jews to show acknowledgment for how Jews feel. Fransen 
shows empathy, using phrases such as “we don’t want” (6), invoking the ‘us and them’ 
interpretative repertoire (Lynn and Lea, 2003) by collectively stating what Britain First, as 
a Christian organisation, want for another religious community. This empathy and looking 
out for the Jewish community allows opposition to Islam to take place, as Fransen is 
opposing Islam not for herself, but for the good of another community. This is a form of 
positive self-presentation (van Dijk, 1992) where Fransen presents herself in a positive 
light against an evil ‘other’. Fransen does not elaborate or discuss Islam at great length, 
and glosses over events by saying “you know” (6) quickly which distances herself from 
opposing Islam. Starting off by using neutral language means that Britain First can draw 
people in before they say contentious statements. Starting with Fransen may have been 
effective because as a female she is less stereotypical as a far-right member compared to 
Paul Golding, especially as he is well known for being a far-right politician and former 
councillor of the British National Party. 18 
Fransen continues after being prompted by Golding’s question: 
Extract Two, Jayda Fransen  
1. PG: Run out of Britain by whom? 
2. JF: ↑Run out of Britain by Islamic extremists- now this is a direct err response by  
3.       the Jewish community um in the wake↑ of the Charlie Hebdo attacks (.) since  
4.       then um we’ve seen lots of coverage in the media but there’s been a- a real  
5.       difficult feel amongst the Jewish community that they have expressed that  
6.       they don’t feel ↓ welcome they don’t feel safe because of Islamic extremists  
7.       threatening their communities now we’re talking about a peaceful people the  
8.       Jewish community who haven’t caused any harm we don’t hear of any  
                                                          
18 http://www.kentlive.news/bnp-candidate-wins-seat-district-council-time/story-12019965-detail/story.html 
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9.       ((Fransen gestures quotation marks using her hands)) Jewish extremism yet  
10.       these people are being forced out of their ho:mes out of the streets and out of  
11.       this country (.) so we’re here this evening just to show our solidarity and our  
12.       support for the Jewish community  
 
At this point Fransen holds Islamic extremists responsible for Jews wanting to flee Britain, 
a response that is prompted by Golding’s question. Fransen then jumps to her next 
sentence rapidly. At the mention of Islamic extremists (2), the camera pans out and shoots 
to a newspaper shot, of a Daily Mail article titled ‘‘I’m going to go Jew bashing’: what 
teenage thug texted friend before Muslim thugs beat up Orthodox Jewish man ‘in protest 
against conflict in Palestine’’. This image works to avoid Fransen making a face-to-face 
accusation to the camera about Islamic extremists, and allows the newspaper headline to 
describe the situation in a more explicit manner. Fransen then provides a general gloss 
over the consequences of the Charlie Hebdo attack on the Jewish community (“a difficult 
feel”, line 5). 
The denial that there are no Jewish extremists is a subtle way to suggest that there are 
Muslim extremists. The use of the word “welcome” (6) constructs Jews as unhappy in their 
own country. 
Fransen invokes a three-part list (10-11) of how Jews are being persecuted by Islamic 
extremists. This construction progressively upgrades from local to national persecution to 
construct how Jewish people are being persecuted: 1) forced out of their homes, 2) forced 
off the streets and 3) forced out of “this” country. Note how the ownership has been 
removed after “their homes”, and no sense of ownership is attached to “the streets” or “this 
country”. This makes the British citizenship of British Jews seem less significant, and this 
concealed support for Jews is a strategy used by Britain First to reach out to the 
mainstream, yet not lose their original followers.  
Fransen is again footing on behalf of the Jewish community by reporting what Jews have 
“expressed” (5). Fransen constructs the solidarity patrol as acting on behalf of a vulnerable 
minority. Fransen refers to Jews as “they”, providing a generic construction of all Jews as 
feeling the same way. Fransen ends this account by saying that Britain First is here “just” 
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to show solidarity and support (11), implying that there is no other agenda behind the 
solidarity patrol other than to protect the Jewish community. This justification for Britain 
First’s recent support towards the Jewish community is necessary given the far-right’s 
historical anti-Semitic outlook. 
Golding goes on to question Fransen about the response from Jewish people in Golders 
Green. Fransen describes the positive response, and draws Christians and Jews together as 
communities that have been and are currently victims at the hands of Islam:  
Extract Three, Jayda Fransen 
1. As a Christian um organisation we kno:w <very well> the effects um that this  
2. Islamic extremism can have on↑on the two religions >I mean< Christians are  
3. are no strangers to persecution at the hands of Islamic extremists and so you  
4. know we have that common bond ((Fransen gestures with hands)) and we just  
5. want them to know that they’re not alone and we don’t want them fleeing  
6. Britain 
Fransen here makes a general reference and gloss over historical events.  Phrases such as 
“common bond” (4) are attempts to build a bridge with the Jewish community. Fransen is 
empathising with the Jewish community by providing a parallel account of persecution 
towards Christians from Islamic extremism. This provides extra support for the Jewish 
community and their own experiences of suffering, as well as positioning Islam as 
incompatible with other religions (see Wood and Finlay, 2008). The subject position of 
Britain First as a Christian organisation serves the purpose of presenting anti-Islamic 
arguments, as Britain First can argue that it is preserving its own traditional religious 
practises, rather than opposing Islam (Kamenova and Pingaud, forthcoming). 
The use of “this” (1) when Fransen talks about Islamic extremism has negative 
connotations, a form of ‘othering’ a group as not one of ‘us’ (Jackson, 2013). Again, we 
see phrases such as “you know”, an appeal to common knowledge and presenting the idea 
of Christians and Jews having a common bond as common knowledge. The use of the 
word “just” (4) is used again to emphasise that there is no other motive for Britain First 
being there. 
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So far, we have seen Fransen show solidarity with Jews and present the solidarity patrol as 
just about showing support for Jewish communities, while showing separation from the 
Jewish community in two ways: 1) the expression that Jews want to flee Britain is only 
seen from the media and not from Jews telling Britain First directly, 2) the removal of 
ownership from Jews to Britain. When Golding appears in front of the camera later, we 
start to see the real agenda behind the solidarity patrol. Golding begins by emphasising 
Islam being the cause of anti-Semitism:  
Extract Four, Paul Golding 
1. Right we’re here in Golders Green in North London the reason we’ve come to  
2. this particular neighbourhood err is a series of media reports that have been in  
3. the press recently regarding err a huge rise especially after the Charlie Hebdo  
4. attacks in anti-Semitic hostility err towards the Jewish community by Islam by  
5. the Islamic extremist movement in this country 
While the link to being in Golders Green and supporting the Jewish community is still not 
explicitly explained at this point, Golding implies that they have chosen “this particular 
neighbourhood” for a specific reason, which he attributes to the media, referring to a 
“series” (2) in order to construct the problem as ongoing. This is a similar attribution made 
by Fransen earlier, as constructing the bad news as coming from the media, rather than 
from Golding directly. Golding uses an extreme case formulation (Pomeranzt, 1986) when 
describing “the huge rise” in anti-Semitism (3), but is hesitant when doing so, saying “err”, 
in a similar way to when he refers to the Jewish community in the following extract. In 
lines 4-5 there is a self-repaired upgrade from “Islam” to “Islamic extremist movement”. 
This is used to juxtapose Islam as an extremist movement with the ‘vulnerable’ Jewish 
community, and polarise the two religions.  
Golding continues with his account as to why the patrol is taking place: 
Extract Five, Paul Golding 
1. some err (.) many many Jews in the media have said that they’re leaving this 
2. country err we’re talking here about a small minority in this country that’s come  
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3. under sustained attack and for reasons of political correctness the media the  
4. politicians the authorities are not taking decisive action we’ve come here today  
5. with our solidarity patrol leaflets and we’ve given out hundreds of these here in  
6. Golders Green err especially to various err (.) Orthodox Jews and err various  
7. Jewish groups that are around this area we’ve given this out because at the end of 
8.  it it says (.) ((points to leaflet)) >you know< if you’re facing hostility from Islamic  
9. extremists and the Police do nothing the authorities do nothing err because they  
10. turn a blind eye for reasons of political correctness then ring Britain First and we  
11. will either pressurise the authorities or we will come dow-down and take action  
12. against Islamic extremist we’re here primarily because (.) err a minority in this  
13. country just like the Sikhs ↑ just like the Hindus are facing hostility from Islamic  
14. extremism and quite frankly these people are born here they’re British they  
15. ↑contribute to our Society and we are not gonna ↑have the authorities turning a  
16. blind eye just like they do with our ↓people to sustained attacks sustained  
17. hostility to their community putting them under pressure  
Here Golding indicates that the reason for the patrol has shifted, from Fransen constructing 
them as “just” (extract two, line eleven, extract four, line four) being there for solidarity, to 
Golding constructing it as that is why they are there “primarily” (12). This suggests that 
there are secondary causes for the patrol, which shows more of a political agenda with the 
patrol being about opposition to Islam; although in both accounts Fransen and Golding 
attribute the media as feeding this information. Note that Golding is now addressing the 
audience directly, referring to “you” suggesting that the message in the solidarity patrol is 
directed at Britain First supporters rather than Jews.   
Golding describes the Jewish community both as a “small minority” (2), and also refers to 
“many, many Jews” (1) who have been attacked. This contrast allows Golding to 
emphasise that Jews are an ethnic minority in Britain whilst nonetheless a high number are 
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reporting leaving Britain. The gloss over numbers enables Golding to justify his patrol 
without having to provide concrete figures or evidence. Golding refers to Jews saying “in 
the media” (1) that they wish to leave the UK, suggesting that Golding has not been in 
direct contact with any Jews who have said this. The latter statement has a self-repair of 
“some” to “many many” in order to upgrade the exaggeration, and make the risk being 
posed (i.e. Jews leaving the UK) more serious. The quantity of Jewish people being 
victimised shifts according to Golding’s account.  At line 12 there is hesitation with the 
use of “err” around mentioning Jews, and an attempt to show awareness of different 
Jewish divisions, yet being cautious not to be offensive (“Orthodox Jews and err various 
Jewish groups”, 6-7). This is similar to the delicacy that is used when discussing issues 
related to race (e.g. Goodman and Burke, 2010; 2011). Golding is attempting to 
differentiate between Orthodox and other sectors of Judaism, as a way of showing respect 
and orienting away from the typical anti-Semitic outlook of far-right groups.  
Golding constructs a three-part list of why Britain First supports Jews (14-15). 1) They are 
born here, 2) They are British, 3) They contribute to society. Golding starts this list with 
“quite frankly” (14), which is used to show that Golding is aware of the problematic nature 
of the contentious statement that he is about to say. This list represents the totality in 
chronological order of why Jews are accepted, beginning with being born in Britain and 
progressing onto contributing to British society. This in turn implicitly indicates that 
Muslims in contrast, are none of these three things. There is conflict between the 
construction of Jews as ethnic minorities, yet still being British and valuable to British 
society. This is how Britain First achieves supporting Jews yet maintain its distance from 
Jews.  Fransen in her account positions Britain First as a Christian organisation, however, 
Goldings’s account here refers to other religious communities who are “born here”, which 
starts to show that Britain First’s agenda lies with British-born people.  
Golding draws upon other religious communities and shows solidarity with minority 
groups. This is used to orient away from the stereotype that far-right groups support ‘white 
only’ groups, and that Britain First does have connections with other non-white groups; 
however, the point is made salient that Britain First’s agenda lies with British, Christian 
people. There is rhetorical work around who the minority is and who the majority is. Even 
though it is not explicitly said, it is implied that Britain First and Christians are the 
majority. The term “these people” (14) allows Golding to be non-descriptive when talking 
about religious groups (Jackson, 2013). This strategy has been identified by van Dijk 
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(1984) as a way of avoiding mentioning specific groups. “These people” appears to be a 
version of the contrastive ‘us’ and ‘them’. Golding is doing moral work by fighting for 
other groups and not himself, as he is not defending his own people, but other groups. 
Britain First is using the example of other religions to illustrate the problematic nature of 
Muslims (Kassemeris and Jackson, 2015), aligning with other ethnic minorities in order to 
present all groups as being under threat from Islam. This makes Golding less accountable 
for taking action against Muslims, as he is protecting a greater cause at his own risk, and 
even at the expense of ‘his own people’ being attacked.  
The term “our people” (16) is a three-part construction of an ‘us and them’ interpretative 
repertoire. Two of these are “us groups”, Christians and Jews, the third group, “them”, is 
Muslims. Christians are helping out another ‘‘us’’ group. This constructs Christians and 
Jews as being somewhat together and having common ground. Golding is drawing upon 
the prejudice that Muslims have towards other religious groups to justify prejudice towards 
Muslims (see Goodman, 2008b).  
6. 4 Political Correctness 
Political Correctness is a common idea regarding the concealment of the truth about Islam, 
mostly by the media (Ekman, 2015).  
Golding makes an accusation twice that Jews are being victimised due to “political 
correctness” (3, 10). At line 45 Golding constructs a three-part list of who is orienting to 
this political correctness by not appearing prejudice by opposing Islam: 1) the media, 2) 
politicians 3) authorities, which leaves no one else significant that people (and Jews) can 
turn to. The list escalates up to more responsible group of people in terms of protecting the 
public. This works to display Britain First as severing ties with all three, and therefore as 
neutral and someone to turn to. The Britain First phone number appears on the screen at 
various points during the video, and on line 10 Golding instructs viewers to ring Britain 
First, constructing Britain First as a charitable organisation that can help people. This 
works to draw the viewer into the position of also being in danger from Islamic extremism. 
Here Golding is orienting to the reason why the authorities are remaining silent over 
extremist Islam and although Golding keeps his account vague, it is made salient that 
political correctness is a negative concept; where the authorities are not taking action in 
order to avoid appearing prejudicial. The use of “turning a blind eye” (10) implies that 
people are not facing up to the truth about Islamic extremism, and that Britain First is 
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being censored by people who are in support of Islam. Golding is orienting to the common 
‘norm against prejudice’, that it is problematic to oppose Islam due to potential accusations 
of Islamophobia.  
Political correctness is used as a reason for showing support for Muslims. It is constructed 
as a negative concept and often discussed in a vague manner in order to avoid being 
undermined (Edwards and Potter, 1992). Political correctness is often constructed by the 
far-right as a danger, and this allows the speaker to display a distorted version of reality, 
and construct being victimized as a result of this political correctness without having to 
state exactly how they are being victimized. Britain First uses political correctness as a tool 
to justify the anti-Islamic patrols, and uses strategies to avoid discussing its historically 
violent patrols. When Golding refers to the Britain First leaflet, he starts with saying “it 
says” (8). Here he is distancing himself from the message in the leaflet, possibly because it 
is of a threatening nature; he also uses the phrase “you know” (8) to suggest that he is not 
spelling out what action they will take. Golding emphasises the message through pointing 
to the leaflet.   
The term “take action” (11) implies an ambiguous threat and potentially causing harm to 
Golding’s perception of people who are Islamic extremists, at this point his presentation as 
reasonable and making sacrifices for a greater good waiver. Golding is constructing a 
positive self-presentation whilst talking about minority groups (van Dijk, 1984).Golding is 
being careful not to be self-incriminating, as he is being vague and not explicitly saying 
how Britain First will take action as this has potentially negative consequences. This is 
where CDP is beneficial to analyse such discourse, as the historical violence of Britain 
First’s Christian patrols are an indication as to why Golding is being vague about ‘taking 
action’. This is similar to research by Bull and Simon-Vandenbergen (2014), who 
identified that the far-right party the BNP portrayed implicit and vague messages, but with 
clear suggestions over its (anti-immigration) stance, also what Wodak (2009: 215) referred 
to as “calculated ambivalence”. 
Here we have seen from Golding’s account, that the solidarity patrol is more about 
opposing Islam than about showing support for Jewish communities. Golding has drawn 
upon the common far-right interpretative repertoires of political correctness to ‘explain’ 
why authorities are not taking action against Islamic extremism. Now I turn to examine the 
visual communication shown throughout the video in more detail.  
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6. 5 Visual Analysis 
Britain First uses visual communication to support the notion that they are in solidarity 
with the Jewish community. There are four points at which Britain First make use of visual 
evidence: 1) the use of the solidarity patrol leaflet with symbols, 2) indicating a “common 
bond” with the Jewish community using hand gestures, 3) handing out leaflets to people 
recognisable as belonging to the Hasidic Jewish sect, 4) the use of coded messages through 
symbols on Golding’s clothing.  
6.5.1 Fransen displays the leaflet 
Jayda Fransen at the beginning of the video (0:16) explains where Britain First is 
patrolling, and that they are out distributing leaflets: 
 
Figure 2-Solidarity patrol leaflet 
Screenshot taken from video posted on Britain First’s official Facebook page at 
https://www.facebook.com/OfficialBritainFirst/videos/712233078921956/ on 31st January 2015 
Fransen shows the leaflet to the camera to ensure that the viewer can see the full leaflet-
providing pictorial evidence. The leaflet indicates a link between Muslims and Nazis. 
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There are three parts to the images on the bottom of the leaflet that provide this link; 1) 
burqa 2) mosque, 3) swastika, all of which are crossed out and positioned as unacceptable. 
The swastika is ambiguous as to what Britain First are opposing, but suggests that Britain 
First are portraying Muslims as Nazis. This in turn constructs Britain First as the opposite 
of Nazis, arguing against a common stereotype that is often invoked about far-right 
members (Burke and Goodman, 2012). Note the Israeli flag is also visible, another symbol 
to represent Britain First’s support towards the Jewish community. Portraying the Israeli 
flag is an orientation towards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, suggesting support for Israel 
and thus further emphasises the separation of both Jews and Britain First from Muslims. . 
The leaflets are in black and white, giving them a timeless, serious depiction.  
6.5.2 Fransen’s Common Bond gesture  
Next (2:16; see also extract three, line four), Fransen uses a hand gesture at the point of 
mentioning this “common bond” between Christians and Jews, and places her hands 
together and taps them twice to symbolise this bond: 
 
Figure 3-Fransen's 'common bond' gesture 
Screenshot taken from video posted on Britain First’s official Facebook page at 
https://www.facebook.com/OfficialBritainFirst/videos/712233078921956/ on 31st January 2015 
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During Fransen’s account, she is building up Britain First’s solidarity towards the Jewish 
community, and reflecting upon its own suffering as Christians, drawing upon its 
experiences as a Christian community. Christians have been where Jews are now. This 
works to put the two religions together in contrast with Islam, yet keeps Britain First 
separate from Jews by invoking an ‘us’ identity; Christians have been constructed as an in-
group category. The text for the telephone number and website for Britain First appear at 
this point on the screen, further emphasising that Britain First is an organisation that Jews 
can ‘turn to’. 
During Golding’s account (3:36), the camera makes visually salient someone who is 
unambiguously recognisable as belonging to a Hasidic Jewish community: 
6.5.3 Fransen with an Individual recognisable as Jewish  
 
Figure 4-Fransen with a Jewish passer-by 
Screenshot taken from video posted on Britain First’s official Facebook page at 
https://www.facebook.com/OfficialBritainFirst/videos/712233078921956/ on 31st January 2015 
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This image shows the importance of visual evidence in this video, and is used to provide 
pictorial evidence that Britain First supports various divisions of the Jewish community. 
While it looks as though Fransen is about to hand over a leaflet, the camera does not 
portray the individual taking the leaflet. So while this image provides ‘evidence’ that 
Britain First is supporting Jews, there is no evidence to suggest how this support has been 
received (this is discussed further in the following chapter, particularly section 7.3).  The 
individual is not standing particularly close to Fransen, suggesting he is on the move. 
6.5.4 Golding’s coded message: The anti-Taliban jacket 
Also of interest is that Golding is wearing an anti-Taliban jacket: 
 
Figure 5-Golding's anti-Taliban jacket 
Screenshot taken from video posted on Britain First’s official Facebook page at 
https://www.facebook.com/OfficialBritainFirst/videos/712233078921956/ on 31st January 2015 
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This is a form of dog whistling to Britain First supporters about the agenda behind the 
solidarity patrol. This refers to the use of esoteric messages to reveal to supporters that 
Britain First’s motives are to oppose Islam. In a similar way that the National Front used 
‘Zionism’ as a code word for Jews in their anti-Semitic ideologies, Britain First are using 
‘Taliban Hunter’ jackets as a euphemism for anti-Islamic rhetoric (Billig, 1978; 
Richardson, 2011). There is a post in the data corpus on the Britain First Facebook Page 
from 16th January 2015 advertising the jacket as official Britain First merchandise, so the 
jacket is also being worn as a form of branding/product placement (note also Golding 
positioning the leaflet so that it is visible to the camera). 
This section has examined the visual communication used by Britain First in the solidarity 
patrol. I have showed that the leaflet was used to imply a link between Islam and Nazis, in 
turn constructing Britain First as anti-fascists. I also discussed Fransen’s physical 
symbolism of a “common bond” to emphasise solidarity between Christians and Jews. 
Thirdly, I demonstrated Britain First’s use of individuals recognisably belonging to the 
Hassidic Jewish sect. Finally, I showed that visual communication can also be used to 
portray esoteric messages to Britain First followers, as to the anti-Islamic nature of the 
solidarity patrol.  
6.6. Summary 
In this chapter I have outlined how Britain First is using the concept of solidarity and 
protecting Jews, in order to make their anti-Islamic rhetoric convincing and seem 
reasonable. Jayda Fransen constructed Christians and Jews as both being under threat from 
Islamic extremism, while Paul Golding used the notion of political correctness to construct 
authorities as irrational for not taking action against Islamic extremism. As well as this, 
Britain First used visual communication both to provide evidence that it supports Jews, 
and to portray coded messages to its supporters (for example, through Golding wearing an 
‘anti-Taliban’ jacket).  
Britain First constructed Jews as vulnerable through footing, in order to highlight the 
perceived dangers of Islamic extremism. Britain First on the surface appears to be 
reasonable in the patrol, but is using strategies to enable Britain First to not alienate itself 
from its supporters. This anti-Islamic patrol is being covered up by Britain First as a patrol 
to show solidarity to the Jewish community. The account in the solidarity patrol portrays a 
rejection of the classic historical anti-Semitic ideology that researchers such as Billig 
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(1978) have identified in far-right parties such as the National Front who disguised their 
extremist views and reject the fascist label, despite having underlying anti-Semitic, racist 
ideologies (Billig, 1978; Eatwell, 2000). In this case, Britain First sent out a prejudicial 
message whilst concealing it as that, using Jews to justify anti-Islamic rhetoric. 
Nonetheless, the next chapter which examines the comments to the video shows that the 
solidarity patrol was presented as convincing by Facebook users. 
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7. “Please protect the Jews”: 
Responses from Facebook users to the 
Britain First Solidarity Patrol 
7. 1. Introduction  
As discussed in the previous analytical chapter, in the solidarity patrol, (where Britain First 
patrolled in Golders Green, North London, to show support for the Jewish community after 
the shooting in the Kosher supermarket in Paris) Britain First portrayed the vulnerability of 
Jews who were being victimised by Islamic extremists.. The result of this portrayal has 
transitioned to anti-Semitic discourse by Facebook users. The first comment to the 
solidarity patrol video started on the same day, one minute after the video was posted onto 
Facebook (31.1.15). The final comments were posted on the 14th February: a total of 436 
comments made in response to the solidarity patrol were analysed. 
The first comments congratulated Britain First and displayed support for Jews, some of 
which were posted by users who identified themselves as being Jewish, and who also 
expressed gratitude towards Britain First. Authors on Facebook shifted their footing to 
report how Jews feel and oriented to the idea that Jews will be grateful towards Britain 
First for the solidarity patrol. This was at the detriment of Muslims who were marginalised 
by other Facebook users. The strategies used to separate Jews from British people are 
utilised, in keeping with the strategies used by Britain First in the solidarity patrol. These 
comments demonstrate that some authors displayed being convinced by the message in the 
video. Next, I examine comments posted by users who identified themselves as Jewish, 
and who also expressed gratitude towards Britain First. There are some extracts that show 
that some Facebook users did challenge Britain First, but nonetheless this was displayed in 
a delicate way and through the use of humour.  
Following on from this, progressively over the next fourteen days the comments became 
more hostile towards Jews. Debates arose about the benefits that Jews bring to the UK, 
with authors drawing upon perceived historical evidence for support as well as anti-
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Semitic rhetoric (such rhetoric shares features with anti-immigrant and/or nativist 
rhetoric). What is similar about this chapter to the solidarity patrol itself as shown in the 
previous chapter, is that eventually the focus turned away from the Charlie Hebdo attack 
and the shooting in the kosher supermarket. Note that offline, the solidarity patrol was not 
well received, with Jewish communities being warned to stay away from Britain First. 19 
In this analysis, I focus on such strategies as Goffman’s (1979; 1981) notion of ‘footing’, 
whereby in the suitable context, speakers can shift their alignment to speak on behalf of 
other people (see previous analytical chapter).  I focus on the identity work surrounding 
Britain First supporters helping people like ‘us’, as discussed in the previous analytical 
chapter. I also show how emoticons can be used to express either support, or display 
humour and make accounts light hearted. Extracts have been numbered according to where 
they appear in the corpus (ordered chronologically ascending by date). 
7. 2 “What have Poor Jews ever done”: Showing 
Support for Jewish people 
In the early comments to the video, viewers displayed signs of being convinced by the 
message in the solidarity patrol. Comments were often written in an informal and 
affectionate manner towards Britain First (e.g., ending a comment with kisses), with 
authors shifting their footing (Goffman, 1981), to talk about how Jewish people feel. The 
focus is the vulnerability of the “Jewish community” and the threat to Jews from Islam. 
This involves a construction that separates Jews from ‘us’, the British, thereby invoking an 
‘us versus them’ interpretative repertoire and marginalising Jews These authors mirrored 
Britain First’s inclusive and exclusive discursive strategy of forming an alignment with an 
ethnic minority, who are like ‘us’, thus using Jews being in danger to justify constructing 
Muslims as an out-group. Some authors distanced themselves from actively supporting 
Jewish communities, and instead pleaded that Britain First continue to do so on their 
behalf.   
Extract one directly mentioned the vulnerability of Jews: 
                                                          
19 http://www.timesofisrael.com/british-jews-say-no-thanks-to-nationalist-groups-support/ 
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Extract One 
 
The first part of this comment has three components: 1) “Well done”; 2) the smiley face; 
and 3) “brilliant”. The “Xxxx” which are used as kisses to end the account, along with the 
smiley emoticon work to make the account affectionate and thus less formal, with P1 
visually expressing pleasure at the video. The account is forming an affiliation with Britain 
First and has a friendly tone, thus drawing Britain First into the position of friends of P1. 
The term “poor” works to place Jews into a category of being vulnerable. Note that P1’s 
interrogative construction of “what have poor Jews ever done” is used to make a 
declaration rather than ask a question, and is a form of complaining on someone else’s 
behalf (Drew and Walker, 2009). 
The vulnerability of Jews is implied through the juxtaposition with “evil” Islamic 
extremists. The term “evil shites” is cohesive with the ‘us versus them’ construction. The 
use of “shites” does not explicitly mention Islamic extremists or Muslims, yet the 
categorisation provides no distinction between the two. “Evil shites” provides a 
generalisation through concealment of Islamic extremists and Muslims as being in the 
same category. Thus, the derogatory term downgrades and objectifies Muslims, as well as 
presents them as dirty. The category construction of Jews as “poor” positions Jews as an 
out-group along with Muslims also being constructed as an out-group. This juxtaposition 
constructs Jews as being under threat from Islam, and Muslims causing Jews to be fearful. 
The next extract demonstrates that not only did the viewer show agreement with the 
solidarity patrol, but also inserted their own suggestion for Britain First to widen the 
support beyond Golders Green to other Jewish communities: 
Extract Two 
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Here P2 constructs a link between location and a religious community (Drew, 1978). Note 
that P2 herself uses the term “Jewish community”, though of course Jewish identity 
displays a complex hybridity between religion, ethnicity, race, history, memory and more; 
so, from a Jewish perspective, “a large Jewish community” might be considered an 
oversimplification tending already to a form of othering – note also that P2 refers to 
“them”. This is the only point where the link between being in Golders Green and showing 
support for Jewish communities is made salient, particularly through using the term “too”.  
P2 is referring to (but has misspelt) Stamford Hill in North London, an area with a large 
Hasidic Jewish community. This comment shows that people are giving accounts of being 
convinced by the video. P2 addresses Britain First as BF; using an abbreviation rather than 
the full name mitigates the nationalist connotations of Britain First as a far-right political 
party. The abbreviation also emphasises P2’s friendliness in an environment where cues 
such as eye contact and nodding are absent (e.g. Fozdar and Pederson, 2013). 
The next extract is different in terms of showing support in an ambiguous way, making a 
comparison with Churchill: 
Extract Three 
 
Here we see an enthusiastic, patriotic comparison of Britain First with Churchill, along 
with the implication that Britain First will ‘save’ Jews. This positions Britain First as a 
mainstream political party rather than a far-right party. The comparison implies something 
significant is taking place that parallels with that of World War Two. The way that P3 has 
written ‘G-d’ is similar to the Jewish custom of avoiding using ‘God’ by full name. This is 
a possible indication that P3 is either Jewish, or aligning with Jews as Britain First were 
doing.  
The response by P4 is a criticism of P3 in the form of an Interrogative question asking for 
clarification (which is not provided by P3). This suggests that P4 is sceptical that Churchill 
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would be in support of Britain First’s cause.  This is the only instance where an author asks 
for clarification, making this explicit through quoting what P3 has said.  
Following this, the comments continued down the line of supporting and thanking Britain 
First: 
Extract Four 
 
Here P5 changes his footing to speak on behalf of “the jewish comunity”, (sic) presenting 
the Jewish community as being in debt and grateful to Britain First for the solidarity patrol. 
An extreme case formulation (Pomerantz, 1986) is invoked that Britain First helping the 
Jewish community will have long term effects, and the notion that the event will have 
historical importance in terms of Jews actively appreciating Britain First’s cause. Note P5 
directly addresses Britain First by name as with extract two (comment number 45).  Britain 
First has been ‘tagged’ in this post (shown by the text in blue), meaning that Facebook 
users reading this comment can click on Britain First’s, name, and will be taken to the 
Britain First Facebook page. Britain First will have received a Facebook notification about 
this comment. This suggests that P5 intended to directly draw Britain First’s attention to 
the comment, and be seen to be actively showing support for Britain First. 
Next is a comment comparing Jews and Muslims: 
Extract Five 
 
P6 uses the argument that Islam is the only religion that is not getting on with other 
religions, and thus is the cause of the problem. “Everybody else does” is an appeal to 
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common knowledge (Edwards and Potter, 1992) to add credibility to P6’s argument. This 
change of footing to speak on behalf of others means that P6 cannot be held personally 
accountable for the view that he/she expressed. The use of “lets face it” (sic) suggests that 
the problematic character of Islam is obvious, but people are not opening their eyes to the 
issue.   
Islam is presented as a threat and a problematic cult (rather than a religion), that is trying 
to take over. Constructing Jews as a “peaceful race” serves to heighten the contrast 
between Jews and the aggression and threat associated with the problematic “cult” of 
Islam. Note the user’s profile picture of the United Kingdom flag, displaying a patriotic 
emblem to represent their British identity (refer to chapter two, section 2.2, for a 
discussion on the British National Party’s ‘patriotic’ union jack logo). 
The next three extracts presented Jews as vulnerable at the hands of Islamic extremism: 
Extract Six 
 
P7 positions Islam as threatening and bullying Jews, again addressing Britain First by its 
name. The construction of Islamic extremism/Muslims as anti-Semitic underlies P7’s use 
of the term “evil”. As with extract one, there is no distinction between Islamic extremism 
and Muslims, and P7 is drawing both into one generic categorisation of “anti semitic 
bullies” (sic). The reference to “evil anti semitic” (sic) has a substantial impact, as anti-
Semitic is a term that carries historical significance. ‘Anti-Semitic’ is also a reference to 
the idea that Muslims are specifically targeting Jews over other groups. Jews are thereby 
being constructed by P7 as needing assistance in “standing up” to Islam. 
Extract Seven 
 
This statement demonstrates that Britain First has successfully constructed themselves as 
‘protectors’ of Jews, who are in danger at the hands of Islamic extremists, and that there is 
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something that Britain First can actively do to keep Jewish communities safe. The term 
“protect” implies that Jews are vulnerable, again emphasising the construction of Jews as 
the good ‘other’. By pleading that Britain First protects Jews, P8 identifies Britain First as 
being the only source of support for Jews.  
Extract Eight 
 
This extract shows that the opposition to Muslims is escalating. P9 begins with an outline 
of what Jews don’t do, creating a contrast between Jews and Islamic extremists. This 
indirect accusation uses strategic concealment, and the use of “this religion” implies that 
the contrast is with another religion-Islam. 
. The use of “this religion” allows P9 to distance him/herself from and not affiliate closely 
with Jews, whilst nevertheless emphatically align with a religion that he/she has named at 
the start of his/her account. Again, we see the use of dots, indicating that there is more that 
could be said about this issue, particularly in the case of P9 where he/she has mentioned 
“beheadings”. The use of dots in this case allows P9 to refer to common knowledge events 
such as the murder of Lee Rigby, without explicitly stating so, reflecting, as discussed 
earlier, the events that have led to the perception that Muslims are a threat to Britain. 
The response to the first comment (comment 139) begins with “oh yes”; displaying 
emphatic agreement and treating P9’s statement as being obvious and self-evident. P10 
then explicitly refers to Muslims, positioning P9’s indirect contrast as referring to 
Muslims. The statement is formed as though P9 had asked a question, and is a similar 
strategy as saying ‘of course’ in an emphatic manner (see Heritage, 1998).  An extreme 
case formulation is used through referring to “ww3”. P10 in comment 139 refers to the 
more generalised identity of “muslims” (sic) rather than ‘Islam’ or ‘Islamic extremism’, 
which suggests that it is less problematic to oppose Muslims in an online setting. This 
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could be due to users being less accountable online than in other settings where individuals 
are more likely to be guarded with how they talk about other groups (e.g. Augoustinos and 
Every, 2007). Similar findings have been reported by Burke and Goodman (2012), who 
found that users online found it less problematic to oppose asylum seekers in comparison 
to politicians and individuals in face to face settings.   
The next extract challenged previous comments that were making comparisons between 
Muslims and Jews: 
Extract Nine 
 
This statement responds to debates surrounding the “damage” that Jews have done to 
Britain (see comments in section 7.5). P11 invokes his/her own three-part (Jefferson, 1990) 
criteria of what counts as damage: 1; bombing, 2; raping 3; killing.  P11 criticises the 
action of comparing Jews to Muslims, yet imposes his/her own comparison by stating what 
Jews don’t do in comparison to what Muslims do, in a similar manner to extract eight 
(comment 138). This comparison of constructing Muslims as violent ‘others’ has become a 
common interpretative repertoire across all of the analytical chapters, and encompasses a 
feature of a genre (Blitvich, 2010).  
Referring to the religion as Muslim rather than Islam invokes a personal attack towards 
individuals rather than the religion generally, as research has shown that politicians make 
the distinction between opposing the religion and not Muslims as individuals to appear 
more reasonable when making anti-Islamic arguments (Verkuyten, 2013). This suggests 
that it is less problematic to oppose Muslims as individuals online than it is in face to face 
settings. There is a conflation of “muslim” (sic) and “religion”, implying that the lines 
between individuals and religion have been blurred. There is some orientation to the 
religion being problematic in terms of ‘telling people what to do’. We see the use of “this” 
used to emphasise hostility (Jackson, 2013). The notion that Jews have not done anything 
to “us” constructs Jews as inherently different to and isolated from British people, but not 
causing trouble. This again separates being Jewish and being British into two different 
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identities, and works to present Jews as impassive; again, we see the formation of ‘us 
versus them’. 
This section has explored comments in support of the solidarity patrol, displaying 
affiliation with Jews and agreement with Britain First’s cause. These extracts differ from 
the solidarity patrol itself in that Britain First emphasised that they are a Christian 
organisation, and that Christians have also faced persecution at the hands of Islamic 
extremism. These comments do not orient to Britain First being a Christian organisation, 
focusing only on Jews being under threat. 
The next section highlights how support for Britain First also came from people who 
identified themselves as Jewish. Comments have the same friendliness and exaggerated 
nature as those in the previous section, and some authors used the same strategy of 
separating being Jewish from being British. 
 
7. 3 Comments from authors who identify themselves 
as Jewish  
Extract Ten 
 
P12 is using the rhetorical technique of separating him/herself from Britain First by 
constructing him/herself as inclusive with Jews and using the term “my ppl” (sic). This 
emphasises that P12 has the ‘right’ to speak as a representative of Jews thus exerting an 
epistemic kind of authority (See Sacks, 1992, on the use of categories of groups used by 
group members and ‘outsiders’). This is a similar strategy to that used by Britain First, 
distinguishing between and thereby separating Jews from British people.  Despite the 
separation between P12 and Britain First, the use of exclamation marks indicates 
excitement and addressing Paul Golding and Jayda Fransen by their first names invokes a 
sense of familiarity. 
We see similar strategies used in the following extract: 
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Extract Eleven 
 
Here P13 discloses him/herself as being Jewish (although note that unlike the other posts, 
the author has stated that they are from outside of the UK). The account is emphasised 
using the hyperbolically ecstatic OMG (“Oh my God”) and triple exclamation marks. As 
has been seen before in previous comments supporting Jews, the account is more informal 
and friendly. While the exclamation marks and the expression of gratitude and love make 
this account affiliative towards Britain First, the account is less affiliative than the posts in 
the first section where authors ‘tag’ Britain First in their posts, so that other Facebook 
users can click on the link and be taken to Britain First’s Facebook homepage (refer to 
extract four for an explanation of ‘tagging’). 
The following extract used some of the same strategies used by Britain First to 
differentiate being Jewish from being British, although at the end of his/her account, P14 
self-categorised as “a proud British Jew”: 
Extract Twelve 
 
This comment is addressing another user on Facebook, who had expressed the opinion that 
British laws and values should be enforced in ‘Sharia zones’ (discussion not included in 
this analysis). P14 has taken what was a statement about Islam, and shifted the focus to be 
about Jews keeping their values and customs separate. P14 is using the common strategy 
identified in this thesis, of making his/her account about Muslims rather than Islam or 
Islamic extremists. P14 begins self-disclosing him/herself as Jewish, and separating the 
subject position of a British Jew, into two parts of Jewish and British. P14 rejects the 
Jewish label (perhaps orienting to the idea that ‘Jewish’ is an ‘othered’ category) and 
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emphasises his/her British identity, but the account ends by integrating the two into the 
subject position of “proud British jew” (sic). 
The ‘us and them’ interpretative repertoire (Lynn and Lea 2003; van Dijk, 1995) is drawn 
upon by the author through keeping Jewish traditions separate from British culture. 
“Forgetting I’m Jewish” may be an orientation to P14 wanting to be identified and listened 
to as a British person rather than a Jewish person. This orients to the notion from Britain 
First (chapter six, extract two) that being Jewish and British are separate and shows that 
the identity distinction between being Jewish and being British is made by a Jewish 
individual. However, P14 switches between “the Jews” (distancing him/herself from the 
Jewish identity) and “our identity”, he/she switches back and forth between Jewish and 
British, showing the complex relationship between being British and being Jewish. 
In this section, I have discussed how authors who identify themselves as Jewish respond to 
the solidarity patrol. The authors displayed gratitude towards Britain First, and used 
similar strategies such as invoking the category of Jews as strangers (e.g. extract ten, 
comment 20), and differentiating between being Jewish and being British (e.g. extract 
twelve, comment 320). 
Next, I will present two extracts that showed opposition to Britain First’s cause, but 
nonetheless humour and rhetorical delicacy was utilised in the accounts suggesting that 
arguing against Britain First is not easy to accomplish: 
 
7. 4 “Islam is the only religion Britain is attacking” 
Comments challenging the Solidarity Patrol 
Extract Thirteen 
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Here is a challenge to a comment that displayed an orientation to the notion of people 
conflating Muslims with “Islamics”. Another strategy here that has already been seen in 
this chapter is addressing Britain First by its name. The use of “ANYONE” implies that 
P15 is not just supporting Jews specifically. There is an upgrade to “OUR country”, 
emphasising the ownership and reinforcing the ‘us and them’ construction between British 
people and Islam. Again, we see a generic term of ‘Islamics’ being used to draw all 
Muslims into the same category.  
P16 constructs his/her argument using humour (Lmao means “Laughing my ass off”) and 
disputing the notion that Muslims are not British. The use of LMAO implies that P16 is 
constructing P15’s argument as laughable and not to be taken seriously. P16 repeats 
“Islamics” in quotation marks to imply that this category construction has been used 
incorrectly, and to avoid being associated with the category construction him/herself. Note 
the use of capitals of “THEIR” for the repetition of both “THEIR streets” and “THEIR 
country”. P16 orients to and challenges the common phrase used by far-right 
organisations, “our streets”, although this is primarily associated with the English Defence 
League rather than Britain First. This suggests that P16 does not make any distinction 
between the two far-right organisations. P16 is using capitals to visually emphasise this 
repetition, and possibly to provoke supporters of Britain First. P16 is using the idea of 
entitlement and orienting to the notion that there are British born Muslims. The use of 
“stupid talk” refers to the common notion that far-right views are constructed as having a 
lack of intelligence (Burke and Goodman, 2012). The use of “only” has similar effects to 
‘just’, criticising the idea of opposing Muslims as being baseless (Goodman and Burke, 
2010). 
The same commentator challenges the notion from another author that Islam is attacking 
Britain: 
 
 
 
 
102 
 
Extract Fourteen 
 
Here we see P17 presenting a common idea that people are not ‘noticing’ the issue of 
Islam (see chapter nine, section 9.3 for additional discussion on this). The use of ‘so’ as a 
preface is to indicate that this is a type of reported speech. There is a contrast drawn upon 
that a religion, Islam, is attacking a country, Britain. This contrast works to orient to the 
idea that there are no British born Muslims. P18 also inserts the July 2005 London 
bombings as ‘evidence’ that Islam is attacking Britain. This comment is addressed to 
another Facebook user who has not participated in this discussion.  
P16 uses hedging language to begin with, using “could”, as well as ending this account 
with a question mark. P16’s account is positioned as a suggestion rather than a declaration. 
Note P16’s use of a winking emoticon, and again the use of humour to mock through using 
an acronym, PMSFL (“Pissed myself fucking laughing”) to soften the accusation and 
perhaps prevent P16 from being challenged, but there is also the possibility that P16 is 
again provoking Britain First supporters. P16 is constructing Britain First as laughable, 
challenging Britain First’s attempts to come across as reasonable. P16 uses a rhetorical 
question, delicately implying that people who are anti-Islamic are somewhat accountable 
for the Charlie Hebdo attack.  
The acronym ‘PMSFL’ is upgraded from P16’s last use of an acronym (‘LMAO’) in terms 
of level of laughter being expressed. These are the only two accounts in this paper that 
contain acronyms related to humour. There is some orientation to the problematic nature of 
Islam, in the author’s description of “retaliate”. Islam is being constructed as violent but 
not entirely accountable, as Britain somewhat deserves the violence for provoking 
103 
 
Muslims. P16 is somewhat admitting the problematic nature of Islam that has been 
claimed, recategorizing them as “retaliating” rather than “attacking”. P16 is orienting to 
Moufahim and Humphrey’s notion of a “moral inversion” (2015: 85), whereby opponents 
argue that the group that they are intolerant of engage in similar intolerant behaviours, in 
order to justify opposition. Note also P16 refers to the religion “Islam”, rather than making 
his/her account about individual people (i.e. Muslims), suggesting that there can be some 
delicacy surrounding making arguments online about religions rather than individuals 
belonging to a religious group. 
Some of the comments challenging the patrol were from people who identified themselves 
as Jewish: 
Extract Fifteen 
 
This is the only point where someone identifying as Jewish disagreed with the solidarity 
patrol. P19 talks directly to Britain First, shown through “your help”. P19’s account 
reflects the reaction to the solidarity patrol offline, where Jews were advised to avoid 
Britain First’s offer of “help”. Here we see two authors identifying themselves as Jewish 
(through using the collective term “we”). P19 is challenging the construction that Jewish 
people are vulnerable at the hands of Islamic extremists. P20 asks “who is we”, disputing 
P19’s argument that Jews do not need help. This constructs all Jews as needing help from 
Britain First, and criticises P19 for speaking on behalf of Jews. The use of “clearly” 
constructs this idea as common knowledge and indefinite. P20 constructs opposition to 
Britain First as due to a lack of awareness and understanding, so this works to make the 
blame lie with P19 and not with Britain First. There is no offer of any evidence to 
convince P19, other than through repetition of watching the video again; P20 is not dealing 
with the substance of the solidarity patrol. 
Here I have examined extracts that showed opposition to Britain First and to anti-Islamic 
accounts. The criticism contained the use of laughter and hedging language, suggesting 
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that it is not easy to criticise Britain First (or support Islam) even in an online setting. We 
also saw opposition from a Facebook user appearing to be Jewish, suggesting that there 
was some resistance to the solidarity patrol from Jews. 
Next, we see the transition from comments being pro-Jewish and contrasting Jews with 
‘evil’ Muslims, to now being anti-Semitic. Comments questioned the contribution that 
Jews brought to Britain, and what Jews have done for ‘us’, British people. We also see 
orientation to the solidarity patrol video being a cover up. The topic remains focused on 
Jews and the distinction between Jews and Christians, but not on either Islam or the 
Charlie Hebdo attack. 
 
7. 5 “Who cares about the Jews?” Comments 
displaying Anti-Semitic Discourse 
The following extract challenged a comment supporting Jews: 
Extract Sixteen 
 
Comment 141 implicitly appeals to the ‘us versus them’ interpretative repertoire, 
separating Jews from Christians, but also aligning with ‘peaceful’ Jews to emphasise 
Muslims as the aggressors (see van Dijk, 1995). The statement “never bothered us” 
constructs Jews as people who are potentially problematic, but choose not to be a problem. 
Jews are peaceful, but still not ‘us’. The term “bothered” implies that Jews have not 
integrated with Christians in Britain, but that it might be problematic for them to do so, 
since the negative connotations of the term that one ‘might have been bothered’ (i.e. there 
was something that might have bothered the author). P21 is dealing with the ideological 
dilemma (Billig et al., 1988) of constructing a positive case for Jews without directly 
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aligning with Jews. Again, we see the author addressing Britain First by its name, and 
tagging Britain First, meaning that Britain First will have received a notification on 
Facebook that they have been tagged in the post. Note that while comment 141 can be 
classified alongside the posts in section 7.2, the comment of interest here is 142 in terms of 
displaying anti-Semitic discourse in disagreement with the author of comment 141. 
The interrogative used by P22 in comment 142 highlights the moment of transition; prior 
to this comment talk had been about the vulnerability of Jews, but at this point we see a 
direct challenge to this notion and the introduction to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, in 
which the Jewish people (Israel) are cast, again implicitly, as the aggressor. Comment 142 
reveals the first construction of Jews as ‘not peaceful’, using the Israeli-Palestinian conflict 
as ‘evidence’. This question is used to mock P21 and provides a gloss over historical 
events, as well as an anti-Zionist statement. This is similar to a strategy used by the British 
far-right political party the National Front during the 1970’s, who argued that they were 
‘anti-Zionist’; this allowed them to make anti-Jewish arguments without being accused of 
being anti-Semitic (Billig, 1978). The use of dots implies that there is more to be said on 
the issue, which does not need to be said or made explicit. Despite P22 explicitly 
challenging the idea that Jews are peaceful, the use of dots means that P22 can avoid 
giving specific examples of why Jews are not “peaceful people”. 
The next comment in opposition to Jews is different to the previous comment in that P23 
invokes historical ‘evidence’ in the Bible: 
Extract Seventeen 
 
P23 constructs Jews as being a problem, referring to an account given in the Bible, and 
thus presenting Jews as an exclusionary group based on religious differences. Unlike the 
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previous comment (142 in extract sixteen), comment 150 is an example of an anti-Semitic 
argument that is given from a Christian perspective. P23 provides a ‘factual’, 
chronological account of Jesus’ crucifixion. Jews are constructed as assailants, contrary to 
earlier extracts where they have been portrayed as victims, although note that P23 places 
further ‘blame’ onto the Romans for Jesus’ crucifixion. Britain First presents itself as a 
Christian organisation, so this author’s account is in line with Britain First’s Christian 
principles (although note that P23 does not acknowledge that Jesus was Jewish). This also 
allows P23 to distance him/herself from making a direct oppositional statement about 
Jews.  
P24 in comment 151 uses multiple exclamation marks to represent disbelief, and the 
author uses the metaphor of the first author in comment 150 being “blind” to emphasise 
P23’s ignorance. P24 confirms the first author’s inferences as being based on the Bible, 
despite P23 not referring to the Bible, suggesting that there is a common knowledge 
repertoire of Britain First supporters (and thus Christians) being familiar with the Bible. 
P24 in comment 151 is making an indirect inference to being sceptical. P23 deals with the 
accusation (comment 152) and manages his/her own position through treating the second 
author’s response as an intention to be humorous and not serious. 
Next, we see oppositional comments towards Jews that conveyed scepticism about the 
contribution that Jews have made to Britain: 
Extract Eighteen 
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P25 in comment 336 displays irony by structuring a declaration into an interrogative 
question. P25’s accusation towards Jews is made in the form of a rhetorical question, and 
thus constructs the notion of ‘ignoring damage’ to be unreasonable. The notion of Jews 
causing “us” damage invokes an ‘us and them’ distinction. Again, the use of the word 
“damage” shows that a transition has taken place, from Jews being constructed as victims, 
to now being shown as the aggressors. The use of dots before the question mark indicates 
that there is more that could be said, whilst the dots allow the author to be ambiguous and 
avoid elaborating about the “damage” that Jews have done. There is also the use of “just”, 
implying that something is unreasonable (Goodman and Burke, 2010), in this case 
ignoring the damage that Jews have caused is displaying an unreasonable action. The 
account is about “Jews” as people rather than ‘Judaism’ as a religion, in a similar way to 
the construction of opposition towards Muslims as people rather than the religion, 
discussed in extract eight. P26 in comment 337 engages with P25, asking for clarification 
in order to challenge P25 (this clarification is not provided). P26 orients to P25 expressing 
conspiracy theories, a common anti-Semitic construction. Note how P26 uses dots in a 
similar way to the first author, this time to indicate pauses, providing P25 with a “cue” to 
provide an answer.  
P27 (comment 338) responds to the “cue” by constructing a pre-emptive response to the 
original post. P27 mocks the first author’s question by drawing upon conspiracy theories 
about extinction rather than Jewish conspiracy theories. The use of absurdity creates 
consensus and humour amongst P26 and P27 (Antaki, 2004), to suggest that oppositional 
arguments towards Jews are not taken seriously. P26 and P27 are building their accounts 
together, using humour and the anticipation of conspiracy theories. As conspiracy theories 
are a standard anti-Semitic argument and encompass the feature of a genre (e.g. Byford 
and Billig, 2001; Richardson, 2013b), both authors anticipated the next development in 
this genre.  
P28 in comment 339 attempted to draw attention to the anti-Semitic comments by the 
other authors, by tagging another Facebook user (who has not posted on here) who would 
have then received a notification about this post. P28 insults P25 in comment 336 through 
using an upgraded form of the term ‘nut job’. P28 distances him/herself from, and 
dismisses, the right-wing category, and associates being right-wing with being crazy 
(similar findings have shown the notion of being a far-right supporter to be linked with 
lack of intelligence, Burke and Goodman, 2012). 
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In the following extract the author oriented to the idea that the solidarity patrol is a cover 
up to promote Britain First rather than to show support for the Jewish community: 
Extract Nineteen 
 
 
P29 implies that the video is a cover, a kind of disguise for the real purpose of the 
solidarity patrol, indicating that the patrol is about promoting Britain First’s publicity 
rather than showing support for Jews. While Britain First promotes anti-Islamic rhetoric by 
showing support for Jews, P29 shifts this rhetoric and implies that Jews are being used as 
an excuse to help Britain First’s cause. Note that P29’s first comment (number 309) 
generates three likes, while the second comment (number 311) does not generate any likes, 
suggesting that the first comment was more popular. The comment could be taken as 
sarcasm, but nonetheless P30 has asked for further clarification, suggesting that it has been 
understood by other users on Facebook as being sincere. Additionally, the application of 
critical discursive psychology means that the interest does not lie with whether authors 
‘really mean’ what they say, but what actions such statements achieve. This account shows 
that while some users claim to be convinced by the solidarity patrol, other users orient to it 
being a cover up to generate anti-Islamic rhetoric. This extract shows that standing up for 
the Jewish community has not lost Britain First its supporters, even if Facebook users are 
not convinced by the message in the solidarity patrol. 
The final extract is from the discussion towards the end of the comments, about who 
Britain First will ‘target’ next: 
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Extract Twenty 
 
P31 begins with an insult towards Britain First as a violent organisation that threatens 
minority groups. The use of the interrogative question is an explicit threat that Jews will be 
“next”, after Muslims. P23 orients to the idea that Britain First targets Muslims, rather than 
Islamic extremists. ‘Dealing’ in quotation marks implies a challenge to the argument used 
by the far-right, that Muslims are problematic.  
P32 in comment 386 explicitly expresses what P31 implicitly suggested, and adds Jews to 
the threat. This is written one line down from the first two statements, which has a similar 
effect to a ‘pause’ or ‘punchline’. Note that both authors refer to “the Muslims” and “the 
Jews”, a form of othering that has already been seen in the solidarity patrol and in extract 
seven in this chapter. P31 is orienting to (and glossing over) a common historical anti-
Semitic outlook from the far-right that Jews exert control over “Western policy”, an 
implicit orientation to the idea of Jewish conspiracy theories (see Stocker, 2015). P32 
(comment 386) asking the original author if they are ‘scared’ appears to be mocking P31’s 
accusation towards Britain First. 
The extracts in this section have shown opposition towards Jews, invoking historical and 
religious “evidence”, standard constructions of anti-Semitic discourse. We have seen an 
author orient to idea that the solidarity patrol’s objective is to use the Jewish community to 
promote good publicity (extract nineteen), and the final extract showed a complex 
combination of opposition to Britain First through using threats and orientation to common 
anti-Semitic arguments. 
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7.5 Summary 
In this chapter I have analysed the responses to the Britain First solidarity patrol by 
Facebook users, and the discursive construction in those responses of in-groups and out-
groups. I have demonstrated that comments began by supporting both Jews and Britain 
First’s cause, although Facebook users differentiated being Jewish from being British (i.e. 
Jewish identity from British identity). This construction has nativist connotations, and 
works to present Jews as outsiders, as not a part of Britain. The supportive comments 
suggest that Facebook users exhibited concern that Jews are vulnerable and under threat 
from Islam, and thus Britain First supporters are displaying anti-Islamic rhetoric. Next, I 
focused on extracts from authors who were Jewish, and used similar strategies as those 
seen in the first section in terms of expressing gratitude towards Britain First for the 
solidarity patrol. Thirdly, there was a minority of Facebook users challenging Britain First, 
although in a seemingly indirect or delicate manner through the use of humour. This 
suggests that it is not easy to criticise anti-Islamic arguments head on. Finally, I discussed 
the comments that transitioned to disagreement with supporting Jews. This shows that 
anti-Islamic rhetoric from Britain First has shifted to anti-Semitic discourse and debates 
about the contribution that Jews bring to Britain.  
What is novel about these discussions, and perhaps the solidarity patrol itself, is that the 
focus is made to turn away from the Charlie Hebdo shooting and the attack at the Kosher 
supermarket in Paris, despite the solidarity patrol being a result of both attacks. Britain 
First aimed to oppose Muslims through their solidarity patrol, which they achieved with 
the collateral benefit, to them, of simultaneously generating anti-Semitic discourse, by 
leaving commentators to draw their own conclusions. Without having to directly attack or 
condemn either minority group, the effect of the Facebook responses to Britain First’s 
‘solidarity patrol’ is to have targeted both groups in a string of Facebook posts, and to have 
generated hatred towards both in the wake of the Charlie Hebdo attack. The identity of 
‘victim’ in that attack is transformed through Britain First’s patrol and the Facebook 
responses to it.   
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8. Anti-Islamic Rhetoric in an Interview 
with Geert Wilders  
8. 1. Introduction 
On 17th January 2014, ten days after the Charlie Hebdo attack, Britain First posted a video 
of Jon Snow on Channel 4 news interviewing the Dutch far-right politician and leader of 
the Party for Freedom, Geert Wilders. Wilders was interviewed regarding a video blog 
where he stated that the Charlie Hebdo attackers were inspired by Islam. Britain First 
posted the video with the caption “Geert Wilders on the Islamic terror attacks in Paris and 
how to combat Islam20”.  
Like Britain First, Wilders is a controversial figure. Wilders has previously caused a storm 
in the media through his anti-Islamic video uploaded onto YouTube called Fitna, which 
contained verses from the Qur’an, shown alongside video footage of terrorist attacks such 
as the September 11th terrorist attacks on the twin towers in New York (van Zoonen, Vis, 
and Mihelj, 2010). The backlash of this included street protests, and reached news 
coverage at an international level. Wilders aimed to show the video in European 
parliaments, and was banned from entering to UK in 2009 to show this film at the House 
of Lords (Vossen, 2014). Wilders has also proposed controversial practises such as the 
legal ban of the Qur’an, and placing a tax on wearing the hijab (Verkuyten, 2014). This 
chapter draws upon how Wilders uses anti-Islamic rhetoric (in a reasonable manner) to try 
to persuade the audience that there should not be any Islam in the Netherlands. 
The previous two analytical chapters have examined how Britain First aligned with the 
Jewish community in order to make Islam appear to be problematic and a threat to the UK. 
This chapter will look other strategies used by Britain First and Geert Wilders to portray 
anti-Islamic rhetoric. I examine how Geert Wilders attempts to appear as a reasonable 
politician following the Charlie Hebdo attack, focusing on the notion of peace and 
                                                          
20 
https://www.facebook.com/OfficialBritainFirst/videos/vb.300455573433044/703320569813207/?type=2&
theater  
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maintaining his opposition to Islam and not Muslims. While initially the introduction 
revolves around the Charlie Hebdo attack, the focus of the topic turns to Wilder’s 
opposition to Islam, and how Snow sets up a parallel between Wilders’ party and the Nazi 
party in Germany. I am interested in how Wilders rejects this parallel and makes himself 
appear to be rational despite Snow’s pursuit of controversy. The main strategy used by 
Wilders to make himself appear reasonable is through maintaining his opposition towards 
Islam as a religion, and not towards Muslims as people.  
Posting this video of Wilders is a strategy by Britain First to portray the far-right in Europe 
in a positive light following the Charlie Hebdo attack. Britain First are footing (Goffman, 
1979b) to display Islam as problematic and show that successful politicians in other 
countries express Islam as a problem. Britain First are calling on the far-right from other 
countries for support, and Geert Wilders is saying what Britain First are not able to say. It 
is likely that Britain First could not get away with saying what Wilders is stating, as a 
newer, less successful party in comparison to the Party for Freedom. 
Snow begins by briefly introducing why he is interviewing Wilders, and gives an account 
of his first question to Wilders: 
Extract One 
1. JS: Hh: today in a ↑video blog the leader of the far-right Dutch freedom party  
2.      Geert Wilders said of the Paris attack (.) these killers are inspired by Islam↓  
3.       well a little earlier I spoke to him↓: hh and I started by asking him if he wanted  
4.      peace in Holland↑ despite anti-Islamic (ref) rhetoric↑  
 
Snow begins his account in a neutral manner, referring to the “Paris attack” (2), rather than 
naming any links with Islam or terrorism. This is typical of Western interviewers, 
generally avoid arguing with or criticising the interviewee’s opinion (Heritage and Roth, 
1995). Note here how Snow gives a polarised account of two opposites, of the possibility 
that Wilders wants peace, despite having an anti-Islamist stance. Snow orients to the idea 
that Wilders does not want peace due to his opposition to Islam. We see the use of ‘these 
killers’ to denote a negative category construction (it is not known whether Wilders used 
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the term “these killers” himself in his video blog, as no link is provided on the Facebook 
page and the video blog itself is not shown in the video clip). 
However, Wilders’ answer to Snow orients to the notion of wanting peace: 
Extract Two 
1. GW: Of course I want peace and in order to have peace we have to fight the  
2.        Islamization of our societies once again not fight (.) all the Muslims that would  
3.       be ridiculous I’m not even suggesting that but we should fight to have more  
4.       (Islam) in our society and when it come to Jihadis hh: we should either jail  
5.        them or send them packing hh: (.) one of the biggest mistake our  
6.        governments and the United Kingdom in the Netherlands in France in  
7.        Germany make is that they when people want to leave for Syria to (wage)  
8.        Jihad: hh that we do not let them go we jail ↑them but we let them stay in  
9.        our countries to make it unsafe and what I suggest is let them all go when  
10.        they make an atrocity it’s better to do it in Syria than in the United Kingdom or  
11.        in the Netherlands but never let them come back let’s get in charge of our  
12.        own border control again and never let them return↓ 
 
Wilders begins by resisting Snow’s claims and presenting the notion of wanting peace as 
self-evident and common sense. “Of course” (1) is an appeal to common knowledge, a 
strategy used by Wilders to present himself as a reasonable and normal person, 
constructing peace as a common moral value shared by everyone. Here Wilders sets up a 
paradoxical disclaimer that mirrors Snow’s polarised account (1), presenting the desire for 
peace, but the need for violence in order to achieve peace. The ‘us and them’ interpretative 
repertoire is invoked (Lynn and Lea, 2003), using terms such as “our societies” on line 2 
and “we” throughout his account, bringing his own country and other countries together 
against Islam. The use of “we” is also highlighted as being a part of banal nationalism by 
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Billig (1995: 144), which he describes as “the daily deixis of little words”. It is not only 
Wilders who has to fight, it is his country and the other countries that he lists (France, 
Germany, and the United Kingdom). This therefore makes all the countries accountable for 
the ‘problem’ of Islam, and are also to blame for the problem, which prevents Wilders 
from being accountable for placing blame onto Muslims. Wilders draws together the 
United Kingdom and the Netherlands into the same position of countries that have the 
common problem (6), caused by “them”, Syria, and thus Islam. 
Wilders achieves his position as a reasonable person by constructing the opposition to all 
Muslims as “ridiculous” (3), and his desire for a greater good, which is peace. This in turn 
makes Snow’s accusations that he is against Muslims as unreasonable. Wilders manages 
his opposition to Islam by showing that he is not “even suggesting” (3), not even the 
lowest intensity of persuasion is being incurred. Similarly, on line 9 when he states “what I 
suggest”, the statement is of low intensity in terms of proposing a demand in order to 
maintain his position as reasonable. Wilders implies that countries are not currently being 
democratic by not letting people leave for Syria to join the Jihad. Wilders is constructing 
himself as having legitimate concerns about safety and being liberal by allowing people to 
leave for Syria. His orientation to freedom of movement constructs him as a rational 
politician, but he imposes his own restrictions of not letting people who leave for Syria 
return. This implies that his concerns lie with his own country being safe. There are 
categories being invoked in order to draw a distinction between Muslims, Islam as a 
religion, and Jihadists. Note Wilders’ category construction of “Islamization” (2), a 
negative concept to highlight a process of a gradual negative change in terms of the 
increase of Islam in society.  
Following on from this, Snow sets up his next question in an oppositional manner:  
Extract Three 
1. JS: And do you accept that as an elected politician saying the things that you’re   
2.      doing that (.) (exactly) stokes the fires of hatred and brings about precisely the  
3.      civil war that you claim is already under way↓  
The “and” at the start of Snow’s prefaced question (Heritage and Sorjonen, 1994), 
indicates that this question is being set up in anticipation of an argument; it is a loaded 
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question.  Through using the term “do you accept that”, Jon Snow is making a 
presumption of being correct emphasised through terms such as “precisely” (2), along with 
the anticipation that Geert Wilders’ response will not be of strong protest. There is 
underling hostility to Snow’s question, however, this is more of an open question and less 
hostile in comparison to a question such as ‘do you not accept that’. Nonetheless Snow is 
undermining Wilders’ position as a competent politician.  
Snow uses the subject position of an “elected politician’” (1), this works to give Wilders 
more stake to manage and makes it more difficult for Wilders to be accountable for what 
he is saying (in comparison to Britain First, a party who does not have “elected 
politicians”). If Wilders was not a politician, what he is saying may be less problematic. 
Snow uses a powerful hell-like metaphor of “fires of hatred” (2), to symbolise Wilders 
opposition to Islam and exclusionary policies, and in turn present Wilders as a threat.  
The next extract shows how Wilders deals with Snow’s question, by attempting to appear 
as a reasonable politician, before Snow makes the comparison between Wilders’ party and 
the Nazi party in Germany: 
Extract Four 
1. GW: Both is not true (.) I have nothing with hate you might (.) not like it but we  
2.        are the biggest party in all the polls in the Netherlands for already half a year  
3.        >erm< you are very far away from the reality at least↑ in the Netherlands sir I  
4.        don’t blame you for that but people don’t like hate people don’t like war I  
5.        want peace but I want it on my own terms and I want it with less Islam as  
6.        possible  
7. JS: Geert Wilders (.) the National Socialist party in Germany was the most popular  
8.       party in Germany and what did that bring us but th-the desecration of Jews the  
9.       hatred of Jews and eventually the gassing↑ of Jews↓ and that surely is the  
10.       kind of parallel in Europe we need to steer clear of 
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Wilders begins by contrasting Snow’s claims. Wilders attempts to appear as reasonable 
and engages with Snow whilst denying Snow’s ideas, which makes Snow look 
unreasonable. Wilders is setting up his account as merely a difference of opinion between 
himself and Snow. The term “you might not like it” (1) orients to a suggestion that Wilders 
is not popular with the media in the UK. Wilders states that he does not blame Snow for 
his views (3-4), which shows understanding towards Snow whilst still maintaining that he 
is correct. Wilders is attempting to pull out Snow’s credentials from beneath him and 
position himself as the expert on the matter. Wilders refers to Snow as “sir”, keeping 
himself distanced from Snow and his account formal.  Wilders constructs Snow as 
ignorant of the situation in the Netherlands (which he describes in a vague manner) and 
thus removed from the context. Snow is constructed as someone who does not know what 
he is talking about. Wilders is shifting position from earlier and now separating the UK 
and the Netherlands. This also works to provide subtle caveats about the situation of 
terrorism in the Netherlands.  
 Wilders draws upon polls as evidence of his popularity (2), a strategy of positive self-
presentation (van Dijk, 1992), which in turn presents Snow’s claims as unfair; that his 
party has a high number of supporters although he is not specific about which polls he is 
referring to. His use of “half a year” (2) emphasises that the party’s success began before 
the Charlie Hebdo attack and thus is not related to the event, which makes his party seem 
more credible and defends his own anti-Islamic stance.  Rooyackers and Verkuyten (2012) 
have shown that Wilders presents himself as a realistic and responsible politician, with 
group oriented policies. Here this is shown through Wilders using terms such as “people 
don’t like hate” (4), but does this in a hedging manner by saying terms such as “at least” 
(3). Wilders is footing on behalf of his supporters being in opposition to Islam, this works 
to place the blame onto Muslims for being the ones with hatred, and not Wilders. Wilders 
is acting on behalf of others as well as himself, indicating that he has the support of his 
followers, and therefore can distance himself from what he is saying. Wilders also makes a 
disclaimer (4-5) of wanting peace, but peace on his terms, orienting to a controversial 
dictator-like position. Drawing upon ideas of peace allows Wilders’ controversial 
comment to be taken as acceptable, that he wants as less Islam as possible. This is still an 
attempt to sound reasonable, using “as possible” (5).  
Snow uses what Wilders says about his party being successful in polls against him to set 
up the parallel between Wilders’ party and the Nazi party. Snow switches “biggest party” 
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to the term “popular” (6). Snow uses this to make a comparison with the Nazi party, who 
were also the most popular party in their own country, as an illustrative example to 
emphasise his argument about the consequences of Wilders’ anti-Islamic stance. Snow 
also uses the similarity of both parties being in Europe. Both are drawing upon similar 
types of factual evidence to make their accounts credible, but the implications of what it 
means to be popular differs among the two speakers, with Snow’s use of the word having 
negative connotations.   
By Snow addressing Wilders by his name, this indicates Snow’s shift in topic (Clayman, 
2010) and indicates that Jon Snow is setting up a challenge towards Wilders. There is a 
self-repair (7) just before Snow makes the parallel, suggesting an awareness of the 
problematic nature of making this parallel. Snow avoids directly mentioning Nazis or 
Hitler, and only refers to the political party name “National Socialist party” (6). This is a 
form of rhetorical delicacy, similar to the hesitation that Golding showed in the Britain 
First solidarity patrol when mentioning Jews and different divisions of the Jewish religion. 
This somewhat normalises the accusation, in order to make the parallel between Wilders 
and the Nazi party more realistic. Snow also compares the parties only, rather than a more 
personal comparison between Wilders and Hitler. Snow invokes a three-part list (Jefferson, 
1990) to show the escalation of the treatment by the Nazi party towards Jews; 1) 
desecration, 2) hatred and 3) gassing, indicating the finality of the situation. Note that 
Snow constructs the opposition to people (Jews) rather than the religion (Judaism).  Snow 
forms a collective identity and constructs Europe as also affected by using the term “us’” 
(7), despite Wilders’ shift in position in comparison to the previous extract, and keeps the 
account about the Netherlands only.  
Wilders responds to this parallel and makes himself appear as reasonable by maintaining 
his opposition to the religion of Islam and not people (i.e. Muslims), unlike Snow’s 
description of the Nazis’ opposition to Jews: 
Extract Five 
1. GW: Well that’s a very sick (.) parallel which is totally not eh valid here I have a  
2.        problem with Islam not with Muslims I told you already if people abide by  
3.        our rule of la:w and by our civil society they are welcome to stay but I don’t  
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4.        want no more Islam we have even more mosques almost in the Netherlands  
5.        than churches I don’t want that we have our own our own culture which is  
6.        based on Christianity and Judaism on Humanism and we are not Islamic  
7.        countries  
 
Wilders explicitly denies Snow’s comparison of his party being similar to the Nazi party, 
the criticism of Snow’s parallel (and refusal to accept) is shown through a “well” preface 
(1). Wilders’ denial is a standard discursive strategy for dealing with a negative accusation, 
particularly in situations related to accusations of racism or prejudice (Wetherell and 
Potter, 1992; van Dijk, 1992). Wilders is orienting to the common knowledge notion that 
being drawn into the same category as Nazis is offensive, emphasised through his use of 
the term “sick parallel” (1). Wilders presents his opposition to Islam as downgraded, in the 
form of a “problem” (2), this is a passive word in comparison to Snow’s descriptions of the 
opposition to Jews as “desecration”. However, Wilders’ position shifts, as earlier in extract 
four he says he wants as least Islam as possible (line 5), whereas here he upgrades to state 
that he wants no more Islam (4). This is different to his group orientation earlier as his 
account is more about what he wants and less about his group orientation. Wilders also 
switches Snow’s account about Europe, and turns the situation back onto the Netherlands 
(4). 
Wilders manages to make his account reasonable and resist accusations of prejudice by 
separating and constructing his opposition to Islam and not Muslims on line 2 (suggesting 
that he is accepting of Muslims as long as they do not practise Islam). He keeps this 
construction consistent in two ways; firstly, through emphasising that he is repeating his 
reference of being in opposition to Islam a second time-this also constructs Wilders as 
being somewhat victimised as he is not being listened to, secondly by referring to the 
religions Christianity, Judaism and Humanism and not the people who practise the 
religions. Wilders refers to “people” abiding by laws (3), rather than referring to any 
religious groups. This is an attempt to make himself appear not anti-Islamic; although 
Muslims are implied as he immediately switches back to talking about his opposition to 
Islam. This distinction between Islam and Muslims also slips when he refers to “mosques” 
(4), which blurs the separation between religion and people. This is a similar strategy to 
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constructing Islam as a political ideology rather than a world religion (Carr, 2006). The use 
of “if people abide by our rule of law” (3) also implies that laws are currently not being 
abided by.  His reference to “civil society” (3) orients to a democratic country, 
emphasising his position as a respectable politician. 
Wilders is constructing himself as someone who is respectful of other religions, and 
therefore distance himself from the Nazi label. Note his inclusion of Judaism, further 
emphasising his difference to the Nazi party and therefore resisting Snow’s comparison. 
Wilders’ insertion of Humanism (completing a three-part list, Jefferson, 1990) shifts the 
issue of opposition to Islam being opposition to a culture and not to a religion. This is 
similar to the strategy of discursive deracialisation, the removal of race when justifying 
opposition to minority groups (Goodman and Burke, 2011). In this instance, Wilders is 
distancing himself from being in opposition to religion and possible accusations of 
Islamophobia by making his opposition about culture; he explicitly orients to “our own 
culture” (5). Again, as we see in other examples in the data, Christianity and Judaism are 
being drawn into same category, as being separate to Muslims. Using phrases such as 
“welcome” (3) invokes the idea that all Muslims are outsiders, here as guests in the 
Netherlands (the same strategy used by Britain First to refer to Jews as “welcome” in their 
solidarity patrol).  
Following on from this, Jon Snow changes the topic, perhaps showing acceptance that this 
line of questioning has drawn to a close. Snow instead makes a comparison between 
Wilders and Nigel Farage (then leader of the United Kingdom Independence Party)’s 
views.  
Extract Six 
1. JS: Well err l-last night on this programme Nigel Farage of the UKIP party  
2.       described what was happening eh within our society as eh fifth column (.) that  
3.      was working away against the interests of the state (.) um eh is that exactly  
4.      how you see it↑ 
5. GW: I’m not so so much blaming um the-the so called fifth column I am blaming  
6.       the politicians who let that happen I can understand hh: that people from the  
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7.       middle East (.) from poor countries that they want to come to our free  
8.        westernised countries but it’s not possible we cannot do that we cannot  
9.        afford it and it brings a lot trouble= 
 
Snow repeats Wilders’ well-preface as before, and follows this with a declarative question, 
emphasised through the rising intonation at the end of line 4 (Quirk, Greenbaum, Leech, 
and Svartvik, 1985). Snow is implying that Wilders and Farage as politicians share the 
same outlook, emphasised by Snow’s use of the word “exactly” (3).  Snow provides 
contextual information about Farage’s claims in order to provide a basis to ask Wilders 
about his position. Snow uses footing (Goffman, 1979; 1981) to construct the opinion as 
coming from another politician with a similar stance as Wilders.  
Wilders detaches from placing blame onto Muslims or Islam and any kind of conspiracy 
talk that Snow is implying, similar to extract four where he is distancing himself from 
placing blame onto Snow. Wilders places blame onto “the politicians” (6) which distances 
himself from being accountable for the problem. This emphasises Wilder’s claim that he 
does not have a problem with Muslims. Wilders also does not address the specific point of 
whether he agrees with Farage, suggesting that he is resisting the comparison. Wilders here 
is managing the ideological dilemma (Billig et al., 1988) of constructing an understanding 
of and empathy for why people come to Westernised countries for economic reasons, but 
at the same time constructing Western countries as being unable to take the financial 
burden. This is similar to van Dijk’s (1993b) argument of a ‘firm but fair’ approach to 
immigration, a strategy that allows opposition to another group seem rational. Wilders 
again uses the collective term “we” so that all Western countries are accountable for the 
burden; Wilders switches position from earlier and now makes all Western counties 
responsible, not just the Netherlands.  Again, Wilders is displaying an understanding of 
something, yet constructing his way as the correct way. Here we see another use of 
discursive deracialisation, with Wilders basing his opposition to Islam on economic factors 
rather than race or religion.  
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8.2 Summary 
In this account, I have examined a video posted by Britain First of Geert Wilders, a far-
right politician renowned for causing controversy in his anti-Islamic views. I show how 
Wilders presented himself as a reasonable politician who emphasised the importance of 
peace, despite Jon Snow’s parallel between Wilders’ anti-Islamic rhetoric after the Charlie 
Hebdo attack with that of the Nazis’ treatment towards the Jews during the Second World 
War. I have discussed how Snow used Wilders’ own claims against him in order to make 
this parallel, and how Wilders defended this parallel (and managed his anti-Islamic 
position) by separating his opposition to a religion rather than to people. This in turn, made 
Wilders’ anti-Islamic rhetoric seem more rational.  
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9. “You sick, twisted messes”: 
Interaction and Conflict in discussions 
about Auschwitz 
9.1 Introduction 
On 28th January 2015, the day after Holocaust Memorial Day and the 70th anniversary of 
the liberation of Auschwitz, the English Defence League (EDL) shared a video on their 
Facebook page entitled ‘70 years After Its liberation, A Drone Captures the Auschwitz we 
Should Never Forget’. The video was originally produced by the BBC news, and was 
posted on the website ‘Israeli video network’21. The video is 2.29 minutes long, and begins 
with a view of the railway tracks leading into Auschwitz-Birkenau, and then shows the 
entrance to Auschwitz. The drone films over the empty concentration camp, with subtitles 
explaining each feature. The video has no audio commentary, with music only.  
The EDL shared the video from the ‘Israeli video network’ website. The EDL did not post 
a caption with the video so have not left their own commentary about Auschwitz, 
nonetheless their stance is made explicit both through sharing the video, and from the 
source of which they took the video. This is similar to the strategies used by other far-right 
parties to distance themselves from the label that they are fascist (Wood and Finlay, 2008). 
The Facebook post of the video generated fifty-nine comments in response over a twenty-
four-hour period. Most of the extracts presented in this chapter are from the fifty-nine 
comments to the video. The other extracts are from comments to a post by the English 
Defence League titled ‘Islamists are just 21st century fascists’, and comments to the Britain 
First video of the Geert Wilders interview (see previous analytical chapter). 
In the first posts, it was found that the idea of reopening concentration camps escalates 
straightaway, with users on Facebook building on the idea collaboratively. Unlike the 
Facebook responses to the solidarity patrol where comments progressively became hostile 
                                                          
21 http://www.israelvideonetwork.com/70-years-after-its-liberation-a-drone-captures-the-auschwitz-we-
should-never-forget/ 
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(see chapter seven) here there is immediate conflict between users over whether the 
reopening of concentration camps is ‘good’ or ‘bad’. Another difference between this 
chapter and the chapter on the solidarity patrol is that authors posted more frequently to 
argue with other Facebook users, whereas in response to the solidarity patrol, authors 
rarely posted more than once. However, what is similar between these two chapters is the 
discussion taking a transition from being anti-Muslim, to being anti-Semitic.  
Users employ reasoning in these discussions over reopening concentration camps and 
putting a twist on what it means to “never forget”. My focus is on rhetorical devices used 
in such reasoning. Here I will discuss five different tropes of reasoning. Firstly, I cover the 
construction of opposing the idea as ‘sick’, as well as how discussion between Facebook 
users can escalate. Secondly, I examine an extract that uses inconsistency as an accusation, 
i.e. how an author can say this but not say that. Thirdly, I address strategies in arguments 
such as contesting someone else’s position through arguments about lack of intelligence. 
Fourthly, the construction of Muslims as ‘the new Nazis’, as well as expressing support for 
Hitler. Finally, I look at ‘devictimizing the victim’, which encompasses comments 
displaying Holocaust denial and the idea that Jews were responsible for their own fate. I 
will demonstrate how these tropes can be utilised in either a positive or a negative way. 
What I am going to explicate is how logic and reasoning is used on both sides of a debate, 
even when Facebook users display violent, visceral expressions of hatred. This has been 
shown to be a common strategy between two groups in conflict, whereby members try to 
persuade the opposing side that their position is a reasonable one (Finlay, 2014).  
The first comment was in direct response to the video, where the idea began of reopening 
concentration camps to put Muslims in them. Following this, fourteen comments were left 
in response to the first comment rather than the video (i.e. users have pressed ‘reply’ 
underneath that comment and not ‘reply’ underneath the video). Thus, a discussion was 
taking place independently to that of the comments left for the video. After this, the 
comments were left in direct response to the video, thus are separate from the discussion 
about reopening concentration camps (see appendix C for the full transcript of comments). 
Firstly, I examine the construction of ‘sickness’, to medicalise perceived ‘negative’ 
opinions. The accusation of another Facebook user being sick is used to say that the view 
is so extreme, the individual expressing the view must be sick. This works to present the 
accused as not reasonable in their opinions. 
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9. 2 The construction of ‘sickness’ and ‘filth’ in 
discussions about Islam 
Extract One 
The first extract shows an argument escalating following the most popular and replied to 
comment. P1 starts with the construction of ‘reopening’ concentration camps to place 
Muslims in them (In P5’s second comment, he is addressing P1 by name): 
 
The logic in this discussion parallels with the strategies used by Britain First that were 
discussed in the first analytical chapter on the solidarity patrol, whereby supporting Jews 
has been used as a resource to portray anti-Islamic discourse. Thus, in a similar way to 
how Britain First used the shooting at the Kosher supermarket in Paris as an opportunity to 
express anti-Muslim statements, the EDL have used Holocaust Memorial Day as an 
opportunity to do the same.  
There is not only an agreement token offered by P2, but an escalation and upgrade of the 
notion being an “excellent idea” as well as three ‘thumbs up’ emoticons to indicate 
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approval. P1 later downgrades putting Muslims in concentration camps, to putting the 
“many muslims” (sic) who are terrorists in concentration camps. This shifts the focus onto 
only the ‘problematic’ Muslims who are terrorists, rather than constructing a generalisation 
that all Muslims should be put into concentration camps.  
We start to see conflict and the construction of sickness at P3’s comment. There is a two-
part construction of a moral category which starts with “sick, twisted” by P3, which is then 
constructed into a two-part subject position of “sick and twisted” by P1. This is an 
example of how ‘sickness’ can be constructed as either supporting Muslims, or being 
opposed to Muslims.  P5’s suggestion of putting P1 into a gas chamber upgrades the 
disapproval by switching who should be placed into concentration camps.  P1 reverses the 
sickness onto “many muslims”, and draws upon the construction that supporting Muslims 
implies that you are not ‘us’ but are ‘one of them’, and that is problematic. This is 
constructed as a causal ‘if x, then y’ construction (see Reisigl and Wodak, 2001), 
emphasised as common knowledge through using “clearly” i.e., if you support Muslims 
you “clearly” support terrorists.  
The next extract is from later in the same discussion, with an accusation of someone who 
is perceived to be Muslim (based on either his/her name or profile picture) as “filthy” 
(P23, whom the author addresses by name). The comments in between comments 48 and 
53 have been omitted, and are presented later in this chapter in extract fifteen: 
Extract Two 
 
P28 replies to P23’s representation of the Holocaust, and presents the notion of Christian 
terrorist as absurd. P28 positions himself as a Christian (and thus offended by P23’s 
comment), shown through the use of “my religion”. The construction of this idea is 
presented as so outrageous, that P23 is positioned as being on drugs, i.e. this account could 
not be presented reasonably when of sound mind. Further emphasis of the absurdity of 
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P23’s comment is shown through P28 using four question marks. This accusation is 
presented informally through P28’s use of “mate”. P28 constructs P23 as a Muslims (a 
construction seemingly based on P23’s name or profile picture) and draws upon the ‘us 
and them’ distinction (Lynn and Lea, 2003) between Christianity and Islam by referring to 
“my religion”, and using derogatory language that orients to the prophet Muhammad’s 
marriage to a six-year-old girl. P28 also accuses P23 of ‘daring’ to make the comparison, 
yet inserts their own comparison between Islam and Christianity. This presents P23 as 
more entitled to make the comparison between Christianity and Islam (see extract fifteen 
in this chapter for further discussion on P23’s comment).   
Similar strategies have been found elsewhere on the English Defence League’s Facebook 
posts (with different authors). The following extract was taken from an EDL post, dated 
16th January 2015 (thus still in the aftermath of the Charlie Hebdo attack), referring to 
Islamists as “20th century fascists”: 
Extract Three  
 
Here P1 expresses that there is only one “difference” between Islamic extremists and 
fascists. We then see the implication of Muslims being positioned in derogatory manner 
through the subject position of “filthy Arabs”, Arabs being synonymous with ‘Muslims’.  
Derogatory language is used by P2 towards P1. P1 is positioned as a Christian by P2, 
implied through the symbolism of “cross worshipper”. This term also has affiliation to 
ISIS, as “cross-worshipper” is a derogatory term used by ISIS to describe Christians 
(Morris, 2016: 59). P3 confirms this association and orientation to Islam through the 
indication that P2 worships “a paedophile”, again a reference to the prophet Muhammad 
that was also seen in the previous extract. Again, we see the use of “filth” to describe 
someone perceived to be Muslim, but “filth” is also used by the individual opposing the 
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support towards Nazis. This keeps to the back and forth construction that we saw in extract 
one of repeating terms in an argument. This extract also shares features with the Nazism 
trope in section 4, in that P1 argues the idea that the Nazis could have prevented terrorism, 
as well as the downplayed construction of Germans as “pretty cool”. This use of language 
subtly others Germans, as it constructs all Germans as Nazis.  
The trope of sickness was identified in the interview with Jon Snow of Channel 4 and the 
Dutch far-right politician Geert Wilders, an interview that was posted on the Britain First 
Facebook Page (and discussed in chapter eight): 
Extract Four 
1. JS: Geert Wilders (.) the National Socialist party in Germany (.) was the most  
2.       popular party in Germany and what did that bring us but th-the desecration of  
3.       Jews↑ the hatred of Jews↑ and eventually the gassing of Jews↓ and that  
4.       surely is the kind of parallel in Europe we need to steer clear of 
5. GW: Well that’s a very sick parallel which is totally not eh valid here I have a  
6.        problem with Islam not with Muslims I told you already if people abide by our  
7.        rule of la:w and by our civil society they are welcome to stay but I don’t want  
8.       no more Islam we have even more mosques almost in the Netherlands than  
9.       churches don’t want that we have our own our own culture which is based on  
10.       Christianity on Judaism on Humanism and we are not Islamic countries↑  
This extract is different to the others in that the one being accused is using the construction 
of sickness, i.e. the accusation that Jon Snow makes of Wilder’s party having parallels 
with the Nazi party is sick, rather than the idea that opposition to Islam is sick. Wilders 
explicitly disagrees with Snow’s accusation, and refuses to accept the parallel. Wilders 
emphasises that his distinction between opposing Islam and not Muslims has been made 
salient already (5). Wilders presents offence at the parallel between his party and the Nazi 
party. This is in line with research on taboos on making accusations of racism, that it is 
problematic to accuse someone of being racist or being a Nazi (Burke and Goodman, 
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2012; Goodman, 2010).  Wilders distances himself from the Nazi label by emphasising 
Judaism as one of the religions that is “acceptable” (10), as well as collectively expressing 
what people want using “we”. Wilders also uses strategies to emphasise his inclusiveness 
through mentioning his acceptance of humanism (10).  
This section has examined the construction of ‘sickness’ in opposing arguments about 
Muslims, as well as insults that individuals perceived to be Muslims are “filthy”. Next, I 
identify the trope of inconsistency; accusations of how an author can say x, but not say y. 
The following extract is taken from comments to the Geert Wilders interview. The author 
corrects him/herself for saying that the notion of killing Muslims is “wrong”. While only 
one extract features in this section, this is a significant and common rhetorical device used 
elsewhere, as will be seen in extract six in the subsequent section.  
9. 3 Accusations of Inconsistency 
Extract Five 
 
Here P1 deals with an accusation that he/she is tolerant of Islam. P1 allows for debate to 
take place and room for disagreement, by stating “correct me if I’m wrong”. P1 manages 
the ideological dilemma of wanting to get rid of Muslims whilst maintaining rationality.  
P1 uses “just” twice to highlight when notions are unreasonable (Goodman and Burke, 
2010): the notion that Geert Wilders “just” doesn’t want Muslims “in my backyard”, and 
“just” moving Muslims to another place is as unreasonable as having Muslims here. P2 
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uses an interrogative question in order to accuse P1 of being tolerant of Islam, as well as 
criticising this tolerance. P3 uses a common idea that is used by other authors (e.g. see 
extract nine), that people who are not opposed to Islam need to either ‘wake up’, or in this 
case “get real”. P1 deals with this dilemma through violent imagery directed towards “all” 
Muslims. P1 uses derogatory metaphors to dehumanise Muslims as pests and as 
animalistic, such as “vermin”, and “multiply” (Goodman, 2007; Sakki, Hakoköngäs and 
Pettersson, 2017). 
This extract has examined an accusation of being inconsistent in opposition to Muslims, 
and how the accused dealt with such accusations. In the next section, users draw upon 
arguments surrounding a lack of intellect and intelligence to explain why people are in 
opposition to Muslims. 
9. 4 Arguments about (un) Intelligence 
The next extract is a continuation of the argument over reopening concentration camps 
(see extract one). This time, authors who were against the idea of reopening concentration 
camps drew upon insults and the notion that authors who created this idea are stupid: 
Extract Six 
 
P5’s first comment suggests that P1 should have implied that terrorist be placed into 
concentration camps, rather than Muslims. This positions P5 as reasonable on both sides of 
the debate as he/she tolerates Muslims, but does not tolerate terrorists. So, the notion of 
reopening concentration camps is still being utilised. Here we see an exchange of insults, 
in the form of a contrasting notion that authors are “plan stupid or plain vile”, which P1 
has again repeated and constructed into a two-part category of “stupid and vile”, as well as 
the additional insult of “fool”. The exchange has a similar back and forth argumentative 
structure to extract one where the trope is being used on both sides of the debate. P1 
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appears not to address the notion of changing his/her comment (mistaking the suggestion 
that he/she should change his comment for the accusation that he/she has changed his 
comment), an error which again leads to P5 drawing upon the lack of intelligence 
argument, the accusation “can’t even read” implies that P1 does not even have the most 
basic of intellect.  
Finally, in this section, we see opponents of the idea of reopening concentration camps 
having a discussion, one of whom (P5) was part of the discussion in earlier comments, e.g. 
extract six: 
Extract Seven 
 
 
Here Facebook users are contesting the other authors’ position through drawing upon 
arguments and metaphors surrounding lack of intelligence. This extract shares features 
with the Nazism trope, as P13 makes parallels between opponents of Islam and Nazis. The 
exaggerated use of “hmmmmm”, suggests that P13 is implying that those in support of the 
idea of reopening concentration camps are the ones who are parallel to Nazis not Muslims, 
and that this does not need saying outright. Note that this is done in a delicate way in 
comparison to the explicit parallels between Muslims and Nazis that have been shown. 
The use of “this lot” refers to the Facebook users in support of reusing concentration 
camps in a derogatory and generalised way. The authors draw upon agreement tokens and 
P14 addresses P13 by name, showing alignment with P13.  
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Following this, P15 directly replies to this comment, showing that he/she has changed his 
stance over reopening Auschwitz. P15 had previously posted in this discussion that the 
reopening of concentration camps was “a good idea”. P15 agrees that there is a lack of 
understanding about the issue, although uses hedging words such as “probably” and 
“quite” so is not totally affiliating with this view. P15 then turns to express an angry post 
wishing to burn Auschwitz. This anger is emphasised using staccato (…) to depict short 
fragments of disconnected sentences. P15 denotes emotive expressions and empathy for 
victims of the Holocaust. 
This trope examined the use of insults in discussions about putting Muslims into 
concentration camps, particularly insults that focus on the idea that people who are against 
Muslims lack intellectual capacity (which did lead to one Facebook user changing their 
stance). In the same thread of comments, we see the co-categorisation of Muslims as ‘the 
new Nazis’ in addition to being terrorists. On the other side of this construction, we have 
the notion that Nazism is a positive idea, to enable the reopening of concentration camps 
for Muslims. This can be paired with the notion that it is a shame that Hitler is no longer 
here. 
9. 5 Nazism 
The following extract is a continuation of the debate about putting Muslims in 
concentration camps, carrying on from the comments from extract one over who is and 
who isn’t ‘twisted’. In this extract, we also see support for Hitler: 
Extract Eight  
 
Here we see further support in the discussion that was started in extract one about 
reopening concentration camps for Muslims, with an upgrade to it being a “great idea”. P6 
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constructs Hitler’s death as being the only drawback to this notion of reusing concentration 
camps. P6 uses the common metaphor of “one large oven” to refer to gas chambers. This 
has connotations of genocide, and whilst Muslims are not mentioned, the notion of killing 
all Muslims at once is implied. P7 is reversing the previous use of the term ‘twisted’, (as 
seen as extract one) whereby ‘twisted’ had been to support the idea of reopening 
concentration camps (this overlaps with features in the first trope of ‘sickness’). P7 
constructs the notion that to be twisted means to support Muslims referring to Muslims as 
“them” suggesting that the term ‘Muslims’ does not need to be explicitly said, and again 
draws upon the notion that Muslims are intolerable.  
Next, we see the use of the subject position of two categories put together, that Islamists 
are ‘the new Nazis’. However, P8 has several strategies to downgrade the hostility that has 
been identified so far in this discussion. Firstly, P8 refers to “islamists” (sic), so the 
opposition is not generalised towards all Muslims as was seen in extract one in this 
chapter, but now towards Islamists and the Islamic State. Similar distinctions between 
opposing Islamic extremism and not Muslims have been identified in the discourse of 
politicians such as Geert Wilders to appear as reasonable (e.g. Verkuyten, 2005). 
Secondly, P8 softens the violence that has been used by previous authors by using the term 
“repatriate” i.e. to send away rather than to kill. However, this does construct Islamists as 
outsiders to the UK, overlooking the notion that Islamic extremists have come from Britain 
(e.g. the London 2005 bombings, where three of the four suicide bombers were British 
born22). Thirdly, P8 uses the idea of practising “Voodoo” which positions Islam as a dark, 
violent cult rather than a religion, in contrast to the ‘peaceful us’. This is a strategy to 
position Islamists as the violent ones, rather than the author. Despite Muslims being ‘the 
new Nazis’, and thus the incarcerators, they are still positioned as ideal to be prisoners in 
concentration camps and are simultaneously being categories as two subject positions.  
At the same time as the discussion about reopening concentration camps was taking place, 
comments were being left in response to the video displaying the idea of Muslims being 
the New Nazis. 
 
                                                          
22 https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2005/jul/13/july7.uksecurity6 
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Extract Nine 
 
P9 is drawing upon the metaphor of being asleep, and that people need to ‘wake up’ and 
face up to the ongoing global problem of Muslims. P9 adds to the construction of Muslims 
as fascist and ‘the new Nazis’ by referring to a “2nd Holocaust” and as Muslims taking 
over from Hitler-this is placed as common knowledge in two ways: 1) through referring to 
Hitler as “him”, and the reference to “another 6 million”-the figure of how many Jews 
were killed in the Holocaust23. In addition to this, P9 constructs Muslims as historically 
aligned with the Nazis. P9 uses the strategy of storytelling (De Fina, Schiffrin, and 
Bamberg, 2006) to express who is being killed “right now” by Muslims. This in turn draws 
upon the idea that nothing is being done about it. This is used to present the identities and 
religions that P9 aligns with, as well as construct Muslims as powerful and harmful. P9 
draws upon the statistic of how many Jews died during the Holocaust, as an implicit threat 
that the same will happen again.  
P10 replies with explicit agreement and addresses P9 by name, this allows for sequentially 
which is useful for online settings where visual continuation cues are absent (Fozdar and 
Pederson, 2013). P10 inserts an additional opinion using the same notion of the world 
being asleep, and again uses implicit threats, although somewhat softer than P9’s threat in 
the form of ‘hoping’ that this won’t happen.  
The construction of Muslims as ‘the new Nazis’ continued: 
 
                                                          
23 http://www.auschwitz.dk/Docu/Faq.htm 
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Extract Ten 
 
Here we see a similar subject position of fascist “Islamic Nazis” and again the notion of a 
second Holocaust which people are not facing up to (note the use of capital letters for 
“Islamic Nazis”, constructing this as a noun). “Nobody talks about” is orienting to the idea 
of ‘political correctness’, this theory has been discussed in chapter six on the solidarity 
patrol, that people do not speak up about Islamic extremism due to fear of being accused of 
Islamophobia. P12 adds an agreement token, and shifts the account from being about 
‘Islamic Nazis’, to being about Muslims as ‘the New Nazis’, again with capital letters 
making this a noun. This shows that the distinction between Islamic extremists and 
Muslims can be blurred.  P12 starts with the idea of eradicating Muslims, then shifts 
position, highlighted through the use of “well”, to downgrade the idea of eradicating the 
religion not the people. This presents P12 as reasonable by suggesting the lowest intensity 
of action.  
This section focused on the construction of Muslims and Islamists as ‘the new Nazis’, as 
well as the construction of Nazism and fascism as synonymous. In the final trope, I 
examine a common feature of anti-Semitic discourse, Holocaust denial. In some of these 
accounts Holocaust Denial is implied rather than explicitly denied, for example, 
devictimizing Jews as being responsible for their own fate, and orienting to the idea that ‘it 
wasn’t just Jews’.  
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9. 6 Devictimizing the victim (Holocaust Denial) 
The first comment denies the use of gas chambers: 
Extract Eleven 
 
This Holocaust denial is done in an indirect way by drawing upon media for support. The 
denial of the existence of gas chambers is a common feature of Holocaust denial (Cohen-
Almagor 2016). P16 is directing readers to a documentary by Dennis Wise (which has 
been banned in several countries) that outlines ‘proof’ that the Holocaust did not exist24. 
This signposting to a documentary works to ensure that P16’s claims don’t appear to be 
unfounded. P16 avoids mentioning Jews and instead refers to “no one” being gassed, a 
strategy to avoid being labelled anti-Semitic. This contrasts with previous findings that 
Facebook users expressed outright support for gas chambers, with no attempt to make 
accounts seem reasonable or reject the Nazi label (Burke and Goodman, 2012). 
Another common strategy in Holocaust denial is denial over the scale of murders that took 
place: 
Extract Twelve 
 
Here P17 orients to the caption in the video which states “An estimated 1.6 million people 
were killed at Auschwitz”.  P17 constructs the figure of 1.6 million as being a lie (possibly 
                                                          
24 http://www.jewishjournal.com/israelife/item/holocaust_denial_becoming_scarily_reliable 
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confusing this with the well-known figure of six million Jews who were murdered during 
the Holocaust). P17 displays the common Holocaust denial of the scale of people 
murdered, and orients to the idea that this figure frequently changes (Wodak, 2015b). “Oh” 
is used to indicate a change of state token (Heritage, 1984), used to imply that P17 has 
received new information, and there is now a change in what is common knowledge. This 
is further shown through using the word “now”, implying that the figure of people killed 
has changed. Note that the author also refers to “the Jews”, a form of othering that has 
been seen in extracts in previous chapters.  
P18 constructs P17’s account as that of confusion over the 1.6 million being how many 
people were killed in the Holocaust, rather than in Auschwitz alone. P18 corrects the first 
author’s ‘mistake’, constructing this as common knowledge and using dots at the end of 
his/her statement, indicating that nothing more needs to be said; this could be a strategy to 
imply that this fact is obvious, or avoidance of directly saying that P17 has oriented to 
Holocaust denial. The term “Jew Hater” is used by P19, another way of calling P17 anti-
Semitic. This accusation could be a strategy to by P19 to the common stereotype that far-
right supporters are associated with anti-Semitism.  
Next we see an extract displaying the common anti-Semitic argument that ‘it wasn’t just 
Jews’: 
Extract Thirteen 
 
The use of numbers has been identified as a common strategy to persuade and add 
reliability due to their preciseness (van Dijk, 1988), and has been found to be frequently 
used on Facebook to create a sense of panic (Orrù, 2014). Both authors cite figures without 
referencing any sources, implying that these figures are common knowledge (the 6 million 
figure has been used frequently on this thread of comments, referring to the number of 
Jews killed during the Holocaust, Cohen-Almagor, 2016). 
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P21 contests P20’s position by adding a significantly larger figure of people killed who 
were not Jewish (or Muslim). This devictimizes Jews by diminishing the harm caused as 
well as undermining Jews, features of anti-Semitic discourse. The use of ‘non muslim’ 
(sic) is another way to marginalise Muslims, implying that Muslims were not affected by 
the Holocaust, and again drawing upon the construction of Muslims as in alliance with 
Nazis.  
The following extract devictimizes Jews by downgrading the effects of the Holocaust: 
Extract Fourteen 
 
P22 draws upon the genocide of Native Americans and uses the figure of how many 
“Fullbloods” Native Americans are left, in order to contrast this with the Holocaust. This 
account downgrades the effects of the Holocaust through using normalising terms such as 
“few years” and “crying”, as well as Jews “just” doing what they were told. Jews are 
positioned as in control of their own destiny, i.e. have been devictimized. This places the 
blame of the Holocaust onto Jews and positions Jews as weak. P18 constructs his theory as 
reasonable by suggesting that at least “a few hundred” would still have died during the 
Holocaust and this means that P22 does not deny the Holocaust altogether. Strategies such 
as the construction of Jews as exaggerating the effects of the Holocaust are manifestations 
of Holocaust denial (Cohen-Almagor, 2016). There is an ‘us and them’ distinction used, of 
the idea that there are people worse off than Jews, yet the author highlights the plight of 
‘us’, a form of differentiating the self (Lynn and Lea, 2003). This strategy allows P22 to 
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show concern for people belonging to his own ‘us’ group, native “Fullbloods”, whilst 
maintaining an anti-Semitic argument. This constructs the ‘us’ group as having worse 
hardship.  
In response, we see the “shame on you Jew Hater” comment again. P5 (who has posted 
numerous times before arguing against reopening the concentration camps, see extracts 
one and six) responds and accepts the first author’s view, and invokes the freedom of 
speech argument to present him/herself as reasonable and tolerant to differing views. The 
support for freedom of speech then allows P5 to make his subsequent insulting comment. 
Other extracts include strategies such as contesting someone else’s position through using 
facts and figures, or information about the Historical background of Auschwitz. The 
following extract was a part of the discussion taking place in extract two: 
Extract Fifteen 
 
P24 disagrees with the first user’s claim, presenting his/her own claims as factual, as well 
as the notion that mostly Christians were killed in Auschwitz. Note that P24’s accusation 
that the original author does not know “facts” is also relevant to the trope of (un) 
intelligence in section three. P24 is removing Christians as being responsible for the 
consequences of Auschwitz by removing Hitler’s Christian identity, and aligning Hitler 
with Muslims. P24 draws upon the common ‘us’ Christians versus ‘them’ Muslims and 
Nazis. This further emphasises the construction of Muslims as ‘the New Nazis’ and gives 
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this idea a Historical basis. Note P25 adding figures in parenthesis to bolster their 
argument that it wasn’t ‘just Jews’.  
The final trope has examined the notion that victims are responsible for their own fate, i.e. 
the victim has become devictimized. Strategies in this trope include Holocaust denial, 
undermining the effects of the Holocaust on Jews, as well as the idea that Jews ‘could have 
done more’.  
9.7. Summary 
In this chapter I have discussed the responses on Facebook to the video about the 70th 
anniversary of the liberation of Auschwitz, and that ‘we should never forget’ Auschwitz. 
This has been discussed in five tropes. Firstly, conflict between users showing support for 
reopening concentration camps for Muslims and those opposing this idea, with a focus on 
who is ‘sick’, as well as Muslims being positioned as “filthy”. Secondly, accusations of 
inconsistency, i.e. how can you say this and not say that. Thirdly, opponents arguing 
against ideas through contesting someone’s intelligence. Fourthly, the co-construction of 
Muslims as the ‘new Nazis’. Finally, comments displaying Holocaust denial and 
devictimising Jews. This involved denial of three types: 1) the use of gas chambers; 2) 
denial over the scale of people murdered; and 3) orienting to the notion that ‘it wasn’t just 
Jews’. In each trope we see some form of conflict and escalation over ideas.  
Concentration camps being a negative phenomenon is displayed as common knowledge, 
but nonetheless constructed as suitable to be reopened for Muslims, with logic and 
reasoning applied to this extreme idea. The caption on the video reads “we should never 
forget”, and users on Facebook have perverted this notion of “never forget” by promoting 
the idea of reusing concentration camps. The effects of the Holocaust can be belittled, a 
manifestation of anti-Semitic discourse. Again, this is constructed with reasoning, for 
example, that Jews are at fault for their own fate. While Holocaust denial is considered a 
manifestation of Hate Speech (Wodak, 2015b), such statements are still left on Facebook 
unreported, despite researchers arguing that reporting racist content to Facebook requires 
little effort (Oboler, 2013). However, comments can be challenged even on a far-right 
page, and we have seen from extract seven that a user did change his/her stance.  
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10. Conclusion 
10. 1 Introduction 
 “Had Donald Trump said the things he said during the campaign eight years ago—about 
banning Muslims, about Mexicans, about the disabled, about women—his Republican 
opponents, faith leaders, academia would have denounced him and there would be no way 
around those voices. Now, through Facebook and Twitter, you can get around them. There 
is social permission for this kind of discourse. Plus, through the same social media, you 
can find people who agree with you, who validate these thoughts and opinions. This 
creates a whole new permission structure, a sense of social affirmation for what was once 
thought unthinkable. This is a foundational change.” 
David Simas, Obama’s political director, 201625 
My research has been important for identifying how, in the aftermath of a terrorist attack, 
groups can be ‘othered’ as not ‘one of us’ and marginalised by the far-right and far-right 
supporters on social media. Brexit, as well as the election of Donald Trump, show just how 
social media can be utilised by politicians not only in the aftermath of events but during 
campaigns. Social media can also be used as means to express reactions to political 
outcomes.  
Britain First has taken over as the main far-right political party in the UK, and at the time 
of writing this chapter at the end of 2016, have just over 1.5 million likes on their 
Facebook page, overshadowing the BNP’s current 200,000 likes. Britain First are still 
ineffective in political terms (see chapter two where I discuss Paul Golding’s unsuccessful 
London mayoral campaign). This may be due to the perceived ‘success’ of the outcome of 
‘Brexit’ in June 2016. However, I have shown that even if the far-right are politically 
unsuccessful, they have prominence and influence on a social media platform. This has 
built upon research by (Atton, 2006) who identified that the internet is a useful tool for the 
far-right to gain supporters, but research had not yet examined how social media can 
facilitate discussion between far-right supporters (and opponents).  
                                                          
25 http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2016/11/28/obama-reckons-with-a-trump-presidency 
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This research examined how two far-right organisations, Britain First and the English 
Defence League (EDL), communicated on Facebook about Islam and protecting Jews, 
whilst maintaining being ‘reasonable’ in their anti-Islamic views. I focused on how both 
organisations managed opposition to Islam in the wake of the Charlie Hebdo attack, 
including the alignment with the Jewish community who are presented as being ‘in danger’ 
from Islamic extremists. I also focused on how Facebook users displayed anti-Semitic and 
Islamophobic views following the terrorist attack. The British National Party’s (BNP) 
activities and success dropped significantly following Griffin’s bankruptcy and exit in July 
2014. Currently, Griffin is no longer chairman of the BNP and the party do not currently 
have any councillors (Cobain, 2016). The lack of activity on Facebook meant that the BNP 
did not feature in the final analysis.  
10.2 Summary of findings and Discussion 
In the first analytical chapter, I examined a video posted by Britain First on its Facebook 
page, of their ‘solidarity patrol’. Britain First patrolled through Golders Green to show 
support for Jewish communities following the shooting at the Kosher supermarket in Paris 
in January 2015, and constructed Jews as being in danger at the hands of Islamic 
extremism. Britain First was distinguishing itself from the anti-Semitic positions of its 
predecessors the British National Party and the National Front, by emphasising explicit, 
direct support for Jews, although as previous research shows, both the National Front 
(Billig, 1978) and the BNP (Carter, 2005; Goodman and Johnson, 2013) used strategies to 
avoid being labelled anti-Semitic such as using moderate language Britain First also used 
visual ‘evidence’ to further emphasise that it showed support for Jews, as well to 
communicate subtle messages to its supporters e.g. Golding’s anti-Taliban jacket. 
However, Britain First still used rhetorical devices to construct Jews as the ‘other’. Britain 
First simultaneously showed explicit support for Jews whilst constructing Jews as different 
from ‘us’, the British. This means that Britain First on the surface appears as though it 
supports the Jewish community, yet maintains its separation from Jews. The findings 
identified in this chapter support research by (Verkuyten, 2013) who discussed the finding 
that far-right politicians base opposition to Muslims on the apparent intolerances of the 
religion of Islam. Here, Britain First is framing its opposition to Muslims based on the 
perceived prejudice that Muslims have towards Jews, and drawing upon in-group 
categories such as “our people”, in a similar way to the BNP using categories such as 
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“indigenous people” to (Edward 2012; Goodman and Johnson, 2013) exclude ‘others’ who 
are not British.  
Britain First had to manage the dilemma that is common for far-right organisations, of 
appealing to the mainstream without presenting ideas that will lose its original supporters, 
a dilemma that historically far-right parties in the UK have had to manage (see Billig, 
1978). Britain First is sending out a prejudicial message whilst positioning itself as a 
tolerant benefactor for the “good” outsider (i.e. Jews) in order to appear reasonable in its 
anti-Islamic stance. Prior research (e.g. Lynn and Lea, 2003; Masocha 2005) has found 
that the ‘us and them’ distinction was used in order to negatively present a ‘them’ group 
(e.g. asylum seekers) as undeserving of support. In the case of this research, British Jews 
have been constructed as another ‘us’ group alongside Christians, in order to present Jews 
in a positive light for the purpose of gaining social capital for Britain First.  The 
construction allows for Jews to appear to be receiving support from Britain First, whilst 
Britain First can still remain distanced and from Jews.  
The Jewish community are constructed as people who need protection and to be looked 
after due to being isolated and marginalised by Muslims, Britain First are being on the side 
of the ‘underdog’. The identity work of aligning with an ethnic minority that are like “us”, 
constructs both Jews and Britain First as being under threat from the aggressor of Islam. 
Whilst showing support for the Jewish community and separating being Jewish from being 
British, this works to make a distinction that Jews are not the same as Britain First, and 
works to do the opposite of what Britain First claimed that it was setting out not to do, 
which was to marginalise the Jewish community.   
Secondly, I focused on the Facebook comments on Britain First’s Facebook page in 
response to the solidarity patrol. I analysed a range of comments, from those that were 
supportive towards Jews, to comments that took an anti-Semitic turn. The comments in 
support of Jews mirrored the strategies used by Britain First, such as the separation of 
being British and being Jewish. The anti-Semitic comments had common features of anti-
Semitic rhetoric, such as anti-Zionist statements, and using the Bible as ‘evidence’. In the 
solidarity patrol itself, Britain First used the ISIS attack on the Kosher supermarket to 
present Jews as being in danger, for which Britain First blamed Muslims.  
A minority of comments showed support for Muslims, albeit in a delicate manner. This 
suggests that it is difficult to combat Islamophobic arguments directly, and is similar to the 
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argument by Goodman (2010) that criticising racist arguments is difficult due to facing 
accusations of censorship. This analysis has shown that the response by Facebook users 
has been contrary to Britain First’s attempt to align with Jews, and resulted in the display 
of anti-Semitic discourse. The overall result is that Britain First has not only achieved its 
objective of anti-Islamic discourse, but another possible objective which was to categorise 
Jews as non-British. This has resulted in the marginalisation of Jews by users on 
Facebook.  
Next, I discussed another video posted by Britain First on their Facebook page in January 
2015, of an interview on Channel 4 news with the Dutch far-right politician Geert Wilders. 
I showed how Wilders tried to appear as a reasonable politician in the wake of the Charlie 
Hebdo attack, and dealt with the accusation from the interviewer Jon Snow, that Wilders’ 
opposition to Islam paralleled with that of the treatment of Jews by the Nazi party. Wilders 
resisted this accusation by making a clear distinction between opposing Islam as a religion, 
and opposing Muslims as people, a finding also identified by Verkuyten, 2013). This is in 
keeping with research that has shown that distinguishing between opposing ideologies and 
opposing individuals is a strategy to resist receiving accusations of prejudice (ibid, 2013).  
The distinction between opposing a religion and opposing people gives support to the 
suggestion that there needs to be a definition which protects Muslims from discrimination, 
for example, ‘Muslimophobia’ (Cheng, 2015). In both the Wilders interview and the 
solidarity patrol, discourse transgressed away from the context of the Charlie Hebdo 
attack, and focused on the problematic nature of minority groups. Wilders, at the time of 
writing, has been convicted of inciting discrimination against Moroccans living in the 
Netherlands26, yet his party the Dutch Party for Freedom, is a strong contender for the 
general election in the Netherlands in March 2017. Wilders communicating via a video 
blog demonstrates that he aimed to reach a mass audience using a variety of media 
platforms, and his popularity as a politician indicates that Wilders’ anti-Islamic rhetoric is 
not losing him followers. 
Finally, I discussed comments to a video posted by the EDL on the 70th anniversary of the 
liberation of Auschwitz that “we should never forget”. This chapter addressed my research 
aim to examine how Facebook users showed both opposition to and support for the far-
                                                          
26 https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/mar/18/dutch-far-right-leader-geert-wilders-goeson-trial-for-
inciting-hatred 
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right. I showed how the comments to the Facebook post created a construction of 
reopening concentration camps for Muslims ‘the new Nazis’, as not only a logical idea, but 
an “excellent” idea. The notion of Islam being linked to Nazis has been identified as a 
strategy used by far-right parties to avoid being labelled as anti-Semitic (Hafez, 2014). Not 
only was reason used in these arguments, but the notion of being ‘sick’ by other Facebook 
users. This contrasts with other research that has identified that anti-Islamic comments 
were not challenged on the EDL message boards, whereas in this research comments were 
contested by Facebook users (Cleland, Anderson and Aldridge-Deacon, 2017). 
 The construction of bringing back gas chambers has previously been identified on 
Facebook discussions about asylum seekers (Burke and Goodman, 2012). I also examined 
Facebook users denying or belittling the effects of the Holocaust, thus ‘devictimizing the 
victim’. Facebook users oriented to common Jewish conspiracy theories such as disputing 
the number of Jews murdered at Auschwitz (Cohn, 1967; Richardson, 2013b). While 
researchers argued that Islamophobia has somewhat ‘replaced’ anti-Semitism (Wodak, 
2015a) my research has shown that anti-Semitism is still an important issue in 
contemporary political discourse, in this case on social media.  
10. 3 A balanced depiction of Islam? 
The application of critical discursive psychology to social media discourse has uncovered 
that Britain First and the English Defence League focused on the apparent tackling of anti-
Semitism in order to win support from Jews. However, what the far-right initially 
presented on their Facebook pages as pro-Jewish (without initially mentioning Muslims), 
has taken a transition by Facebook users to not only anti-Islamic, but also anti-Semitic 
rhetoric. This transition from support for Jews to opposition to Islam is a new finding.  
 The analysis has shown how one religious group (Jews) can be used as means to achieve 
opposition to another religious group (Muslims). I have also discussed how various 
conflicting social identities (i.e. Muslims, Jews, British and Islamic extremists) can be 
constructed in online interaction. In prior research by Rhodes (2009) it was shown how the 
British National Party gained support by constructing opposition to immigration as being 
about concern for British citizens. Now Britain First have built upon on this strategy to 
also show concern for other groups that they do not consider as ‘British’, to look more 
reasonable by extending their concern for people who are not ‘us’, but still ‘affected’ by 
Islam. 
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There appears to be discrepancy between the EDL’s public image that they are only 
against Islamic extremism (Treadwell, 2012; Treadwell and Garland, 2011) with the 
discourse that we have seen from their supporters on their Facebook page. As discussed in 
the first chapter, the EDL’s aims include to educate the British public about Islam, which 
incorporates the promotion of a “balanced depiction of Islam as a religion and ideology”27. 
Based on the findings identified in the analysis, users on Facebook have twisted the 
meaning of such aims, for example to promote Muslims as ‘the new Nazis’, and deserving 
of being killed in concentration camps.  
While previous research has shown that politicians are cautious to appear to oppose Islam 
as an ideology and not Muslims as individuals (see Wood and Finlay, 2008), in this 
research Islamic extremists and Muslims were found to be synonymous and used 
interchangeably on Facebook. Britain First did not name ‘Muslims’ in the solidarity patrol, 
but Facebook posters recognised that opposition to Muslims was implied. Another 
example was seen in chapter seven, extract eight. Even though the first author did not 
directly mention Muslims and implied Islam by stating what the Jewish community ‘don’t 
do’, the concealing strategies used were confirmed by the following speaker who then 
directly mentioned” Oh yes its the muslims” (sic). 
10. 4 Modern Anti-Semitism 
Atton’s (2006) research on parliamentary data showed that the BNP used strategies to 
mask its underlying racist ideologies and present itself as reasonable. Similar strategies 
have been identified here by Britain First, on social media. While the BNP distanced itself 
from organisations such as the Ku Klux Klan in order to avoid being positioned as racist, 
Britain First distanced itself from the anti-Semitic position.  
This thesis has shown that logic and reasoning is used not only by far-right parties, but by 
users on Facebook and supports previous research that found that. Islamophobia was 
presented as a rational reaction to Islamic extremism in the UK (Kassimeris and Jackson, 
2015), and here has been disguised as an expressed concern for Jewish communities.  
Individuals on Facebook used reason in their arguments of why we should get rid of 
Muslims, whilst politicians, publicly, are maintaining that they are not opposed to 
Muslims. This suggests that far-right supporters can express on social media what the far-
                                                          
27 http://www.englishdefenceleague.org.uk/mission-statement/ 
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right cannot, that is the underlying, more extreme messages. The far-right cannot express 
such extreme messages due to the need to maintain a portrayal of rationality and appeal to 
the mainstream. Social media discourse can reinforce the binary opposition of ‘us and 
them’, and the ‘othering’ of Muslims (Kamenova and Pingaud, forthcoming).  
I have demonstrated how violent ideologies can be normalised by users on Facebook, 
whilst the far-right used more subtle strategies to marginalise groups. As Richardson 
(2011) showed, the new and emerging ‘exoteric’ messages being used by the far-right to 
communicate to the mass only camouflage the underlying ‘esoteric’ fascist message being 
dispersed to their supporters. Britain First demonstrated Billig’s (1982:218) notion of 
politicians attempting to present their extreme positions as non-extreme.  There are some 
similarities between anti-Semitism during the Nazi era and today (Kovács and Szilágyi, 
2013), in this case the use of concealed messages to supporters, and belittling the effects of 
the Holocaust. Far-right parties have rebranded the same ideas, in the form of a more 
“uncontroversial nationalism” (McGlashan, 2013; Richardson and Wodak, 2013), what 
Copsey (2008:82) termed “fascism re-calibrated”. 
10. 5 Limitations of research 
There are several challenges posed related to the use of the internet for data collection 
regarding the nature of the internet, and the access to data: 1) The dynamic and changing 
nature of the internet, 2) the disappearance of texts and 3) the international scope of social 
networking (see Mautner, 2005). All three of these factors make analysing social media 
discourse a complex procedure. The first two challenges refer to what Pink (2007: 202) 
termed the “open-endedness” of representation. Unlike other forms of data such as 
parliamentary or mass media data, material can be regularly updated or removed, so that 
the representation of interaction can never be complete.  
The third challenge describes how with discursive methods it is simply not possible to 
present all the data on which analysis is based (Potter 1988).  This means that replication 
of findings would not be possible, which some researchers argue is more important than 
discourse analysts claim (Abrams and Hogg, 2002). For example, we should examine the 
extent to which racist discourse in one context prevails in other contexts. Potter (1996b) 
argued that discourse analysts ensure the validity of findings in other ways, for example, 
rather than omitting data that does not ‘fit’ the story being told by the researcher, analysts 
examine cases that deviate away from the pattern being examined, which, rather than 
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disconfirms the pattern, can show the genuine nature of the pattern. Potter also argued that 
insights from new studies can both build upon and use the knowledge of earlier work, for 
example, discursive devices such as extreme case formulations. This new research then 
adds to the adequacy of previous work. Additionally, I argue that with the use of CDP, 
these findings do reflect wider contexts outside of research, especially patterns of the 
social and historical context of the far-right in the UK. This will be discussed further in the 
concluding remarks.  
Another criticism of discursive methods is that there is no ‘formal’ strategy for the 
systematic selection of texts being shown, so it is not transparent what is being represented 
and what is not being represented (Zajonc, 1989). This research does analyse a small 
selection of data, but I have met my objective of collecting all of the naturally occurring 
data that centred around a period of time i.e. the Charlie Hebdo shooting. My research has 
been data driven, in the sense that I have examined fascist discourse as it has emerged 
following a terrorist attack, which is representative of how online fascist discourse takes 
place. What this thesis has presented is a selection of extracts that show striking themes 
that have contributed to the analysis of far-right discourse. With naturally occurring data, 
there is also the issue of not being able to ask for clarification as you would from ‘live 
participants’, but researchers such as Jowett (2015) argued that it is how ambiguous 
comments are responded to and made sense of that give us insight rather than what the 
comments ‘really mean’.  Naturally occurring data also avoids the interviewer imposing 
their own categories and assumptions the same way they may do when conducting an 
interview (Potter, 1996b).   
Researchers such as Goodings and Brown (2011) acknowledged the difficulty of applying 
DP to social networking pages due to the discussion not always directly responding to the 
previous message. However, I have shown that there can be smooth transition in 
interaction and logic applied to arguments around a single idea. In chapter seven, there was 
a transgression taking place from supportive discourse towards Jews, to anti-Semitic 
rhetoric. Chapter nine showed escalation in conflict over the idea of ‘reopening’ 
concentration camps. In both chapters a transition took place from Islamophobic 
discussion, to anti-Semitic discussion. These findings can be used to make the argument 
that Facebook discourse is not as disordered as Goodings and Brown claimed.  
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10. 6 Future research 
Despite the limitations that have been discussed, this thesis has opened multiple avenues 
for future research that this thesis has not been able to address: policies regarding the 
legality of online hate speech, and interventions and strategies to combat hate speech and 
prejudice discourse. Firstly, the aim of my research did not address policies on hate 
speech. For example, what is categorised as illegal hate speech on social media. Future 
research investigating hate speech could build upon this research. This could include 
analysing what counts as hate speech on social media and thus illegal, using a mutli-
disciplinary, mixed methods approach. This could also address the limitations that have 
been identified in this thesis. For example, what are the effects of hate speech on those 
being targeted, and could social media be used as a tool for marginalised groups and 
victims of hate speech to communicate and share support (Gerstenfeld et al. 2003).  
Another avenue for future research is to identify interventions to prejudice discourse and 
hate speech. One of the benefits of free speech is that people can freely leave counter 
arguments to prejudice discourse. Fozdar (2008:530) used the term “duelling discourses” 
to describe how racist and anti-racist discourse are directly in opposition to each other 
online. An idea would be to investigate counter-racist strategies, which usually take place 
in the form of corrections or humorous put-downs to the argument that racist discourse is 
‘just a joke’ (see Billig, 2001; Perez, 2013). As research has found that accusations of 
racism can stifle debate and lead to resistance on both sides (Every and Augoustinos 
2007), this becomes a circular argument of both parties issuing accusations with a vested 
interest in protecting self from receiving potential accusations. This supports the argument 
by Billig (1991) that specific accounts are designed to counter competing alternative 
arguments. Every (2013) found that anti-racism Facebook pages were used to circulate and 
expose Australian racist material with the intention of racist discourse being censored in 
future. This could be an emerging anti-racism strategy. 
As discussed in chapter three, one of the problems with counter-arguments over racism is 
developing effective anti-racist practises without abruptly stifling conversation or making 
accusations of racism, both of which have been identified as being damaging for anti-
racists (Goodman, 2014). If people feel under attack they may not listen or respond to anti-
racism arguments (Pederson, Paradies, Hartley, and Dunn, 2011). Rather than stifling 
debate or constructing arguments such as a lack of intelligence, anti-racist arguments could 
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focus on highlighting the benefits of diversity in Britain and raising cultural awareness. 
Another problem with anti-racist discourse is the number of different definitions of terms 
such as racism and Islamophobia, therefore the difficulty is constructing counter-
arguments to challenge specific definitions (Every and Augoustinos 2007).  However, 
opposing far-right extremism does require knowledge of the structure of arguments used 
by the far-right in order to develop effective counter-arguments (Wood and Finlay, 2008), 
which is why my research is of importance.  
10. 7 Concluding Remarks  
What has emerged from the discourse of far-right Facebook pages is that it is not Islamic 
extremists being targeted, as the far-right try to uphold, but ordinary, everyday Muslims as 
well as Jews. The support towards Jews has been used to present Islam as dangerous to 
British society. The consequences of such discourse do not lie just within the boundaries of 
social media. Unger, Wodak and KhosraviNik (2016) argued that the online world should 
not be treated as independent from the ‘offline’ world, and that the social context behind 
internet discourse needs to be considered:  
“we view the participatory Web as part of a media apparatus which is used by individuals in 
society, hence we do not treat digitally mediated texts as part of a “virtual” world that is separate 
from the physical world and “reality”, despite acknowledging that digitally‐ mediated contexts 
have specific features that may affect our analyses” (Unger et al., 2016). 
At the time of writing, MPs are suggesting that Britain First should be listed as a terrorist 
organisation following the murder of Labour MP Jo Cox by white supremacist Thomas 
Mair28, with researchers suggesting that the media is putting too much emphasis on Islamic 
extremism, and not enough on far-right extremism (Abbas, 2017). The possible connection 
of this murder to Britain First due to Mair shouting “put Britain First” during the killing, has 
left Britain First in yet another damaging position. Golding at the time of writing, has 
temporarily stood down as leader29. It may be that Britain First in the future are a redundant 
‘predecessor’ far-right party, as was witnessed with the BNP during data collection. But 
what has been shown, is that the scope of this research has implications outside of social 
                                                          
28 http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/britain-first-terrorist-organisation-listed-lousie-haigh-
jo-cox-thomas-mair-labour-mp-a7439036.html 
29 https://www.britainfirst.org/jayda-fransen-temporarily-assumes-leadership-of-britain-first/ 
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media. The interest of CDP does not just lie with online communication, but the 
consequences of the discourse itself, as KhosravaNik (forthcoming: 5) argues: “We are not 
only interested in what happens in media per se but in how it may shape and influence social 
and political sphere of our life worlds.” 
Previous research has shown that anonymity can lead to extreme language online 
(Bomberger, 2004; Burke and Goodman 2012) and it used to be that Facebook discourse 
was under less public scrutiny in comparison to media discourse. Politicians do not have that 
anonymity, yet the now elected president of the United States Donald Trump demonstrates 
the frequent use of extreme language online. While previous research (Billig 1982) proposed 
that politicians present themselves as neutral in order to be able to frame extreme discourse 
as non-extreme, yet Donald Trump has shown the contrary; that a politician can portray hate 
speech and still be popular. Such discourse (for example, Islamophobic rhetoric) has filtered 
into the mainstream, with it no longer being just a feature of far-right discourse. With 
Trump’s Twitter account having 19.9 million followers at the time of writing (a figure that 
is steadily increasing)30, the question can be asked whether Trump would be President 
without the power of social media; a figure that can be popular whilst simultaneously being 
accused of being fascist. Trump’s election and the result of Brexit only provide more groups 
that will be marginalised; marginalisation that is filtering into mainstream political 
discourse.   
  
                                                          
30 https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump?lang=en 
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Appendix A: Outline of Data Corpus 
 
English Defence League 
Facebook Posts  
Title of post  Date No of 
comments 
1. Gay Muslim 13.3.14 33 
2. Wake up Britain 16.3.14 25 
3. British Girls on Pilgrimage at risk from Jihadists  16.3.14 32 
4. Man charged with Redditch murder 17.3.4 33 
5. Somalia Jihadists behead Mother of two girls  17.3.14 34 
6. Plans to build Muslim cemetery  17.3.14 74 
7. Telegraph article: British Muslim women don’t need 
feminism  
17.3.14 50 
8. Another old church gone to Islam  17.3.14 75 
9. BBC article: Two face genital mutilation charges  21.3.14 56 
10. Stop Jihadists entering this country 21.3.14 31 
11. Telegraph article: Christians should copy Muslims  21.3.14 43 
12. Woman threw acid in friend’s face disguised in veil  21.3.14 27 
13. Balaclava raiders invade mosque: Inside Job? 21.3.14 77 
14. Daily Mail Article: Islamic teacher who sexually 
abused girl spared jail  
22.3.14 143 
15. Promotion of website 23.3.14 18 
16. Islamic law to be adopted by solicitors: Creeping 
Sharias? 
23.3.14 76 
17. Telegraph article: Government intervenes at school 
taken over by Muslim radicals 
23.3.14 38 
18. Rebel Catholic priest confesses to gay sham marriage  23.3.14 52 
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19. School spends £70,000 on speakers to call Muslims to 
prayer 
23.3.14 58 
20. Express article: Islamic law denying women and 
unbelievers inheritance  
23.3.14 74 
21. Channel 4: what is life like for Muslim lesbian 
women? 
24.3.14 27 
22. LGBT blasts Muslim mosque leader for linking 
homosexuality to paedophilia  
24.3.14 91 
23. Sharia Law means less human rights  25.3.14 49 
24. First Halal sweet and takeaway to open in Scunthorpe  26.3.14 36 
25. Women’s meeting-self segregation 27.3.14 62 
26. Passenger doing chin ups on bus after a woman victim 
of racist attack  
27.3.14 38 
27. Police ready for mosque protests in Sunderland 28.3.14 23 
28. Peterborough demo preparations 28.3.14 12 
29. Rising number of ‘convenience Muslims’ behind bars 1.4.14 39 
30. British woman jailed for insulting Islam on Facebook 2.4.14 33 
31. Former Arsenal player films Jihad video 4.4.14 67 
32. There is no such thing as peaceful moderate Muslim 5.4.14 75 
33. Children should not be forced to starve for Ramadan 6.4.14 66 
34. David Cameron’s adviser is Muslim brotherhood 
founder’s grandson 
10.4.14 72 
35. New Islamic school to open in Batley 10.4.14 89 
36. PM won’t intervene on meat labels 8.5.14 110 
37. Anti-Fascists accuse EDL of exploiting Lee Rigby  19.5.14 110 
38. Muslim school refuses to deal with governors 27.5.14 34 
39. West Ham mosque 27.5.14 45 
40. Racism on the rise: bad press 28.5.14 102 
41. Website promotion  29.5.14 29 
42. Brothers stoned pregnant sister to death 30.5.14 54 
43. Attack on Catholic Church in Central African 
Republic  
31.5.14 34 
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44. Queen’s speech to mention crackdown on extremists 
with British links who’ve travelled to Syria 
1.6.14 37 
45. Parliament plea for Muslim and Hindu bank holiday 1.6.14 118 
46. Everyone is welcome in the EDL  2.6.14 54 
47. Extra officers for Stevenage 5.6.14 43 
48. You say that I am racist because… 7.6.14 56 
49. West Ham mosque public inquiry 11.6.14 29 
50. Middlesbrough public enquiry 11.6.14 18 
51. London’s 20 most popular  12.6.14 6 
52. Animal welfare should come before 7th century 
superstition 
13.6.14 12 
53. Soldiers secretly being fed Halal meat  13.6.14 47 
54. Be more British Cameron tells Muslims 13.6.14 35 
55. Woman abused after asking children to stop swearing 17.6.14 33 
56. Middlesbrough demo 18.6.14 7 
57. British Jihad call for UK Muslims to join ISIS  20.6.14 153 
58. Peterborough pair jailed for sexually abusing teenagers 20.6.14 60 
59. West Midlands division 20.6.14 5 
60. New Oakes cemetery  20.6.14 48 
61. Charges over child sex exploitation 26.6.14 38 
62. Abu Qatada not guilty over terror plot 26.6.14 45 
63. Abu Qatada will not come back 26.6.14 63 
64. English Defence League Five years old  27.6.14 44 
65. NHS worker bullied Muslim by praying for her 29.6.14 35 
66. France bans Muslim veil  1.7.14 93 
67. Britain’s treatment of the Muslim brotherhood is cack 
handed 
2.7.14 15 
68. UK airports on alert after plan to bring jet down 3.7.14 32 
69. Amir Kahn arrested  4.7.14 135 
70. Graffiti on 7/7 memorial  7.7.14 39 
71. Christians should marry Muslims 9.7.14 194 
72. Michael Adebowale moved to hospital 13.7.14 84 
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73. Independent article: children’s books are too white 14.7.14 61 
74. Muslim campaigning to ban the burka 17.7.14 87 
75. English population being ethnically cleansed  18.7.14 121 
76. Halesowen mosque dome rejected 21.7.14 48 
77. Christian in Iran to have lips burnt for eating during 
Ramadan 
23.7.14 76 
78. End of Ramadan 24.7.14 34 
79. Government spends £80,000 sending Romanian 
migrants back to Romania and Bulgaria  
28.7.14 78 
80. Batley 28.7.14 43 
81. George Galloway and his friend 28.7.14 83 
82. Muslim quits UKIP after racism claim 15.8.14 57 
83. How it feels to chop off infidels’ heads revealed in 
chatroom 
17.8.14 18 
84. Did your grandparents fight two world wars… 26.8.14 42 
85. Get to Rotherham police station 27.8.14 29 
86. Rotherham police station update 27.8.14 25 
87. Only 10% of an iceberg sits above water 28.8.14 29 
88. How many thousands of girls must be savagely 
raped… 
28.8.14 25 
89. Rotherham demo 29.8.14 39 
90. Sikhs supporting the EDL in Rotherham 29.8.14 114 
91. Shout out to Andrew Edge 29.8.14 43 
92. Guardian article: The Blame game 31.8.14 41 
93. How to become involved in the EDL 31.8.14 58 
94. Police plan mass raid on sex gangs 31.8.14 190 
95. Virgins in paradise 1.9.14 33 
96. justice carpet 1.9.14 18 
97. UAF countering Rotherham 2.9.14 145 
98. UK social worker exposes Pakistani sex ring 3.9.14 33 
99. Thousands of patriots on the streets 13.9.14 40 
100. Teenager banned from exams for wearing 
niqab  
23.9.14 276 
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101. Pakistani Christians 24.9.14 70 
102. Bridgewater mosque wins council cash 24.9.14 97 
103. UK on the road to war with Islamic state 25.9.14 89 
104. Controversy over freedom of speech 27.9.14 180 
105. Iraqi asylum seekers rent out London flats 28.9.14 34 
106. Calling them Asian 14.10.14 39 
107. 75% groomers are Asian 17.10.14 111 
108. Morrison’s force poppy seller to stand outside  27.10.14 109 
109. Daily Mail article: poppy burner enjoys life of 
benefits 
29.10.14 359 
110. Manchester teacher admits terrorism plot 29.10.14 32 
111. Leeds/Rotherham demos 6.11.14 10 
112. Soaring fuel bills will kill pensioners 18.11.14 212 
113. Luton the Return 20.11.14 24 
114. Luton demo 20.11.14 5 
115. Dudley and Manchester demo 29.11.14 10 
116. I heard a young girl lost her head… 29.11.14 44 
117. British Muslims suffer job discrimination: cry 
me a river 
30.11.14 97 
118. Muhammed the most common baby name 1.12.14 163 
119. UK pub crisis Muslims to blame  4.12.14 53 
120. Mass polygamy in UK Muslim community 10.12.14 48 
121. EDL Luton protest 29.12.14 24 
122. Muslim faith schools cause divisions in society 1.1.15 12 
123. Psychologist claims Islam root cause of rape 
wave 
1.1.15 29 
124. Sweden hit by third arson mosque attack 2.1.15 194 
125. ISIS fighters contract Ebola  2.1.15 71 
126. ISIS plans to take control of Spain 2.1.15 79 
127. Molested boy found hanged in mosque 3.1.15 92 
128. Migrant killers and rapists could be flooding 
into Britain 
5.1.15 99 
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129. Another terrorist attack in France 7.1.15 50 
130. Shot fires at French magazine HQ 7.1.15 20 
131. I am Charlie 8.1.15 65 
132. Another terrorist attack in France today 9.1.15 55 
133. New mosque ban in Padua after Paris attack 9.1.15 93 
134. Murdoch says Muslims should be held 
responsible   for ‘Jihadist cancer’ 
11.1.15 152 
135. Sikhs are not Moslem 11.1.15 21 
136. While Jews are slaughtered the left worry about 
Islamophobia 
14.1.15 50 
137. That card must be getting very heavy 15.1.15 238 
138. Tony Blair: Force is necessary to combat 
extremist Islam 
16.1.15 55 
139. Islamists are just 21st century fascists 16.1.15 43 
140. Cameron says pope is wrong to suggest 
punching people who mock Islam 
18.1.15 173 
141. Fury over plans to use taxpayers’ money to 
fund halal abattoir  
25.1.15 88 
142. 70 years after its liberation, a drone captures 
the Auschwitz we should never forget 
28.1.15 59 
143. Porn obsessed Jihadists are literally wankers, 
says Boris 
30.1.15 52 
 
Facebook photos  
Title Date  Number 
of 
comments  
1. No Islamic studies in English Primary schools  5.3.14 348 
2. Peterborough demo 6.3.14 14 
3. Forgive me Allah 14.3.14 204 
4. Topless protesters  21.3.14 80 
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5. Loud and proud: we’re coming  26.3.14 11 
6. Peterborough demo 26.3.14 34 
7. We’re coming: demo eve  28.3.14 30 
8. Londonistan 2055  28.3.14 263 
9. Peterborough Demo 29.3.14 62 
10. Happy Mother’s Day  30.3.14 1 
11. We are Sikhs  5.4.14 198 
12. St George’s day 22.4.14 22 
13. Subway Sharia controlled zone 1.5.14 261 
14. I love real bacon 6.5.14 53 
15. Eating takeaway pizza 7.5.14 185 
16. Cover photo-Stevenage  18.5.14 7 
17. Lee Rigby Never Forget a 20.5.14 61 
18. Sikh bikers support EDL  21.5.14 - 
19. How do you justify calling us right wing  26.5.14 78 
20. Stevenage 26.5.14 6 
21. Middlesbrough 2.6.14 2 
22. We support the British Sikhs  4.6.14 40 
23. Middlesbrough 7.6.14 16 
24. Rik Mayall 9.6.14 25 
25. This is England 10.6.14 70 
26. From Evolution 10.6.4 - 
27. Enough is enough 10.6.14 - 
28. Supporting the EDL is not racist 11.6.14 - 
29. We told you so Mr Cameron 24.6.14 22 
30. Muslimbrough 24.6.14 11 
31. Churchill 25.6.14 - 
32. Lefty flags 25.6.14 - 
33. Right wing? No 25.6.14 - 
34. Sharia Police? 25.6.14 - 
35. Politics is no longer right v left 26.6.14 - 
36. Lloyds TSB Islamic account 26.6.14 - 
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37. Fascists united  26.6.14 - 
38. Newsflash 2015 26.6.14 - 
39. Two tier newsflash 26.6.14 - 
40. Truth, the new hate speech 26.6.14 - 
41. We paid a heavy price for your freedom  26.6.14 - 
42. Flag Cover page  29.6.14 19 
43. Batley demo 29.6.14 43 
44. Independence Day 4.7.14 7 
45. More people came to Britain in 2013… 4.7.14 125 
46. 9th anniversary of terrorist attacks in London  6.7.15 62 
47. 7th July 2005 always remembered  6.7.15 2 
48. There is no such thing as Islamophobia  10.7.15 23 
49. Join  10.7.14 4 
50. Who am I 18.7.14 141 
51. It’s an invasion  25.7.14 55 
52. Stop Halal cruelty 7.8.14 23 
53. Why is it acceptable to leftards…  7.8.14 50 
54. . I should not be classed as…  7.8.14 54 
55. George Galloway free zone 8.8.14 53 
56. Where are the UAF 9.8.14 168 
57. Know the difference: Sikh and Muslim-comments 
separate 
10.8.14 230 
58. Bournemouth cover photo 10.8.14 25 
59. Bournemouth demo 21.8.14 1 
60. Religious symbols cartoon 24.8.14 34 
61. Downing Street: We’re coming down the road 24.8.14 17 
62. Silence is the loudest cry 27.8.14 16 
63. Justice for the 1400 27.8.14 78 
64. Metropolitan Police 27.8.14 24 
65. Rotherham demo 28.8.14 61 
66. Justice for the Rotherham 1400 29.8.14 14 
67. We demand justice for the 1400 29.8.14 37 
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68. Muslim paedophile gangs 29.8.14 29 
69. Justice for the 1400 29.8.14 52 
70. Not afraid to speak out 29.8.14 83 
71. 1400 kids my age 30.8.14 49 
72. Downing Street demo  1.9.14 14 
73. UAF scum 2.9.14 53 
74. UAF counter protest 2.9.14 181 
75. Congrats William and Kate 8.9.14 60 
76. Stamping out child abuse 10.9.14 28 
77. 11th Sept-never forget 11.9.14 80 
78. The EDL have landed 13.9.14 166 
79. London demo 14.9.14 15 
80. Profile pic 23.9.14 6 
81. Peppa Pig 24.9.14 91 
82. Not insulting, but describing Islam 25.9.14 36 
83. Birmingham 27.9.14 20 
84. Now recruiting 29.9.14 80 
85. Demonstration poll 2.10.14 125 
86. Shirt worn by a WW2 veteran 7.10.14 37 
87. Demo group photo 12.10.14 8 
88. Demo photo 12.10.14 19 
89. Demo photo 13.10.14 11 
90. Anjem Choudary tweet 17.10.14 128 
91. Ladbrokes refuse to sell poppies 22.10.14 211 
92. Luton demo 25.10.14 35 
93. Whose streets? 31.10.14 27 
94. We’re coming down the road 28.10.14 23 
95. Muslims and Nazis 20.10.14 400 
96. Join the EDL angels  4.11.14 16 
97. Make a stand against Militant Islam 7.11.14 23 
98. St Edmund 20.11.14 7 
99. Luton 22.11.14 53 
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100. Commies who tried to destroy Luton 23.11.14 57 
101. Logo 26.11.14 2 
102. Merry Christmas 27.11.14 1 
103. Dudley Demo 29.11.14 7 
104. Remembering Sir Winston Churchill 30.11.14 51 
105. Dudley demo 30.11.14 - 
106. A picture is a thousand words 2.12.14 169 
107. Merry Christmas from the EDL  3.12.14 17 
108. Britain embraces diversity 4.12.14 98 
109. Christmas baubles 6.12.14 2 
110. Dudley cover photo 7.12.14 54 
111. List of Islamic terror attacks in past 30 days 17.12.14 62 
112. Twitter  17.12.14 2 
113. 3 attacks in 3 days in France  22.12.14 39 
114. Merry Christmas  23.12.14 20 
115. Christmas e-card 24.12.14 2 
116. Merry Christmas 25.12.14 36 
117. Happy new year 31.12.14 46 
118. Happy new year 1.1.15 7 
119. Join us 3.1.15 5 
120. ISIS cartoon 7.1.15 173 
121. Hebdo cartoon  7.1.15 255 
122. Je Suis Charlie 7.1.15 14 
123. Dudley Demo 13.1.15 15 
124. A Charlie Hebdo here would put Farage in no 
10 
14.1.15 49 
125. Why should I respect your culture 19.1.15 16 
126. Rest in Peace Anne Kirkbridge  20.1.15 14 
127. Churchill: still a legend 24.1.15 55 
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Facebook Videos 
Title Date Comments 
1. The new national Anthem  26.6.14 92 
2. Rotherham Paedophiles 13th September  1.8.14 7 
3. Citizen Steve Farewell my England  27.10.14 21 
4. Luton demonstration promotion 18.11.14 81 
5. Luton demonstration 23.11.14 60 
 
British National Party 
Facebook Posts 
Title  Date No of 
comments 
1. Take action over Pizza Express and Halal 8.5.14 283 
2. VE day 11.5.14 38 
3. Stunning BNP victory 24.5.14 74 
4. No to anti-white racism 3.6.14 276 
5. Passing the buck, police won’t take responsibility 
over rape of 16-year-old girl 
20.6.14 28 
6. Thank you to our brave service men and women 28.6.14 28 
7. Islamist preacher London council house 30.6.14 521 
8. 435, 760 asylum claims in the last year 11.7.14 22 
9. BNP treasurer 31.7.14 27 
10. Bolton against Islamification 3.8.14 54 
11. Give Johnny Johnston a knighthood 17.8.14 91 
12. British people a nation of animal lovers 16.9.14 37 
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13. Out of Africa 7.10.14 8 
14. Great work by Simon Darby 25.10.14 79 
15. Cameron wants to see an Asian prime minister 6.11.14 83 
16. Burnley man in court on sex charges 19.11.14 51 
17. Government attacks kids for being “too English” 20.11.14 31 
18. Police appeal in search of missing sex offender 9.1.15 130 
 
Facebook Photos 
Title Date No of 
Comments 
1. Donate  1.3.14 5 
2. Another black footballer plays the race card 2.3.14 146 
3. Name needed for mascot  2.3.14 433 
4. Close the borders now  4.3.14 63 
5. Halal meat 4.3.14 66 
6. Tougher penalties for animal abusers 7.3.14 25 
7. Happy St. Patrick’s Day  17.3.14 31 
8. We fight grooming gangs 24.3.14 16 
9. UKIP are not against immigration 2.4.14 45 
10. Boycott labour  2.4.14 47 
11. Boycott conservatives 4.4.14 56 
12. Stop the invasion comments separate  12.4.14 193 
13. Roma gypsy gangs  21.4.14 121 
14. St George’s day  23.4.14 62 
15. BNP lead UKIP follow comments separate  24.4.14 18 
16. Coming soon 25.4.14 2 
17. Con men 28.4.14 56 
18. Broadcast today  29.4.14 6 
19. BNP broadcast banned 29.4.14 22 
20. Broadcast banned 30.4.14 79 
21. Don’t keep calm 2.5.14 41 
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22. Eye photo 2.5.14 1 
23. 26 million people 8.5.14 95 
24. No more mosques 11.5.14 22 
25. Run ‘em out of Scotland 12.5.14 30 
26. Say hello to Enoch Powell 17.5.14 143 
27. RIP Lee Rigby  22.5.14 465 
28. BNP on sexuality 4.6.14 112 
29. 2014 election win  4.6.14 66 
30. You know these types 5.6.14 77 
31. Remembering D-Day  6.6.14 25 
32. Happy birthday Captain Scott  6.6.14 32 
33. Happy birthday George Stevenson  9.6.14 29 
34. Wake up! Rise!63 12.6.14 85 
35. Boot out the bosses 12.6.14 77 
36. Happy birthday James Clerk Maxwell  13.6.14 25 
37. Love Europe 14.6.14 100 
38. Never surrender 14.6.14 77 
39. Happy birthday Enoch Powell  16.6.14 160 
40. Happy birthday John Wesley 17.6.14 18 
41. Happy birthday George Mallory 19.4.14 36 
42. Scottish blood English heart 22.6.14 100 
43. Happy Birthday Alan Turing 23.6.14 51 
44. Labour’s ethnic cleansing 4.7.14 197 
45. Islamification? No thanks 15.7.14 195 
46. Happy birthday Emmeline Pankhurst  15.7.14 42 
47. Flawless BNP account  31.7.14 27 
48. Happy Lammastide  1.8.14 19 
49. No, I’ll not sit by… 2.8.14 229 
50. Happy birthday Alexander Fleming  6.8.14 28 
51. Happy birthday Enid Blyton  11.8.14 43 
52. Happy birthday John Logie Baird  13.8.14 41 
53. Happy birthday Henry V  16.9.14 70 
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54. Close the borders now 19.8.14 122 
55. Time for Action 22.8.14 110 
56. Happy birthday William Wallace  23.8.14 143 
57. Fresh meat 28.8.14 16 
58. Cover up of the rape of 1400 girls 12.9.14 38 
59. Happy birthday Horatio Nelson 29.9.14 131 
60. Islamist time bomb leaflets 1.10.14 28 
61. Rebecca will be an ethnic minority 1.10.14 21 
62. When we didn’t have to apologise 6.10.14 212 
63. Join the winning team 17.10.14 15 
64. Happy birthday Bill Oddie  20.10.14 21,000 
65. Happy birthday Alfred the Great 25.10.14 148 
66. Remembering our heroes  4.11.14 9 
67. We will remember them  11.11.14 36 
68. Happy birthday David Stirling 15.11.14 101 
69. Happy birthday Bernard Montomery 17.11.14 78 
70. I heart GB but… 20.11.14 57 
71. Labour party 29.11.14 45 
72. Enoch Powell was right 4.11.14 140 
73. Logo 4.11.14 60 
74. Blame it on the immigrants  12.11.14 - 
75. Defend the rev 12.11.14 91 
76. White Christmas 2.12.14 139 
77. White taxi drivers only 12.12.14 19 
78. Protecting our Christmas 15.12.14 17 
79. Merry Christmas  23.12.14 37 
80. Get out of the EU 1.1.15 77 
81. Happy birthday Sir Isaac Newton  4.1.15 24 
82. British jobs for British workers 5.1.15 76 
83. NHS in crisis 7.1.5 56 
84. Solidarity with our Gallic cousins 8.1.15 137 
85. Time for Action 13.1.15 30 
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86. Stop mass immigration 16.1.15 107 
 
Facebook videos 
Title Date No of Comments 
1. Banned Broadcast  May 2014 - 
2. Uncensored Broadcast  13.5.14 139 
 
Britain First 
Facebook Posts  
Title  Date No of 
comments 
1. Iraqi illegal immigrant guilty of rape and robbery 13.3.14 111 
2. Britain has lost every attempt to stop new laws since 
Brussels since 1996 
25.3.14 32 
3. British Hindus starting to rally behind Britain First 10.4.14 247 
4. British First has quietly become most popular UK 
political party on Facebook 
21.5.14 190 
5. Don’t unpack you’re going back 8.12.14 21 
6. Policewoman deliberately hit by car in Paris 15.1.15 53 
7. British Jihadist warns of more attacks 15.1.15 88 
8. Taliban hunting hoodie 16.1.15 32 
9. Christian patrol in East London mosque 16.1.15 158 
10. Homeless veteran appeal 17.1.15 128 
11. Iranian footballers warned by Islamic regime for 
posing for selfies 
19.1.15 82 
12. Sign up 21.1.15 82 
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Facebook photos 
Title  Date No of 
comments 
1. Animal offenders list 1.3.14 8 
2. Happy St David’s day 1.3.14 31 
3. Anjem Choudary 3.3.14 - 
4. With more of this there would be less of this 4.3.14 120 
5. Ash Wednesday 5.3.14 32 
6. Ban the Burka 5.3.14 42 
7. Dude I’m joking… 5.3.14 19 
8. Enoch Powell was right 7.3.14 - 
9. Wizard of Oz 7.3.14 27 
10. I heart GB but… 8.3.14 - 
11. I want you… 11.3.14 - 
12. Lee Rigby memorial 11.3.14 - 
13. The phoenix has risen 13.3.14 24 
14. Ulster is British 14.3.14 - 
15. Made in Britain 17.3.14 40 
16. Happy St Patrick’s day  17.3.14 7 
17. You are entering a Sharia free zone 19.3.14 68 
18. Happy birthday Vera Lynn  20.3.14 - 
19. Britannia Ball 23.3.14 33 
20. Rest in Peace all who died on Malaysian plane 24.3.14 111 
21. Flags 25.3.14 65 
22. Isn’t it weird… 25.3.14 - 
23. Translator at benefits office 26.3.14 - 
24. Islamification: coming to a school near you 25.3.14 - 
25. Happy Mother’s Day  30.3.14 - 
26. World Autism Day  2.4.14 - 
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27. I am a closet Brit 5.4.14 - 
28. Britain and India 5.4.14 - 
29. Holy Bible 6.4.14 - 
30. RIP Peaches Geldof  7.4.14 - 
31. Palm Sunday 13.4.14 - 
32. Iron lady 15.4.14 - 
33. Hillsborough  15.4.14 - 
34. Hey Taliban… 16.4.14 35 
35. Christian commandment 16.4.14 4 
36. Counter Jihad mosque 18.4.14 12 
37. Happy Easter  20.4.14 77 
38. Happy birthday to the Queen  21.4.14 - 
39. Those who act like sheep will be eaten by wolves 22.4.14 85 
40. Happy St George’s Day  23.4.14 76 
41. Queen and country 24.4.14 130 
42. Counter demonstration outside Saudi embassy  26.4.14 35 
43. Tell your grandchildren you did nothing 29.4.14 167 
44. RIP Bob Hoskins 30.4.14 - 
45. Don’t just keep calm 29.4.14  
46. Vive le France 26.5.14 190 
47. Racist? 3.6.14 172 
48. St George 4.6.14 136 
49. D day  6.6.14 - 
50. RIP Rik Mayall  9.6.14 - 
51. Martin Luther King 12.6.14 79 
52. Weeping 12.6.14 - 
53. Happy Father’s Day 15.6.14 - 
54. Gandhi 18.6.14 82 
55. Peace sign 19.6.14 134 
56. Happy birthday William  21.6.14 - 
57. The next generation  23.6.14 150 
58. Peace group photo 25.6.14 91 
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59. Peace group photo 26.6.14 86 
60. This person is British and proud 26.6.14 117 
61. Coventry 1.7.14 - 
62. Hope not soap 4.7.14 - 
63. Remember 7th July 7.7.14 - 
64. Time to Rise 22.7.14 53 
65. I hope they never find life on any other planet 26.7.14 112 
66. Anjem Choudary: Pure evil 3.8.14 205 
67. Illegal immigrants versus Old age pensioners 11.8.14 258 
68. RIP Lauren Bacall 13.8.14 - 
69. Political correctness is fascism pretending to be 
manners 
16.8.14 61 
70. Benefits Street 18.8.14 - 
71. Politically correct  August 
2014 
- 
72. I’m a tolerant liberal 7.9.14 - 
73. Congratulations Will and Kate  8.9.14 - 
74. September 11th  11.9.13 - 
75. Campaign to save union in Edinburgh 13.9.14 - 
76. Bagpipe player 13.9.14 - 
77. South shields 13.9.14 35 
78. Christian Sunday 21.9.14 - 
79. Put British people first 30.10.14 65 
80. Nick Robinson 21.11.14 11 
81. Group photo 22.11.14 6 
82. St Andrew’s day  30.11.14 61 
83. Welsh activists spreading the message 18.1.15 - 
84. T-shirt 20.12.14 44 
85. Merry Christmas  24.12.14 80 
86. Happy new year  31.12.14 158 
87. Russel and Brand 18.1.15 501 
88. You think I’m just going to hand over my country? 23.1.15 91 
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89. Nobody needs to coin the term 23.1.15 86 
90. Censored 26.1.15 104 
91. Sharing Jesus  26.1.15 111 
92. Obama: Islam’s Trojan horse 27.1.15 256 
93. It is not racist to criticize a religion 29.1.15 264 
94. Jayda being interviewed 30.1.15 39 
95. America is calling 31.1.15 67 
96. Scottish activists 31.1.15 40 
 
Facebook Videos 
Title Date No of Comments 
1. First political party 
broadcast  
2.6.14 - 
2. Geert Wilders on the 
Islamic terror attacks in 
Paris 
17.1.15 384 
3. Solidarity Patrol in 
support of the Jewish 
Community  
31.1.15 436 
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Appendix B: Transcription Symbols 
 
Taken from Jefferson, G. (2004). Glossary of transcript symbols with an introduction. In 
G. H. Lerner (Ed.), Conversation Analysis: Studies from the First Generation (pp: 13-31).  
Amsterdam: John Benjamin. 
 
(.) A full stop inside brackets denotes a micro pause, a notable pause but of no significant 
length. 
hh, hh in-breath (note the preceding full stop) and out-breath respectively. 
Word, Underlined sounds are louder, or emphasised  
WORD  capitals louder or shouted 
> < Arrows surrounding talk like these, show that the pace of the speech has quickened 
< > Arrows in this direction show that the pace of the speech has slowed down 
(Word) a word within single brackets indicates the transcriber’s guess at an unclear 
fragment of talk 
 (( )) Where double brackets appear with a description inserted denotes some contextual 
information where no symbol of representation was available. 
↑ When an upward arrow appears it means there is a rise in intonation 
↓ When a downward arrow appears it means there is a drop in intonation 
= The equal sign represents latched speech, a continuation of talk 
: Colons appear to represent elongated speech, a stretched sound 
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Appendix C: Transcript of English 
Defence League Discussion 
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